SeriesHidden Power: Dynasties, Secret Societies and the Invisible Mechanisms of Power Part 3 / 55

Real Conspiracies and Unproven Theories

On 17 June 1972, police arrested five men who had broken into the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, DC.

Symbolic AI-generated illustration: evidence may support certain connections while broader interpretations remain open to examination.

On 17 June 1972, police arrested five men who had broken into the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, DC. In the first few hours, investigators could establish some relatively tangible facts: who had been arrested, where, with what equipment and under what circumstances. It was much harder to prove who had ordered the operation and how far efforts to conceal what lay behind it had reached. The answers emerged not only from public statements, but also from financial trails, court evidence, witness testimony and, eventually, recordings of White House conversations. [1] [2]

Today, Watergate is remembered as a historic scandal, but how it was uncovered matters more to our investigation than its notoriety. It showed that people who hold real power can conceal actions from the public, and that some of those actions can subsequently be proved. It did not, however, show that every later allegation of hidden power must therefore be true. How, then, can we distinguish a real conspiracy from a documented plan, a plausible but unresolved suspicion, or a story that has yet to be supported by evidence?

What Does It Mean to Prove a Conspiracy?

In everyday usage, the word conspiracy is often applied to anything secret or suspicious. That is too broad for research. In this article, we use it to mean deliberate, covert coordination among several people towards a particular objective. Secrecy does not in itself amount to a criminal offence: confidential negotiations, protecting a source and private planning may all be lawful. To establish a conspiracy in the research sense, we must demonstrate actual coordination and its purpose; if we claim that the conduct was unlawful, violent or politically harmful, we must establish those further circumstances as well. What matters is not secrecy alone, but who did what, why, by what means and with what consequences.

In assessing evidence, we can be misled by jumping between different stages of the same story. An idea may develop into a proposal, a proposal may receive approval, and only then might implementation follow; responsibility and consequences must be established separately. The authenticity of a proposal does not establish that it was approved; approval does not automatically establish implementation; and even implementation does not tell us all the consequences. The same applies to a document stating that someone intended to take action: evidence of intent is not automatically evidence that the action was carried out.

The starting point is therefore modest but demanding: define precisely the claim we are investigating. Instead of saying that 'they controlled everything from behind the scenes', we should ask who allegedly instructed whom, on what date, through what connection and what trace such an instruction might have left. If a claim expands or changes in response to every piece of contrary evidence, without acknowledging the change, it becomes increasingly difficult to test. If it can be revised in the light of new information, it can be a genuine research hypothesis, even if it later proves false.

Watergate: When Recordings Revealed the Cover-up

The US National Archives holds trial exhibits from United States v. Liddy and records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. These are not later online accounts of the event, but collections of evidentiary material, including objects and photographs used at trial. The archival description confirms the break-in of 17 June 1972; subsequent investigations brought its wider political dimensions to light. [1] [10]

Black-and-white photograph of a 1973 US Senate Watergate hearing, showing Fred Thompson, Howard Baker and Sam Ervin seated at the table.
US Senate Watergate Committee hearing in 1973: Fred Thompson, Howard Baker and Sam Ervin (left to right). The photograph documents the public inquiry, not the contents of Nixon’s recordings. Image: Uradni fotograf Senata ZDA, 1973; Sam Ervin Library and Museum; Wikimedia Commons; CC BY-SA 3.0 CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported

One of the most important surviving pieces of evidence is a conversation between President Richard Nixon and his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, recorded in the Oval Office on 23 June 1972 and identified as conversation 741-2. The official summary from the Nixon Presidential Library states that they discussed the progress of the FBI investigation and the use of the CIA to ask the FBI to halt the investigation on the pretext of national security. Archivist Samuel W. Rushay later described this as Nixon's instruction to have the CIA intervene with the FBI so that investigators would be misled about the political background of the break-in. The recording, later known as the smoking gun, was therefore a crucial part of exposing the cover-up and Nixon's political responsibility. [2] [3]

This case became convincing not because every public suspicion turned out to be correct, but because independent lines of evidence pointed to identifiable actions. Yet an important limit remains: the existence of a recording of a conversation about obstructing an investigation does not entitle us, without further evidence, to attribute the same conduct to every associate, every government body or every later scandal. We have not critically examined the entire collection of trial records or all the recordings at this stage, so we do not extend findings of individual legal responsibility beyond the archival conclusions cited here.

COINTELPRO: When Covert Activity Became Part of the Official Record

In the Watergate case, investigators focused on a specific criminal offence and its concealment. COINTELPRO, by contrast, shows how covert activity can form part of a long-running institutional programme. In its own historical account, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirms that the programme began in 1956, initially targeting the Communist Party USA, before expanding to other groups, including the Socialist Workers Party, the Ku Klux Klan and the Black Panthers. The FBI also acknowledges infiltration, the encouragement of internal disputes and attempts to discredit targets, sometimes without sufficient evidence that those targeted were engaged in unlawful activity. The programme formally ended in April 1971. [4]

A more independent institutional assessment came from the US Senate investigation known as the Church Committee. In 1975–1976, the committee investigated abuses by intelligence agencies, including FBI methods directed at civil rights movements, opponents of the Vietnam War and individuals such as Martin Luther King Jr. It issued its final report on 29 April 1976 and found, among other things, that citizens' constitutional rights had been undermined by inadequate oversight of intelligence activities. [5]

In its historical account, the FBI states that COINTELPRO accounted for approximately two-tenths of one per cent of its investigative workload over fifteen years, while also emphasising the security conditions of the time. That context should be understood, but it does not in itself justify documented abuses. Equally, the committee's findings do not establish that every organisation was monitored to the same degree or that every official involved performed the same acts. This is why individual archival files matter: we may document the programme as a whole, but each intrusion into a particular person's life requires its own evidentiary trail. [4] [5]

An unequal distribution of power is not, by itself, a reason to infer a conspiracy; in some cases, however, direct evidence of covert interference does exist. But an accurate account has no need for exaggeration. An established violation is serious enough without attributing unproven dimensions to it.

Northwoods: A Genuine Document That Does Not Prove Implementation

In 1962, US military planners presented proposals for creating pretexts for intervention against Cuba in a memorandum dated 13 March, entitled Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba. The document, known as Northwoods, was subsequently declassified and is now presented by the National Security Archive. The options described included staged incidents designed to create an impression of Cuban responsibility. This memorandum is not an invented internet legend. [6]

That is precisely why its evidentiary limits matter so much. The document confirms that such ideas existed at a senior military level and were passed on for consideration. It does not, by itself, establish that the proposed staged provocations were carried out. Nor does it establish that any later real attack was executed according to the same pattern. Respecting this distinction makes the document no less disturbing: it shows that official planners, too, can propose deceiving the public. Erasing the distinction, on the other hand, turns a verifiable historical document into something it does not itself demonstrate. [6]

When reading such documents, we should ask who wrote them, whom they were intended for, whether they represent an idea, a proposal or an approved instruction, what followed and what other sources corroborate their content. The authenticity of a particular digital copy also matters: an anonymous transcription with no provenance is not equivalent to a document traceable to an archival collection. At this stage, we have not independently examined every page of the original memorandum, so we do not extend our account beyond its documented description and the accessible archival information.

Iran in 1953: A Documented Operation and an Incomplete Archive

The overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 alerts us to another danger: even when covert foreign intervention is documented, the full explanation of an event is not necessarily settled. In 2014, the National Security Archive published an account of newly declassified portions of an internal CIA history, The Battle for Iran, drafted around the mid-1970s. The material addresses the planning of the operation, disagreements among certain US officials and planners, the British role and some factors within Iran. The surviving version is a working draft containing numerous redactions; the public documentation does not establish whether a final version was ever produced. [7]

This case matters not because a single archival release explains every stage of the coup. Quite the opposite: according to the published archival account, the CIA destroyed a substantial portion of its internal correspondence about the coup in 1962; parts of the report remain redacted; those involved sometimes disagreed; and Iranian actors were not merely passive figures in the background of foreign policy. Documented foreign involvement is therefore not the same as proof that every event was controlled in advance from a single centre. The source examined confirms important aspects of the covert operation, but not a complete causal reconstruction of every decision and consequence. [7]

When an archive is incomplete, we may be drawn towards two mistaken extremes. The first claims that nothing can be proved without complete documentation. The second treats missing documents as confirmation of whichever explanation has been chosen. Both replace the question of what we know with a predetermined answer. Circumstantial evidence, testimony and independent traces may help fill some gaps, but each must withstand scrutiny in its own right.

How Do We Test a Claim of Covert Coordination?

A serious investigation begins not by choosing an enemy, but by identifying a specific claim. When someone alleges that a group steered a particular decision, we first need to know which group, which decision and which period they mean. We then ask whether the alleged action was a meeting, an exchange of information, an agreement, an order or an act actually carried out. These stages require different kinds of evidence. The fact that two people met does not prove that they ordered an operation.

The next question is where the evidence comes from. A court document may establish that a claim was made before a court, without making every statement it contains necessarily true. A declassified official memorandum establishes the original text and possibly an institutional intention, but not necessarily implementation. Testimony may reveal an important detail, yet it must be compared with the chronology, other witnesses and material traces. Five news reports that all repeat the same anonymous account are not five independent confirmations. The distinction between repeated many times and independently corroborated several times is essential.

We must then consider alternative explanations. Similarity between two decisions may result from shared interests, access to the same information, political opportunism, an ordinary mistake or genuine coordination. Some explanations are less dramatic but better supported by evidence. Sometimes an investigation succeeds precisely when it narrows an initial suspicion: a broad allegation may give way to evidence of a specific improper meeting, biased decision-making or an inaccurate public statement. A narrower, proven conclusion is worth more than a sweeping but unproven theory.

We must also seek evidence that could weaken the hypothesis. If we claim that someone issued an order, a dated document, reliable testimony or a sequence of actions carrying it out would be important. If no such traces are available, we do not yet know that the order was never given. But our degree of confidence must remain lower. We should be especially cautious about explanations that treat almost any possible outcome as confirmation: if every counterexample is necessarily described as 'proof that everything was concealed', the hypothesis loses its ability to distinguish truth from falsehood.

Openness to Truth and the Danger of Unprovable Certainty

In his 2021 article “Conspiracy theory”: The case for being critically receptive, philosopher Tim Hayward observes that the term 'conspiracy theory' is often used disparagingly. Such a label can obstruct legitimate inquiry in advance, even though history confirms that real conspiracies have existed. His argument is not that every suspicion is correct, but that each claim should be judged on its evidence rather than dismissed solely because of an unpopular label. [8]

James H. McIntyre develops a different emphasis in his 2026 article Conspiracy theories and the hidden evidence penalty. He argues that an explanation which assumes a highly concealed and almost undetectable structure carries a greater epistemic burden: the less detectable it would be in principle, the stronger the reason to withhold acceptance without substantial supporting evidence. McIntyre derives from this a presumption against accepting such theories, which sufficiently strong evidence can nevertheless overturn. This is a philosophical argument about choosing between explanations, not empirical proof that covert operations do not exist. [9]

The two approaches differ and do not address exactly the same question: Hayward primarily defends the legitimacy of investigating individual suspicions, while McIntyre argues for caution in accepting hypotheses carrying a heavy burden of undetectability. Ridicule is therefore no substitute for investigation, but neither does openness to a hypothesis give us reason to believe it. Both arguments deserve critical assessment rather than being presented as two equally strong pieces of empirical evidence. The same standards of verifiability must apply to an official explanation and to an alternative critique of it.

Who Bears the Consequences – and Who Bears Responsibility?

Covert conduct is not merely a logical puzzle. When public authorities unlawfully interfere in people's lives, discredit them or attempt to obstruct an investigation, the consequences are real: lost trust, infringements of rights, damaged relationships and sometimes ruined lives. This is why revelations should not be reduced to entertainment, and why we must not skip over the evidence when identifying those responsible. Human dignity must matter even when we criticise powerful people, institutions or opponents of our own beliefs.

Freedom of judgement does not mean that we must reject every piece of official information. It means that we may demand evidence, examine its provenance, understand an opposing explanation and revise our position when necessary. Nor does it mean that every question must be resolved immediately. 'We do not know' can be an honest outcome of research, if we state precisely what we do not know, why, and what could change the answer. Scepticism without a willingness to revise one's view can become a new form of blind faith – this time in one's own suspicions.

Watergate and COINTELPRO are concrete enough to disprove the naive belief that genuine covert abuses cannot occur. Northwoods shows that an authentic and troubling plan may exist without our being entitled to declare its implementation proven. Iran in 1953 reminds us that even a confirmed covert operation does not settle every outstanding question. The crucial distinction is not whether someone calls themselves a sceptic or a believer, but whether they adjust their conclusions to the evidence.

The next article therefore asks a somewhat different question: how did narratives of a single hidden world power emerge and spread over the centuries, and how can we distinguish their documented historical origins from the claim that the same organisation has existed throughout?

Next: The Origins of Theories about a Secret World Power (SM-04).

Documentary sources and archive links

These links lead to documents, archival records or photographs hosted by their original source institutions.

Sources and further reading

  1. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). U.S. v. Liddy Trial Records and Government Exhibits. Digitised trial exhibits and an account of the Watergate break-in of 17 June 1972. Official archive Source
  2. Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Watergate Trial Tapes. Official catalogue of conversations, notably 23 June 1972, conversation 741-2 (Smoking Gun); the catalogue and summary were used, not a critical transcript of all the audio material. Official archive Source
  3. Samuel W. Rushay, Jr. (2007). Listening to Nixon: An Archivist’s Reflections on His Work with the White House Tapes. Prologue, National Archives. An archivist's explanation of the significance of recording 741-2. Archives article Source
  4. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). And Justice for All, 1954–1971. The FBI's official historical account of COINTELPRO, its scope and criticism of it; the institution's self-assessment must be compared with the Senate investigation. Official FBI history Source
  5. United States Senate. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee). Official historical overview, report of 29 April 1976; not all volumes and individual files have been examined. Official overview Source
  6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (13 March 1962). Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (memorandum known as Northwoods). Declassified document and description from the National Security Archive. The archival description was examined, not every page of the original PDF. Archival record Source
  7. Malcolm Byrne, ed. (27 June 2014). The Battle for Iran, 1953: Re-Release of CIA Internal History Spotlights New Details about anti-Mosaddeq Coup. National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 476; a working, partly redacted internal CIA history. Declassified research documentation Source
  8. Tim Hayward (first published online in 2021). “Conspiracy theory”: The case for being critically receptive. Journal of Social Philosophy, 53(2), 148–167. DOI: 10.1111/josp.12432. A philosophical argument for critical openness to testable hypotheses. Original paper Source
  9. James H. McIntyre (2026). Conspiracy theories and the hidden evidence penalty. Synthese, 208, article 152. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05797-2. A philosophical argument concerning the evidentiary burden of supposedly undetectable structures. Original paper Source
  10. National Archives and Records Administration. Records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. An archival inventory of investigative and trial records; most files are not available online, and an inventory cannot replace examining them. Archival inventory Source