SeriesIsrael and Palestine: Is the Israeli Occupation of Palestine Justified? Part 5 / 12

Palestinian Homes Under Attack

How do demolitions, evictions and violence affect Palestinian homes? A review of cases, legal procedures and the limits of official statistics.

Symbolic illustration of the loss of a home, generated with AI. It does not depict a documented demolition or a specific family.

When Losing a Home Means More Than the Demolition of a House

A home can be lost in a single day: to a bulldozer, an explosion, or the enforcement of a court order. But living in it can also gradually become unbearable—when a family can no longer reach its land safely, when settlers attack its property, when water cisterns are destroyed, or when the journey to school passes through roadblocks and threats. These circumstances are documented in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, but they are not all the same. The legal procedures, actors, reasons, and avenues of redress differ.

The question, therefore, is not simply how many houses have been demolished, but also who has had to leave, who has been able to remain, and under what conditions. The loss of living space, an agricultural building, a water source, and access to land are not the same kind of harm. When such measures overlap, however, they can threaten a community's ability to remain in a place where it has lived for generations.

The article's central claim is verifiable and limited: UN documents show different ways in which Palestinians lose their homes and means of livelihood; in its 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Israeli policies, including forced evictions, extensive demolitions, and restrictions on residence and movement, had often left residents of Area C with little choice about whether they could remain, and that those policies were contrary to the prohibition on forcible transfer. This does not mean that every documented demolition has the same legal basis or that every individual case has resulted in a final criminal judgment. [1][10]

What the Statistics Count—and What They Do Not Tell Us

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains records of demolitions of Palestinian structures and the resulting displacement in the West Bank. In this dataset, the category structure encompasses more than houses: it can include residential extensions, livestock shelters, shops, cisterns, water connections, and other buildings or infrastructure. Recorded demolitions also include cases in which owners demolish their own structures following orders from the authorities. Displaced people are those who lose their place of residence as a result of an incident; people otherwise affected are not the same category, so the two should not be combined without explanation. Where demolitions or losses of housing occur repeatedly, the same person may be counted more than once in aggregate data; the totals therefore cannot always be read as numbers of distinct individuals. [1]

In its report dated 5 November 2026, OCHA recorded 31 structures demolished or demolished by their owners in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, between 27 October and 2 November 2026. Of these, 24 were removed for lack of an Israeli building permit and seven on punitive grounds. These incidents displaced 71 people, including 38 children, while another 72 people were affected in other ways. This is a weekly figure, not an annual total, and it does not mean that 31 occupied houses were destroyed. [2]

Similarly, OCHA reported 457 settler attacks resulting in casualties or property damage during October 2026. According to the methodology described, this was the highest monthly figure for such recorded incidents since monitoring began in 2006. It does not mean that 457 homes were destroyed, nor does the number itself establish the criminal responsibility of 457 different people. In the reporting week, OCHA recorded 64 such attacks; its detailed account identified 41 as related to the olive harvest. A highlighted graphic in the same source inconsistently labels all 64 incidents as harvest-related, so this article follows the more detailed text: 64 attacks in total, 41 of them related to the harvest. [2]

Statistics cannot replace individual stories. They do, however, help us assess the scale of the problem without confusing incidents, structures, and people.

Building Permits: An Administrative Procedure with Consequences for Daily Life

In Area C of the West Bank, the Israeli Civil Administration exercises planning and construction oversight. Its official website states that its supervisory unit enforces building regulations in Israeli and Palestinian areas, safeguards state land and military zones, and performs duties connected with verifying land status. This is an important Israeli institutional position: the measures are presented as the enforcement of construction and security rules. [3]

But the existence of a rule does not answer whether residents have a realistic opportunity to comply with it. In its 2024 opinion, the ICJ examined the planning and permit system in the occupied territory. In paragraphs 214–222, the Court described restrictions on planning and access to permits and found that the permit system and demolitions for lack of permits under consideration constituted prohibited discrimination against Palestinians in comparison with settlers. In paragraph 215, it cited a UN report stating that, in July 2023, the Israeli Civil Administration's head of infrastructure confirmed that more than 90 per cent of Palestinian building-permit applications had been rejected. The same account stated that 60–70 per cent of Israeli applications were reportedly processed and approved. These percentages must not be presented as comprehensive figures for 2026 or treated as directly comparable across all permit applications without methodological qualifications. [10]

A family can thus become trapped in a vicious circle: it needs a place to live, cannot secure a building permit in practice, builds without one, and then faces the prospect of demolition. Israeli building laws and avenues for objection are not irrelevant, but legality under domestic law and compliance with an occupying power's international obligations are not automatically the same legal question.

This distinction also applies to East Jerusalem, where Israel applies its domestic law and regards the area as part of its territory; most of the international community and the ICJ, however, consider it part of the occupied Palestinian territory. [10]

Punitive Demolitions: The Security Rationale and the Question of Family Responsibility

A separate legal category involves the demolition of homes associated with people who carried out—or are alleged to have carried out—attacks. Israeli authorities present these demolitions as a deterrent against future attacks. This is not merely an inference made by critics: a statement by the Israeli prime minister and defence minister on 24 July 2026 explicitly listed the demolition of an attacker's home among measures announced after an attack. [4]

Attacks against Israelis cause real harm. Attacks on civilians and other unlawful acts cannot be justified by political or historical injustice. Yet it is equally necessary to ask what such a measure means for family members who did not commit the attack. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly prohibits punishing a protected person for an offence they have not personally committed and prohibits collective penalties. Article 53 limits destruction of property by an occupying power to situations in which it is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. [11][12]

Assessing this measure does not require us to stop at a description of two opposing positions. In paragraphs 211–213 of its 2024 advisory opinion, the ICJ was not convinced that punitive demolitions met the strict test of absolute military necessity or were otherwise justified. It found that such demolitions punished people who had not committed the underlying acts, contrary to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and constituted prohibited discrimination. The Israeli government continues to present the measure as a deterrent and a component of security policy; however, a domestic legal basis does not, in itself, remove the limitations imposed by international law. This is a finding about state practice, not a final individual criminal conviction of the person who carried out a particular demolition. [10]

Settler Violence: Attacks on Homes and the Ability to Make a Living

Physical violence and threats constitute a third route to the loss of security at home. OCHA's November report describes attacks on Palestinian houses in communities of Masafer Yatta. In Khirbet al Majaz, settlers reportedly physically assaulted residents and damaged a dwelling and its contents; damage to homes and property was also reported in Mughayir al Abeed and Halaweh. These are documented humanitarian reports, not proof that the perpetrator in every case has been identified and finally convicted. [2]

Olive trees and the harvest were also at risk during the same period. The report describes attacks on farmers, restrictions on organised access to olive groves, and the taking of harvested produce. Between 1 September and 2 November 2026, OCHA recorded 377 incidents connected with the olive-harvest season, according to the methodology set out in its report. These incidents must not be added to the 457 reported for October, because the periods and categories overlap. [2]

Losing access to a grove is not the same as having one's house demolished. But for a household that depends on olive farming, it can mean losing income, food, and a reason to remain on the land. From the perspective of civilian protection, it also matters whether the responsible authorities prevented an attack, properly investigated it, and provided protection. In assessing the broader pattern in 2024, the ICJ pointed to systemic shortcomings in the prevention and punishment of settler attacks. This is an assessment of state obligations, not a collective accusation against all Israeli settlers or Jewish people. [10]

Masafer Yatta: When Losing a Cistern Threatens an Entire Community

Masafer Yatta, in the southern Hebron Hills, comprises several rural Palestinian communities. The Israeli authorities have designated part of the area as a military training zone known as Firing Zone 918. The Israeli security rationale rests on the need for military training and control of a particular area; residents and humanitarian organisations, meanwhile, warn of the loss of homes and essential infrastructure. [5]

OCHA's report dated 11 September 2026 describes two groups of demolitions between 2 and 8 September across three Masafer Yatta communities. A total of 49 structures were removed, displacing 57 people, including 27 children, and additionally affecting seasonal residents. The demolished structures were not only dwellings but also livestock shelters, latrines, water-storage facilities, and solar-energy infrastructure. In Khirbet at Tabban, a group of 27 structures was demolished on 2 September, including structures funded through humanitarian assistance. [5]

Water tanks and solar installations are not inconsequential additions to a home. If a family loses its roof, drinking-water supply, and access to electricity, the consequences compound. OCHA further reported in November 2026 that movement restrictions and attacks had kept emergency water deliveries suspended in four Masafer Yatta communities, affecting 975 people, while deliveries in six others were less frequent. This refers to humanitarian water provision during a particular period; it does not prove that all 975 people had no other water source whatsoever. [2]

This helps explain why researchers speak of a coercive environment: a direct order to leave is not the only way to undermine a community's ability to remain. Even so, the legal rationale and the authority responsible must be distinguished for each measure.

Ruins of a demolished house in the rocky landscape of Masafer Yatta in January 2023.
Ruins of a house in Masafer Yatta, photographed in January 2023. The image does not show demolitions in 2026. Image: שי קנדלר (Shai Kendler; Wikimedia zapis avtorja v hebrejščini) / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY-SA 4.0

Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah: Eviction Is Not the Same as Demolition

In East Jerusalem, the issue of home is not confined to building regulations; it also appears in civil property and tenancy disputes. In some cases, Israeli settler organisations assert claims to land based on alleged ownership predating 1948. Palestinian families point to their long residence, tenancy arrangements, and unequal legal opportunities. A court determines the outcome of a particular dispute, but its ruling does not automatically resolve the broader question of forcible displacement in occupied territory.

Silwan, 18 August 2026. OCHA reported that Israeli forces evicted two Palestinian households comprising eight people from parts of a three-storey residential building in Batn al Hawa, after which the settler organisation Ateret Cohanim took control of parts of the building. OCHA reported that the families had built and lived in the building since before 1967; the court proceedings concerned claims that the land had been Jewish-owned before 1948. This account explains both the nature of the claim and its consequences for residents without purporting to finally adjudicate the historic land-title dispute in this draft. [6]

Sheikh Jarrah, 1 March 2022. An important corrective to the impression that every legal case ends in eviction is the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in רע״א 2401/21, Sami Jaouni and Others v. Nahalat Shimon Ltd. According to OCHA's summary and the available text of the Israeli judgment, the Supreme Court set aside the eviction orders then in force and allowed the families to continue living in their homes as protected tenants pending a final resolution of the land-rights issue. The ruling did not finally establish Palestinian ownership of the disputed land. OCHA described seven Palestinian families as covered by the eviction orders, while four families were parties to the Supreme Court proceedings. These are different ways of describing the scope of the case, not conflicting court outcomes. The decision did not resolve every eviction dispute in East Jerusalem. [7][8]

On 26 March 2026, a humanitarian group comprising UN and non-governmental organisations warned of continuing evictions in Batn al Hawa and of more than 200 Palestinian households facing eviction proceedings in East Jerusalem. This was an assessment and an appeal by humanitarian actors on a specific date, not a judicial determination of every private property claim. [9]

Exterior of a building in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem, in August 2021.
A building on Mohamed Salah Street in Sheikh Jarrah, photographed in August 2021. It is not evidence of any particular court-ordered eviction. Image: McKaby / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY-SA 4.0
View over the densely built Silwan neighborhood of East Jerusalem.
A view of Silwan in East Jerusalem, November 2019. The photograph provides geographic context, not documentation of a specific demolition. Image: وفاء خطيب (Wafaa Khatib) / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY-SA 4.0

Hebron, October–November 2026: After an Attack on Soldiers, Consequences for Children

According to OCHA, on 23 October 2026 two Palestinian attackers shot and killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded four other people. Israeli forces subsequently conducted an operation in parts of Hebron city, ending on 2 November. The initial attack must not be omitted: the circumstances of the security response are part of the complete picture. But the obligations owed to people who did not take part in the attack remain in force. [2]

OCHA reported that on 30 October, two occupied apartments in the ‘Ein Deir Bahah neighbourhood, belonging to the families of the deceased attackers, were blown up. The explosions also damaged neighbouring apartments. The demolitions displaced three families comprising 15 people, including nine children. These are specific, verifiable figures for homes and people; they are not the same as the weekly count of all structures in the West Bank demolition dataset. [2]

During the operation, Hebron's municipal authorities reported that more than 3,000 people had left two neighbourhoods. OCHA explicitly cautioned that these figures were still being verified and noted that families began returning when the operation ended. These departures must therefore not be described as more than 3,000 permanent displacements or an equivalent number of destroyed homes. Temporary restrictions also made 11 schools serving approximately 4,450 pupils inaccessible on 1 and 2 November; a separate figure of around 90,000 pupils whose education was disrupted refers to a wider area and a differently defined form of disruption. [2]

Hebron therefore raises two questions at once: the need to respond to a deadly attack within the law and the limits on measures that affect the homes and schooling of large numbers of civilians.

What Does International Law Permit—and What Does It Prohibit?

In occupied territory, international humanitarian law sets obligations for the occupying power regardless of its domestic legal system. Three provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 are especially relevant to this investigation:

  • Article 33: prohibits collective penalties and punishing protected persons for offences they have not personally committed. [11]
  • Article 49: prohibits individual and mass forcible transfers of protected persons, permits temporary evacuation only under strictly limited conditions relating to civilian safety or imperative military reasons, and requires return once those reasons have ceased. Coercion may also arise from living conditions that leave people without a genuine choice. [13]
  • Article 53: prohibits an occupying power from destroying private or public property unless doing so is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. [12]

In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the ICJ examined the wider system of Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory. In paragraphs 142–147, it found that forced evictions, extensive demolitions, and restrictions on movement and residence often left residents of Area C with little genuine choice about remaining and that the policies described violated the prohibition on forcible transfer. In paragraphs 148–154, it found that systematic failures to prevent or punish settler violence, together with excessive use of force by security forces, were inconsistent with international obligations. More specifically, in paragraphs 211–213, it found the practice of punitive demolitions to be contrary to humanitarian law and to amount to prohibited discrimination; in 214–222, it found that Israel’s planning and building-permit policy, and in particular its demolition practices for lack of permits, treated Palestinians differently from settlers without justification and amounted to prohibited discrimination. [10]

This opinion is not a criminal conviction of individual officials, soldiers, or settlers, and it is not the same as a decision of the International Criminal Court. Nor can legal protections for Palestinians be interpreted as permission to attack Israeli civilians. International law protects civilians regardless of nationality or religion; security concerns and the requirement to protect rights cannot simply be set against one another without a legal assessment of the conduct in question.

Who Gets to Stay? The Family and Moral Dimensions

When a family loses its home, it loses more than walls. It may lose stored food, tools, a safe route to school, and the sense that it will still be living in the same place tomorrow. For a livestock-raising community, the destruction of a cistern may remove the conditions needed to remain; for a farmer, repeated violent attacks on an olive grove can mean losing a harvest and the willingness to return the following year. The impact on children is also reflected in interruptions to schooling, recurring fear, and repeated moves. [2][5]

An Israeli family that has lost a relative in a shooting attack has the right to protection, an investigation, and justice. A Palestinian family whose member did not take part in that attack does not lose its right to safety and dignity merely because of a family relationship or its origins. These rights do not contradict one another.

Editorial conclusion: On the evidence examined, it would be inaccurate to describe every case as a single process of “stealing homes.” There are administrative demolitions, punitive measures, court disputes, individual attacks, and restrictions on access. Yet it would be equally inaccurate to treat each one in isolation and ignore their combined effects. In 2024, the ICJ found that the Israeli policies of forced evictions, demolitions, and restrictions described in Area C were contrary to the prohibition on forcible transfer, and that settler violence and inadequate protection contributed to a coercive environment. The legal assessment of state policy therefore extends beyond whether a formal order was issued in an individual demolition case. [10]

The moral question that remains: If everyone has a right to security, can that security be permanently guaranteed by depriving someone else of their home, access to water, or ability to live on their own land? Neither historical memory, religion, nor revenge can justify violence against civilians. The first condition of a serious debate is to recognise the same rights for all.

Sources and further reading

  1. OCHA, Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank, methodology and definitions: source Source
  2. OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Report | 5 November 2026 (published 6 November 2026), West Bank, reporting period 27 October–2 November: source Source
  3. Israeli Civil Administration/COGAT, official description of Supervision duties: source Source
  4. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, joint statement by the prime minister and defence minister, 24 July 2026: source Source
  5. OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Report | 11 September 2026, published 12 September, section on Masafer Yatta: source Source
  6. OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Report | 28 August 2026, published 29 August, Silwan: source Source
  7. Israeli Supreme Court, ruling in civil leave-to-appeal proceedings רע״א 2401/21 — Sami Jaouni and Others v. Nahalat Shimon Ltd., 1 March 2022. Official court download endpoint (identified in independent references, but returned a server error during the C5 check): source ; accessible Hebrew text of the ruling reproduced by a legal publisher: source ; independent archival catalogue of the court-document link: source . No claim is made here that the official download was successfully opened. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  8. OCHA, Protection of Civilians Report | 22 February – 7 March 2022, published 11 March 2022, discussion of the Sheikh Jarrah decision: source Source
  9. OCHA, Humanitarian Country Team statement, UN and NGOs urge the Israeli authorities to stop forced evictions in East Jerusalem, 26 March 2026: source Source
  10. International Court of Justice (ICJ), advisory opinion, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 19 July 2024; especially paragraphs 142–154, 207–222 and 285; official UN document A/78/968, available copy: source ; archive: source Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  11. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 33: source Source
  12. ICRC, Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 53: source Source
  13. ICRC, Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49 and 2025 commentary: source ; source Source 1 Source 2