Visible Authority and Invisible Power
When a parliament passes a law or a government announces a decision, it is usually possible to establish who had the authority to vote, sign a document or order its implementation.
Editorial illustration: the content and agenda of a decision may take shape before the formal signature.
When a parliament passes a law or a government announces a decision, it is usually possible to establish who had the authority to vote, sign a document or order its implementation. It is much harder to answer other questions: who first proposed the idea, who had an opportunity to present their arguments, who shaped the options from which decision-makers chose, and why some options were never considered at all?
The distinction between visible authority and less visible power is not necessarily a distinction between legality and conspiracy. It is, above all, a distinction between formal authority and actual influence. If we want to understand how decisions are made, we must also look at what happens before a document is signed, a vote takes place or a decision is publicly announced. It is there that official rules, personal connections, interest groups, expert advice and, at times, attempts to steer decisions covertly come together.
Who Makes Decisions, and Who Influences the Decision-Maker?
Formal authority is set out in constitutions, laws, rules of procedure and defined powers. These tell us who may submit a proposal, convene a meeting, request an opinion, adopt a regulation or oversee its implementation. Such rules are essential because they make public accountability possible: a decision can be attributed to a body or an individual from whom an explanation may be demanded. Yet a formal description of a procedure does not reveal everything about the relationships that led to a particular option being chosen.
In his 1957 article The Concept of Power, political scientist Robert A. Dahl examined power as a relationship between people that can also be studied through the effects they have on one another. His approach directs us away from general ideas about “influential people” towards a more testable question: on what issue did one actor influence another, and what evidence supports that conclusion? This is an important shift. A person may enjoy considerable social prestige without having a decisive influence on a particular law; conversely, someone may contribute significantly to the wording of a regulation at a less visible stage of the process. This account is based on the accessible abstract of Dahl's work, not a comprehensive analysis of the original text. [1]
When we speak of hidden power, therefore, listing the names of powerful individuals or organisations is not enough. We must connect the actor, the issue, the procedure and the effect that can be established. Only then can we distinguish general social standing from actual influence on a specific decision.
The Public Hierarchy: Law, Mandate and Accountability
At first glance, a political system is organised hierarchically. Parliaments adopt legislation, governments pursue particular policies, ministries prepare and implement measures, and courts decide matters within their jurisdiction. Yet each formal step generally rests on earlier work: collecting information, drafting proposals, considering alternative solutions, coordinating positions and consulting others. Responsibility for the final decision and influence over how it takes shape are therefore not always in the same hands.
This does not mean that advisers, specialist departments or participating organisations are invisible rulers. Assistance with decision-making may be necessary and beneficial, especially on matters requiring specialised knowledge. A legitimate research question nevertheless arises: do all important perspectives have a comparable opportunity to reach decision-makers, and can we establish why one proposal prevailed? An official signature tells us who made a decision; understanding how it came about often requires us to examine the path leading to that signature.
Some influences are less visible because of ordinary working arrangements, privacy protections or the confidentiality of sensitive information. Others become questionable when access is systematically confined to a narrow circle, when connections are concealed or when conflicts of interest are not adequately disclosed. These situations are not equivalent. Serious research must first establish what kind of restricted access or lack of openness is involved before attributing an improper purpose to it.
Informal Influence: Access, Trust and Privilege
An informal network can grow out of years of cooperation, shared education, membership of the same organisation, professional contacts or personal trust. Such a network is not necessarily secret, and its existence is not in itself problematic. It may facilitate the rapid exchange of information, coordination of specialist work and cooperation between institutions. Yet when some people enjoy consistently easier access to those making public decisions, a question arises about inequalities in political influence.
Interest representation is part of public life. Trade unions, environmental initiatives, professional associations, business organisations, researchers and individuals may wish to persuade the relevant authorities to adopt or reject a measure. Their right to participate does not mean that their proposals are necessarily justified, just as an attempt to exert influence does not automatically amount to corruption. What matters is who participates, on what terms, which positions are presented and whether there is a record that allows public scrutiny. The OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence, adopted in 2010 and amended on 3 May 2024, addresses standards of transparency and integrity in efforts to influence decisions. Here we rely on officially available bibliographic details and public information about the Recommendation, not a comprehensive analysis of all its provisions. [6]
The distinction matters for research: an acquaintance is not an instruction, a meeting is not an agreement, a family relationship is not evidence of a shared political plan, and a coordinated public statement does not in itself prove that someone gave orders to someone else. All of these may be leads worth investigating, but they are not conclusions we may simply assume.
Power over the Agenda
Power is not exercised only when choosing between proposals already on the table. It may also be exercised in deciding which issues become subjects of debate in the first place. In their 1962 article Two Faces of Power, political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz drew attention to the limitations of research focused solely on visible decisions. Their discussion also directs us towards issues that, for various reasons, never reach formal decision-making. This framework is supported in the research dossier by a published abstract and an academic explanation; the full article has not yet undergone critical review. [2]
However, the absence of an issue from the agenda does not prove that someone secretly prevented it from being discussed. The reasons may be substantive, procedural or related to timing, and the responsible body may also reject a proposal for reasons stated publicly. If we want to speak of deliberate exclusion, we must establish who proposed the issue, who was able to decide whether it would be considered, what reasons were given and whether there is evidence of pressure or a concealed veto.
The distinction between an issue not being considered and its consideration being demonstrably prevented is one of the important criteria for investigating invisible power. When we can trace earlier drafts, committee minutes, proposed amendments and public explanations, we can move from a sense that an issue was silenced to a verifiable sequence of events. When such records are not available, we must acknowledge the limitation rather than fill the gap with certainty.
Who Shapes Our Ideas of What Is Possible?
There is an even less tangible dimension of power: influence over what people recognise as important, reasonable, desirable or even possible. In his 1974 book Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes extended the discussion of power to the shaping of interests, beliefs and preferences. In presenting this approach, we rely on an academic review by P. E. Digeser; we have not directly examined the whole of Lukes's original text. [3]
Public debate is not a space in which everyone starts with the same information. Influence over the selection of subjects, expert interpretations and language may help make certain options seem self-evident and others unthinkable. But similar words, beliefs or values do not themselves prove that someone is secretly directing them. To investigate such influence, we would need to compare the origins and timing of messages, organisational links, changes in conduct and explanations that do not presuppose coordination.
We must also remember that people are not merely passive recipients of messages. They form opinions through their own experiences, disagreements, knowledge and public scrutiny of claims. Research into influence must therefore leave room for manipulation, but also for persuasion, freely given agreement and independent thought. A more detailed examination of propaganda and the psychology of control belongs in later articles in the series.
Traces of Influence: The EU Transparency Register
We need not speculate about whether many actors seek to influence public decisions. The European Union has a public Transparency Register covering interest-representation activities intended to influence the formulation or implementation of EU policy or legislation, or decision-making by EU institutions. The interinstitutional agreement underpinning the system entered into force on 1 July 2021. According to the official guidelines, registration is voluntary in principle, but prior registration is required for certain contacts and activities. Interest representatives enter their own information into the Register and are responsible for its accuracy; the Secretariat monitors the quality of the entries. [4][8]
In accordance with the applicable rules, the European Commission publishes information and minutes concerning certain meetings between interest representatives and Members of the Commission, members of their cabinets and staff in management positions. Commission Decisions (EU) 2024/3081 and 2024/3082 were adopted on 4 December 2024 and have applied since 1 January 2025. This is not a complete log of every conversation within European politics, nor does it prove that an interest representative's position prevailed in a particular case. It is, however, an officially recognised record showing that interest representation takes place and can, at least in part, be scrutinised publicly. [5]
The Register can help us establish which organisations present themselves as representatives of particular interests, which meetings are publicly recorded and which areas of activity have been declared. On its own, however, it cannot tell us whether a particular meeting changed the wording of legislation. To assess that, we would have to compare proposals, comments, successive drafts, the chronology of the procedure and the explanations given by decision-makers. Nor is the absence of an entry reliable evidence that a contact never took place; the scope of the Register and the publication rules is limited. [4][5]
Transparency, therefore, does not mean that every irregularity has already been eliminated. It does mean that some questions can be asked more precisely. Instead of making the general claim that “someone is deciding behind the scenes”, we can examine who communicated with a particular body, on what subject and what actually followed in the procedure.
The Revolving Door between the Public and Private Sectors
Moves between jobs in the public and private sectors, often referred to as the revolving door, are a particularly sensitive area. Someone who has helped formulate public policies may later put their expertise to use elsewhere. Such a move is not necessarily unlawful or unethical: employees have a legitimate right to pursue their careers, and experience gained in different environments can be valuable. Risks arise when new duties create a conflict of interest, when confidential information could be used or when personal connections provide privileged influence.
In case OI/1/2021/KR, the European Ombudsman examined 100 files relating to such moves by European Commission staff. In her decision of 16 May 2022, she found genuine improvements compared with an earlier review, but also cases in which moves by former senior staff had been authorised despite concerns about whether the restrictions imposed sufficiently reduced potential risks of conflicts of interest and the use of knowledge or contacts. The Ombudsman recommended stricter scrutiny, more enforceable restrictions and timelier publication of information. [7]
Precision matters here. The Ombudsman examined the quality of oversight and the risks involved; this decision does not establish that every staff member examined influenced a particular law, committed a criminal offence or acted corruptly. The case shows why we must distinguish the possibility of abuse, an identified administrative shortcoming and proven individual responsibility. This distinction is especially important when the people concerned are publicly named.
When Does a Connection Become Evidence of Coordination?
Research into invisible power often begins with connections. The same person appears in several organisations; representatives of different institutions meet; some proposals put forward by different groups resemble one another. Such observations may matter, but they are only a starting point. If we immediately infer a common secret command structure, we skip a crucial step in establishing what the evidence actually shows. If we dismiss the observations as irrelevant in advance, we may overlook genuine channels of influence.
A more reliable approach begins with formal competence: who actually had the power to make the decision? It continues by identifying the actors and their roles, the evidence of access, the actual content of proposals and the sequence of events. Only then can we assess whether an observed change to a proposal was connected to specific attempts at influence, and whether other explanations are equally or more convincing. Where possible wrongdoing is at issue, we must examine the findings of the competent oversight bodies or courts rather than rely solely on public accusations.
A documented meeting can establish contact, but not necessarily an agreement. A letter containing a proposal can establish an attempt to influence, but not that the proposal was accepted. A change in wording after a meeting may warrant further investigation, but is not in itself proof of causation. Even when improper influence is convincingly documented, it does not follow that every other institution or network can be linked to a single centre. Individual facts must remain tied to the scope of what they actually support.
This is not a method designed solely to disprove suspicions. It is intended to make it possible to test them genuinely. Some hypotheses will gain documentary support, others will encounter counterarguments, and for still others the answer will remain open. A lack of publicly available evidence does not prove that covert activity is impossible. Equally, it does not entitle us to declare that we know what took place or who carried it out.
Power, Accountability and Integrity
No society can eliminate every personal acquaintance, expert consultation or difference of interest. The question, therefore, is not how authority could exist without influence, but how power can remain accountable to the people affected by its decisions. Transparent procedures, access to documents, the right to criticise and independent oversight cannot guarantee perfect justice, but they create opportunities to expose and limit improper influence.
A moral question also remains. A person may comply with every formal rule while using their position without regard for the dignity of others; another may influence a public decision openly, responsibly and for the benefit of the community. The real dividing line is therefore not simply between what is visible and what is hidden, but also between responsible influence and power that evades accountability. From a spiritual and philosophical perspective, this touches on a question of conscience: is power intended to serve or to subjugate?
If we want to understand who truly shapes our world, we must learn to recognise both formal institutions and informal relationships while remaining faithful to the distinction between a question, a suspicion and evidence. This is an essential foundation for the next stage of the investigation: how to recognise a genuine conspiracy and how to assess a theory for which the evidence is not yet sufficient.
Next: Real Conspiracies and Unproven Theories (SM-03).
Documentary sources and archive links
These links lead to documents, archival records or photographs hosted by their original source institutions.
Sources and further reading
- Robert A. Dahl (1957). The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201–215. DOI: 10.1002/bs.3830020303. The published abstract was used, not the full text. Source Source
- Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962). Two Faces of Power. American Political Science Review, 56(4), 947–952. DOI: 10.2307/1952796. The published abstract and a basic academic explanation were used; the full text has not been critically reviewed. Source Source
- P. E. Digeser (2015). Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View. In: The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary Political Theory. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198717133.013.44. An academic abstract about Lukes's 1974 book was used, not Lukes's full original work. Source Source
- EU Transparency Register Secretariat (guidelines following the 2024 revision). Guidelines. Part I, chapters 1–3; the public register, the voluntary nature of registration and conditions for certain activities. Official guidelines Source
- European Commission. Transparency Register; in particular the section Meetings with interest representatives and links to Commission Decisions (EU) 2024/3081 and 2024/3082 of 4 December 2024. Official overview · Decision (EU) 2024/3081 · Decision (EU) 2024/3082 Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
- OECD Council (2010; amended 3 May 2024). Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence. OECD/LEGAL/0379. Bibliographic details and publicly available information were checked in C0/C1; the full provisions have not been comprehensively analysed. Official instrument Source
- European Ombudsman (16 May 2022). Decision on how the European Commission manages ‘revolving door’ moves of its staff members (OI/1/2021/KR). Official decision and description of the examination of 100 files. Official document Source
- EU Transparency Register Secretariat. FAQs and Contact, explanations of the activities covered and the registration requirements. Official FAQs Source