When the Yugoslav Crisis Became International: Germany, the United States, the European Community, and the Question of Recognition

Before recognition, the West supported Yugoslavia as a whole

Today it can appear as though Western states supported Yugoslavia’s breakup from the beginning. The documents do not show such a simple story. Even during the first half of 1991, Washington and the European Community publicly supported: democratization, a peaceful political solution, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and an agreement among the republics. The U.S. government opposed the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia because it believed such a process could trigger a broader conflict.[1]

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker spoke in Belgrade on 21 June 1991 with the leaders of the federation and all six republics. His message was twofold: the United States supported democracy and the right of people to express their political will, but it did not want a unilateral breakup of the state without agreement.[1][2]

The European Community, too, was still defending the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia shortly before the declarations of independence, while at the same time increasingly emphasizing the right of the republics and peoples to determine their political future peacefully and democratically.[3] This was the fundamental contradiction of international policy in 1991: self-determination and territorial integrity were both recognized principles — the problem was what to do when they came into conflict. June 1991: a declaration of independence did not mean automatic recognition.

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. But internationally they did not automatically become generally recognized states the following day. The United States still treated them as republics within Yugoslavia.[4] Most members of the European Community were likewise not ready for immediate recognition. In Slovenia, an armed conflict with the Yugoslav People’s Army began almost immediately. In Croatia, clashes among Croatian forces, insurgent Serbian structures, and the JNA expanded and in the following months developed into a far more serious war. This is essential to the later debate. By the time the European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, almost seven months had passed since their declarations of independence.

The war in Croatia had by then been raging for months. International recognition in January 1992 therefore cannot explain the beginning of the war in June or the summer of 1991. But another question can still be asked: how did the recognition decision affect the subsequent political and military dynamics of the breakup? Brioni: Europe first tries to freeze the breakup.

On 7 July 1991, the ministerial troika of the European Community reached an agreement with the parties to the Yugoslav crisis on the Brioni islands. The Brioni Declaration was notable precisely because it did not simply choose one side. It stated: that only the peoples of Yugoslavia could decide their future; that a solution had to emerge through negotiations; that human rights and self-determination had to be respected; but also the principles of international law concerning territorial integrity; and that all parties had to refrain from unilateral, especially violent, action.[5]

Slovenia and Croatia postponed implementation of part of their independence decisions for three months. The European Community wanted to create time for political negotiations. This was still a period when the main Western strategy was: stop the shooting and reach an agreement on Yugoslavia’s future form. Recognition of new states was not yet the central instrument of policy.

Slovenia and Croatia became two very different cases in the summer of 1991

The Slovenian conflict lasted roughly ten days. The JNA then withdrew. Slovenia did not have a large internal ethnic or territorial conflict comparable to Croatia’s. Croatia was different. A large part of Croatia’s Serb population rejected secession from Yugoslavia or the authority of the new Croatian state. Serbian autonomous or separatist structures were created. The JNA gradually became more closely aligned with the Serbian side in the conflict.[1] During the summer and autumn of 1991, the fighting spread rapidly.

That made the question of recognizing Croatia far more complicated than the question of Slovenia. If Croatia was recognized within its republican borders: what would happen to the Serbian population in areas that did not recognize the authority of Zagreb? If Croatia was not recognized: would that give an advantage to actors able to change facts on the ground through military force? This conflict among the republic’s right to self-determination, the rights of national communities, and the prohibition on changing borders through violence would become the center of European diplomacy. The Hague Conference: an attempt to turn breakup into agreement.

At the end of August 1991, the European Community convened a peace conference on Yugoslavia. Its first major meeting took place in The Hague in September under the chairmanship of former British foreign secretary Lord Peter Carrington.[6] At the same table sat: representatives of the federal state, the presidents of the republics, and representatives of the European Community. The conference rested on three key principles: borders must not be changed unilaterally by force;

the rights of all people and communities must be protected; the legitimate aspirations of the republics and peoples had to be incorporated into a political settlement.[6] The Carrington process tried to find a new form of relations among the republics. This was no longer simply a project to preserve the old Yugoslavia. By the autumn of 1991 it was increasingly clear that the final outcome could also be a very loose association or the creation of independent states. But the objective remained: to reach the new situation through negotiation, not war.

The Badinter Commission: lawyers are asked whether Yugoslavia still exists as a functioning federation

Within the Hague conference, an Arbitration Commission of five presidents of constitutional courts from European Community states was established. It was chaired by Robert Badinter. Its task was not military or political mediation. It answered legal questions arising from the breakup. Its first opinion, issued on 29 November 1991, became highly significant. The Commission did not say that Slovenia and Croatia had simply carried out an ordinary secession from an otherwise normally functioning state. It concluded that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution.[7] That changed the legal perspective.

If the federation was dissolving as a whole, the question was no longer only: “Does an individual republic have the right to leave Yugoslavia?” but rather: “Which states emerge from the federation’s dissolution, and which obligations and borders do they inherit?” That distinction became very important for later recognition. Borders: why a republic could not simply take the territory of another republic.

In January 1992, the Badinter Commission also answered the question of borders. Its Opinion No. 3 applied the principle of uti possidetis: former internal republican borders would become the borders of the new states upon independence and could be changed only by agreement.[8] This meant: Croatia could seek recognition within the borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Serbia could not unilaterally change that border simply because Serbs lived on part of Croatian territory. At the same time, Opinion No. 2 emphasized that Serbian communities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were entitled to protection of their identity and to all internationally recognized minority rights.[9] This was an attempt to connect two principles:

the borders of the republics must not be changed through violence; minorities within those borders must be politically and legally protected. The question was whether both could be achieved on the ground. Germany begins to lose patience.

While the Hague conference was underway, the war in Croatia intensified. Germany increasingly advocated within the European Community for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. It was not the only state with this position, but by the end of 1991 it was its most visible advocate.[10] The German argument was essentially this: if the European Community refused to recognize republics whose populations had expressed a will for independence while borders were being changed through military force on the ground, non-recognition could end up rewarding the use of force. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl therefore spoke increasingly openly about Germany recognizing Slovenia and Croatia even without full European consensus.[11] This created a serious dispute inside the European Community.

Britain, France, and others feared a different problem

Some European Community states saw the situation differently. Britain, France, and the Netherlands were more cautious about rapid recognition.[10] Their argument was not necessarily: “Yugoslavia must remain together at any cost.” They were more concerned about sequencing. If the republics were recognized before a final peace settlement: would there still be an incentive for compromise? What would happen to Serbia and to Serbs outside Serbia?

What would happen to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there was no simple majority-national republic? Would recognition of one side transform the conflict from an internal constitutional crisis into a war between states without resolving the underlying political problem? UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar also warned Genscher in December 1991 that selective and premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia could complicate the peace process and increase the risk of the conflict spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.[12] Genscher answered with the opposite argument:

further delay could encourage actors trying to achieve political goals through military force.[12] This was a genuine diplomatic disagreement. Both sides claimed that their goal was to prevent a broader war. Germany did not decide for all of Europe — but it strongly changed the pace.

Popular explanations sometimes say: “Germany forced Europe to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.” At the other extreme: “Germany played no special role in the common European decision.” Historical research does not support such a black-and-white picture. By the end of 1991, Germany was the strongest advocate of rapid recognition. It publicly announced its willingness to act alone. That undoubtedly increased pressure on the other members of the European Community.[10][13] At the same time, however, European policy was also changing because of: the war in Croatia, failed ceasefires, the collapse of common federal institutions,

the Badinter Commission’s conclusion that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, and the broader end of the Cold War order in Europe.[7][10] This is why there is a genuine historical debate. Some scholars see the German move as a unilateral break with a common policy and as significant pressure on its partners.[13] Others note that by December 1991 wider European policy had already moved toward accepting the breakup and that recognition cannot be reduced to German will alone.[10][14] That is more useful than searching for a single external “culprit.”

16 December 1991: the European Community creates recognition rules

On 16 December 1991, the foreign ministers of the European Community adopted common guidelines for recognizing new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, together with a special declaration on Yugoslavia.[15] The republics were not to be recognized automatically. Conditions were imposed. A state seeking recognition had to commit, among other things, to: respect for democracy and the rule of law; human rights; the rights of national and ethnic minorities; the inviolability of borders, which could be changed only peacefully and by agreement;

international obligations; and the peaceful settlement of disputes.[15] The Yugoslav republics had until 23 December to indicate whether they sought recognition and accepted the conditions. Their applications were reviewed by the Badinter Commission. The implementation date for recognition decisions was set for 15 January 1992.[15] This was both politically and legally important. The European Community was trying to use recognition itself as an instrument of conditionality. Slovenia was legally the simplest case.

On 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission concluded that Slovenia met the European conditions for recognition.[16] It emphasized in particular: the will of the population expressed in a plebiscite; a constitutional commitment to human rights; respect for international law; and legal protection of the Italian and Hungarian minorities.[16] Slovenia also did not have an open territorial conflict on the scale of Croatia’s. For that reason, recognition of Slovenia was considerably less controversial among European states. Croatia was a different case.

In Croatia’s case, the Badinter Commission found that the constitutional framework then in force did not yet fully guarantee all minority safeguards envisaged by the European peace plan.[17] Its opinion was therefore not identical to the Slovenian one. The Commission requested additional guarantees for the rights of the Serbian population. Croatian President Franjo Tuđman subsequently sent the European Community additional commitments regarding minority protection.[18] The European states recognized Croatia on 15 January. This shows clearly that recognition was not merely a technical legal act. The Commission issued legal opinions. The final decision was made by states. Macedonia shows even more clearly that law was not the only factor.

The Badinter Commission concluded that the Republic of Macedonia also met the European conditions for recognition and that its name did not in itself imply territorial claims against another state.[19] Yet the European Community did not recognize it on 15 January. The main reason was the dispute with Greece over the name and symbolism of the new state.[20] This is a very important example. If European recognition had operated only as an automatic application of legal criteria, Macedonia would have been recognized at that time. It was not. Recognition was simultaneously: a legal issue, a political decision, and a diplomatic negotiation.

German recognition: an important chronological detail. Germany made the political decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia on 19 December 1991. On 23 December it formally communicated the decision to the two republics.[21] But the establishment of full diplomatic relations was coordinated with the European date of 15 January 1992.[21][22] It is therefore not entirely accurate to say either: “Germany recognized them only together with Europe on 15 January” or: “Germany had already carried out a completely separate recognition in December, unrelated to the EC.” Germany decided and formally announced its recognition earlier. The full diplomatic effect was coordinated with the European timetable. This detail captures well the combination of German pressure and European compromise.

15 January 1992: the European Community recognizes Slovenia and Croatia

On 15 January 1992, the member states of the European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.[20][22] Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were not recognized at that time. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission considered that the will of the population for independence had not yet been sufficiently clearly established and could be demonstrated through a referendum.[23] In Macedonia’s case, as noted above, the decision was blocked by the dispute with Greece even though the Commission believed it met the legal criteria.[19][20] European policy was therefore not a simple decision that: “all republics should become states.” It was a process of differentiated recognition. The United States did not follow Germany.

This is another important correction. If there had been a unified Western strategy aimed at breaking up Yugoslavia as quickly as possible, we would expect a similar timeline among the largest Western powers. There was none. Until the summer of 1991, the United States opposed the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia.[1][4] It later supported the European peace process but did not rush to formal recognition. The United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia only on 7 April 1992.[24] On the same day, it also recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina.[24] That was almost three months after the European Community’s recognition.

American policy therefore differed from European policy, especially Germany’s, in timing and degree of caution. The United States would later play an increasingly important role in the Yugoslav wars. But in 1991, the main diplomatic initiative was still European.[1]

The end of the Cold War changed Yugoslavia’s value

This article also connects back to Between East and West: How Yugoslavia Became Non-Aligned. During the Cold War, an independent socialist Yugoslavia had been strategically important to the West precisely because it did not belong to the Soviet bloc. By 1990–1991, that international position had changed fundamentally. The Berlin Wall had fallen. The communist regimes of Eastern Europe had collapsed. The Soviet Union was disintegrating. The U.S. State Department’s historical review of its own policy notes that, with the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost part of its former geostrategic importance to Washington.[1] This does not by itself prove that the West therefore wanted Yugoslavia to break up.

It does mean that an important reason why the stability of a non-aligned Yugoslavia had been a special Western strategic interest for decades had disappeared. The international environment in which the country had prospered in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s no longer existed.

Did recognition cause the war?

Here we have to be very precise. If by “war” we mean the beginning of armed conflict in Slovenia and Croatia: no. Those conflicts began in June and the summer of 1991. European recognition of Slovenia and Croatia took effect in January 1992. Chronology therefore does not allow the claim that recognition caused the beginning of those wars.[10] But there is another question: Did the recognition policy affect the further development of the conflict, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Here the historiography is not uniform. Critics of rapid recognition argued that it: weakened the Carrington negotiations; reduced incentives for a compromise Yugoslav arrangement; created pressure on Bosnia and Herzegovina as well; and opened questions of statehood before minority and security questions had been resolved.[12][13] Supporters of recognition replied: that Yugoslavia was by then already in a process of dissolution; that federal institutions no longer effectively represented all republics; that the war in Croatia was already underway; and that continued refusal to recognize could amount to accepting political outcomes achieved by military force.[7][10][14] This is not a dispute that can be honestly resolved with a single slogan.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was an especially difficult case

Bosnia and Herzegovina was not Slovenia. Nor was it Croatia. It did not contain one national group with a large majority, but rather an interwoven population of Muslims/Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. The question: “Should the republic become independent?” therefore also meant: “Do all three major communities share the same idea of the state in which they will live?” The Badinter Commission demanded a clearer democratic expression of the population’s will. A referendum followed at the end of February and beginning of March 1992, which most Bosnian Serbs boycotted. The European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992, and the United States followed the next day.[24] But this story is too important to reduce to a paragraph. We will return to it separately.

Did the West break up Yugoslavia?

The documents reviewed for this article do not support a simple formula that Germany, the United States, or the European Community pursued a unified project from the outset to dismantle Yugoslavia. During the first half of 1991, the United States and the EC still supported its unity or a negotiated political settlement.[1][3][4] There was a serious dispute among Western states over recognition. Germany favored faster recognition. The United States was significantly more cautious. Britain, France, and other European states long feared the consequences of premature recognition.[10][12] But it would also be wrong to say that international policy merely observed the internal Yugoslav process neutrally. The European Community:

mediated ceasefires; sent monitors; ran a peace conference; created legal criteria for the breakup; set conditions for recognition; and eventually recognized new states. Germany, through its pressure, significantly affected the pace of European policy.[10][13] International actors therefore did not create all the domestic causes of the Yugoslav crisis. But they became part of the process that determined what its legal and diplomatic resolution would look like.

The most useful distinction: cause, accelerator, or response?

Instead of asking: “Who broke up Yugoslavia?” it is more useful for research to separate three things. Cause. What created the conflict? Economic crisis. Collapse of political consensus. National mobilization. Constitutional conflict. Armament. Breakdown of common institutions. Accelerator. What strengthened particular processes or changed their incentives? International sanctions. Recognition. Diplomatic support. External financing. Embargoes. Peace negotiations. Response.

What was adopted only after the situation on the ground had already changed substantially? Recognition belonged partly in this category. The European Community recognized two republics on 15 January 1992 at a moment when, in the view of its own arbitration commission, the SFRY was already in the process of dissolution and the war in Croatia had been underway for months.[7][22] But recognition then itself became a new political factor. History almost never has only one direction of causation.

Why this article matters for what follows. So far we have seen: a state with high postwar social mobility; a distinctive system of workers’ self-management; the international power of non-alignment; political restrictions and repression; a debt crisis; the IMF and reform; and the translation of social conflict into national politics. With this article we add another layer: international recognition and diplomacy. The end of Yugoslavia thereby became more than an internal constitutional crisis. It became a question of:

international law, European security, state borders, minority rights, and the relationship between self-determination and territorial integrity. But we still cannot reach the wars in the individual republics through one single explanation. The next part therefore returns to Slovenia and to a question that begins even before June 1991: what happened to the weapons of the Territorial Defence, who controlled them, and how did Slovenia build a parallel defense structure before the Ten-Day War? The Disarmament of the Territorial Defence and the MSNZ: Who Controlled the Weapons Before Slovenian Independence?