SeriesIsrael and Palestine: Is the Israeli Occupation of Palestine Justified? Part 8 / 12

Who Enables the Continuation of the Occupation? International Responsibility

How do states, international institutions and economic ties affect the continuation of occupation? We examine responsibilities, measures and their limits.

Symbolic illustration of international legal and political responsibility; not a photograph of a real proceeding or meeting.

Editorial note: This article examines the international responsibility of states, institutions and other actors. It does not assign collective guilt to the people of Israel, Jews, Palestinians or any religious community. Judicial findings, political statements, national laws, announced measures and the author's moral conclusions must be distinguished. Legal and political statuses are stated as of the research cut-off date and must be rechecked before publication.

Introduction: Occupation Is Not Sustained by Force on the Ground Alone

When Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory is discussed, attention often focuses on soldiers, checkpoints, settlements, house demolitions and restrictions on movement. Yet any long-lasting policy also has an international dimension. Diplomatic relations, trade rules, financial flows, supplies of military equipment and other countries’ responses to breaches of international law may affect the conditions in which an occupation continues. Establishing an unlawful contribution, however, requires evidence about the particular conduct and its legal context.

This does not mean that every conversation with Israel, every purchase of an Israeli product or every form of security cooperation already amounts to unlawful assistance to the occupation. Such a conclusion would be methodologically unsound. It does mean, however, that third states have duties which they cannot defer simply by saying that a solution depends on future negotiations. The legal question is which specific activities help maintain an unlawful situation, which merely occur alongside it and which actively oppose it.

On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful. In the operative part of its advisory opinion, it also addressed the obligations of all states not to recognize the unlawful situation and not to aid in maintaining it. This is the article's starting point, not a presumption that every state cooperating with Israel is guilty. [1] [2]

What Did the International Court of Justice Find in 2024?

The ICJ's advisory opinion of July 19, 2024, answered questions put by the UN General Assembly concerning the legal consequences of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Among other findings, the Court determined that Israel's continued presence is unlawful, that this situation must be brought to an end as rapidly as possible, that new settlement activity must cease and settlers must be evacuated from the occupied territory, and that reparation is owed for damage caused. [1]

Of particular importance here are paragraphs 273–279 and operative subparagraphs 7–9 in paragraph 285. The Court stated that states must not recognize as lawful the situation created by Israel's unlawful presence or render aid or assistance in maintaining it. They must also distinguish, in their dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. As the Court explained, this duty of distinction extends to certain treaties, economic and trade relations, diplomatic practices and steps to prevent investments that maintain the unlawful situation. [2] [3]

Four levels must be kept separate. Non-recognition means not treating an unlawful territorial situation as lawfully acquired sovereignty. Non-assistance means not supporting the maintenance of that situation. Territorial differentiation means not treating Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory as one geographic and legal unit. Cooperation to realize the right of self-determination involves action within the United Nations and compliance with obligations under international humanitarian law. [2]

An advisory opinion is not a criminal judgment and does not determine the personal guilt of every politician, soldier or business executive. Nor does it automatically invalidate every agreement made with Israel. it is nevertheless an authoritative judicial assessment of obligations arising under international law. Although the opinion is advisory rather than a binding judgment between litigating parties, the underlying international-law duties it identifies are not made optional by that procedural form.

Israel's Foreign Ministry rejected the opinion as one-sided and emphasized that a political solution must come through direct negotiations. Israel and its security partners point to rocket attacks, the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, hostages and regional security threats. Those concerns are real and cannot be ignored. But a security threat does not automatically confer a right permanently to acquire territory or cancel another people's right of self-determination. There were also separate and dissenting opinions within the ICJ on certain legal questions; the Court's majority advisory opinion nevertheless remains the documented starting point. An important limit on the opinion's subject matter is that, in these proceedings, the Court did not legally assess Israel's military response in Gaza to the October 7, 2023 attack; that question falls within separate legal and humanitarian frameworks. [1] [2] [4]

Exterior of the Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the International Court of Justice.
The Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the International Court of Justice, photographed in 2024. This does not depict a court hearing or judgment. Image: CIRISORG / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY-SA 4.0

The General Assembly and Security Council: What Did States Decide—and What Did They Not Decide?

On September 18, 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/24 by 124 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions. It demanded an end to Israel's unlawful presence within no more than twelve months of adoption—that is, by September 18, 2025—and called on states to take measures concerning settlement products, arms, cooperation and targeted sanctions. The requested twelve-month deadline matters for assessing political commitments and follow-up, but the resolution itself is not automatically equivalent to a domestic legal prohibition or a binding Security Council measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Existing international-law duties must be assessed on their own legal foundations. [5] [6]

Whether a state that voted for the resolution then actually changed its customs rules, export licences or public procurement practices is a separate question. Votes show public positions. Documents demonstrating implementation are needed to establish their practical effects.

The UN Security Council operates under a different mechanism: its five permanent members have veto power. In 2025, the United States vetoed two specific draft resolutions on a ceasefire in Gaza: S/2025/353 (June 4) and S/2025/583 (September 18). On both occasions, 14 members voted in favour and the United States voted against. The drafts dealt primarily with a ceasefire, the release of hostages and the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would therefore be wrong to portray their texts as directly covering every measure against West Bank settlements. They do show how an institutional veto can block a specific proposal even when almost the entire Security Council supports it. [7] [8]

The earlier Security Council resolution 2334 (2016), in operative paragraph 5, calls on states to distinguish, in relevant dealings, between Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. Such differentiation was not invented in 2024: it had appeared in legal and diplomatic documents long before then. [9]

Interior of the United Nations General Assembly hall with seating and speaker’s podium.
United Nations General Assembly Hall photographed in 2019; not a photograph of the ES-10/24 vote in 2024. Image: Jack Autosafe / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY-SA 4.0

The European Union: Customs Preferences, Trade and Proposals Not Yet Implemented

The EU offers an important example of why importing a product, the customs treatment of that product and a general trade prohibition must be distinguished. The European Commission explains that products originating in Israeli settlements in territories placed under Israeli administration since June 1967 fall outside the geographic scope of the preferential regime under the EU–Israel trade agreement. Accordingly, they do not qualify for its reduced tariffs. A technical arrangement on origin sets out the data customs authorities use to establish where goods were produced. [10]

Refusing preferential treatment to a settlement product does not necessarily mean that importing the product is prohibited. The first decision determines customs liability; the second determines whether importation is permitted. Confusing the two would artificially overstate the scope of European measures.

On September 17, 2025, the European Commission submitted proposal COM(2025) 890 to suspend the application of certain trade provisions of the EU–Israel Association Agreement. At the research cut-off, procedure 2025/0890/NLE was still listed by EUR-Lex as ongoing. A Commission proposal is thus not equivalent to a Council decision that has been adopted and entered into force. A Dutch government report dated June 3, 2026, separately recorded insufficient support among EU member states for the Commission’s proposed measures at the May Trade Council. That report is evidence of the discussions at that time, not proof that the legislative position could never change. [11] [29]

The critical task is therefore to verify actual decisions and their scope. A state may oppose settlement expansion while continuing to support trade with Israel within its internationally recognized borders. Such a policy may be too limited in effect or inconsistent, but it cannot fairly be described as a total trade blockade—or taken as proof that every Israeli manufacturer supports the settlements.

Berlaymont building in Brussels, headquarters of the European Commission.
European Commission headquarters in Brussels, photographed in 2018; the image does not establish the adoption or implementation of a particular trade measure. Image: acediscovery / Wikimedia Commons (WebP-optimized preview) CC BY 4.0

The Psagot Judgment: What Must a European Consumer Be Told?

On November 12, 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted EU food-consumer information rules in case C-363/18 (Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot). It held that food originating in a territory occupied by Israel must identify that territory and that, where the food originates in an Israeli settlement within it, settlement origin must also be indicated. [12]

Why? A label stating only “Israel,” or only the broader occupied territory, could give consumers a misleading impression of the product's actual origin. The Court noted that ethical considerations and respect for international law may also be relevant to an informed consumer decision. That is not an instruction that consumers must choose to boycott; it is a requirement to provide accurate information. [12]

The judgment applies to the food-labelling framework at issue, not to every form of service, financial instrument or investment. It is not a criminal conviction of the producer and does not establish a general European embargo. Its significance lies elsewhere: origin becomes a legally relevant fact that the market must not conceal.

EU Sanctions: From Principles to Named Persons and Legal Effects

On May 28, 2026, under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, the Council of the EU listed four entities and three individuals associated with serious human rights violations against Palestinians in the West Bank. Those named included the Nachala movement and its leader Daniella Weiss. The official implementing instrument is Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1177, amending the list under Regulation (EU) 2020/1998. The verified regulation confirms the addition of three natural persons and four entities on May 28, 2026; that does not establish that the list remained unchanged thereafter or that every envisaged asset freeze had already been carried out in practice. [13] [14]

Measures under this regime principally involve freezing assets and prohibiting funds or economic resources from being made available to listed persons and entities; listed individuals may also face travel restrictions. These are not sanctions against all Israeli citizens, every company in Israel or the country's entire economy. A legal entity not on the list does not automatically become sanctioned simply because it performs similar activities.

Being placed on a sanctions list is not the same as being convicted of a crime by a court. Listing is a legal measure carrying specified restrictions and subject to avenues of judicial review. Its effectiveness—how much property was actually frozen, for example, or whether it prevented further attacks—is a separate empirical question. This draft does not claim that such outcomes have been proved.

Comparing National Measures: Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

Different states took markedly different approaches in 2025 and 2026. For each, the relevant legal instrument, date and limits of effect must be identified.

Spain. Through Real Decreto-ley 10/2025 of September 23, 2025, published the following day, Spain introduced, among other measures, a legal ban on imports of products originating in Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Article 3), restrictions on military materiel (Article 1) and rules against advertising settlement goods or services (Article 4). Article 3 requires the place and postal code of origin to be stated in customs declarations for goods from Israel. Article 4 treats advertising for the specified settlement goods and services as unlawful advertising under Spain’s general advertising legislation. The additional provision allowing exceptional authorization by the Council of Ministers concerns military and related transfers under Article 1**; it is not a general exemption from the Article 3 settlement-products import prohibition. In February 2026, Spain's tax agency published an updated list of places and postal codes to implement the import ban. [15] [16] [32] Thus, alongside the law itself, there is documented customs implementation machinery. This does not, however, allow us to infer how many shipments were actually stopped without official statistics. [15] [16]

Ireland. Ireland enacted the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Prohibition of Importation of Goods) Act 2026. According to the Irish Revenue Commissioners' official guidance, the prohibition began to apply on September 15, 2026. It covers goods from designated postal codes, provides for customs enforcement powers and includes an exception for non-commercial goods in personal baggage for personal use; a procedure for establishing origin applies to mixed postal codes. It would therefore be inaccurate to rely on older accounts saying that the Irish ban remained merely a bill. [17]

The Netherlands. On October 3, 2025, the Supreme Court ruled that the government had to reassess the licence for exporting F-35 aircraft parts against the standard of a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Court did not itself definitively decide all future military exports. In an official parliamentary report in June 2026, the government explained that, following its reassessment in May 2026, it had continued to exclude Israel as a final destination under general export licence NL009. This is a more concrete outcome than the judgment alone. The available information does not support the broader claim that all Dutch defence exports were halted. The June parliamentary report envisaged a further reassessment within the next six months; its possible subsequent outcome had not been directly verified by the research cut-off. [18] [19]

The United Kingdom. In September 2024, London suspended selected export licences for military equipment linked to military operations in Gaza, with special arrangements for the multinational F-35 programme and the exclusion of direct supplies to Israel. On September 8, 2026, the Foreign Office announced an additional criterion: refusing future export licences for equipment that would materially contribute to the occupation. A parliamentary answer of September 16 confirmed that, since September 8, no additional licences had been revoked or suspended under that criterion, as relevant licences were said already to be covered by earlier restrictions. The government also announced a future regime restricting imports of goods from illegal settlements and certain advertising services. In an official answer on October 1, 2026, it explained that the regime would be introduced through secondary sanctions legislation under the 2018 Act, expected in six to nine months, whereas the new export-licensing criterion was already in operation and required no additional legislation. In its November 10, 2026 response, the government again said it was still preparing the new legislation and that detailed guidance for businesses would follow. The proposed import and advertising prohibitions are therefore not presented as in force at the research cut-off. [20] [21] [22] [30] [31]

What does the comparison establish? Spain and Ireland used legislative and customs measures against settlement products. The Netherlands conducted an administrative review of a military export licence following a court ruling. The United Kingdom combined export criteria with announcements of further economic measures. These are different tools, with different legal conditions, exceptions and measurable effects. Treating them as equivalent would conceal what each state actually did.

Slovenia, 2025–2026: Why the Timeline Matters

On July 31, 2025, Slovenia adopted decision no. 51000-20/2025/2, prohibiting exports and transit of military arms and equipment to Israel and imports of such equipment from Israel, subject to certain security and resilience exceptions. This was a specific government decision, distinct from the general export-licensing regime. [23]

On August 6, 2025, the government adopted starting points for the preparation of economic measures, including an idea concerning imports of goods from settlements. These starting points were not the same as a finalized regulation imposing an import ban. A statement that Slovenia was already enforcing a ban on settlement-product imports in August 2025 would therefore not be supported by the cited government material. [24]

Then, on June 11, 2026, the government revoked the specific arms decision and three earlier decisions setting out policy starting points, which it explicitly stated had not been implemented: nos. 50000-3/2025/4 (July 17, 2025), 56000-2/2025/3 (September 25, 2025) and 30000-5/2025/2 (August 6, 2025). Among the reasons given was a desire to resume political dialogue, quiet diplomacy and cooperation in areas of shared interest. It explained that trade in military materiel remained subject to applicable legislation and the criteria of EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. [25]

Two different conclusions follow. First, the specific political prohibition regime introduced in 2025 was lifted. Second, its revocation does not prove that every future export or import of military equipment is automatically permitted without legal checks. To assess the measure's actual material effects, one would need to compare licences granted and refused, actual shipments, recipients and the period following revocation. Such a comparison has not yet been completed in this draft.

A serious moral question remains: does withdrawing expressly stated restrictions in the expectation that dialogue will succeed better protect the rights of Palestinian people? That is a legitimate public question, but an answer must be supported by evidence of consequences rather than simply approving or condemning a particular government.

The United States: Security Assistance and a Veto Are Different Forms of Responsibility

The United States is Israel's most important security partner. The ten-year memorandum of understanding, signed in 2016 for US fiscal years 2019–2028, sets out a baseline framework of USD 38 billion: an average of USD 3.3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing and USD 500 million annually for joint missile-defence programmes. This is an intergovernmental assistance framework subject to US congressional appropriations. It must not be read as evidence that the full ten-year amount has already been disbursed, or as an audit of actual payments in any particular fiscal year. Any extraordinary appropriations must be accounted for separately to avoid double-counting. [26] [27] [33]

US policy justifies this cooperation by reference to Israel's security, regional threats, the alliance and protection against rocket attacks. Such assistance should not automatically be equated with the direct funding of residential settlements in the West Bank. A specific allegation of that kind would require a documented trail of equipment or payments, an identified recipient, use, a connection to maintaining the unlawful situation and the appropriate legal test.

But the opposite conclusion—that assistance described in general terms as security support can never be legally relevant—would also be too facile. The right to defend civilians and the existence of security threats do not relieve suppliers of the obligation to assess whether a particular transfer could contribute to serious breaches of international law. Where such a risk exists, review of an export licence is a distinct legal question.

American diplomacy is also visible in the Security Council. As noted above, the US vetoes on June 4 and September 18, 2025, prevented the adoption of specific drafts concerning Gaza. They do not by themselves establish that the US government approved every act by Israeli settlers, but they do demonstrate its ability decisively to influence measures under discussion in the international community. [7] [8]

An assessment of international responsibility must therefore stay with the evidence: what was supplied, what was diplomatically blocked, which obligation might be engaged and where the evidentiary link is still missing.

Companies, Institutions and Personal Responsibility: From Words to Verifiable Action

The OHCHR database of companies, updated in September 2026, includes 214 companies associated with specified activities in Israeli settlements. Inclusion is not a criminal conviction and does not in itself answer whether any state unlawfully assisted in maintaining the occupation. It should be treated as an evidentiary starting point for examining specific activities, contracts and links to the unlawful situation. Article PL-07 addresses individual business cases and the database's limitations in greater detail. [28]

Responsibility operates at several levels. A state may be under duties of non-recognition and non-assistance. A company may have due-diligence obligations arising under applicable domestic rules, contracts and international standards. An individual may in certain circumstances face criminal scrutiny, but only where the elements of an offence and procedural conditions are met. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) addresses legal questions concerning states; the International Criminal Court (ICC) deals with the responsibility of individuals. Confusing the two would be an error.

The significance of legal decisions lies not only in convictions. Prevention also matters: denying customs preferences to settlement goods; requiring accurate labelling of origin; preventing exports of particular equipment where there is a clear risk; restricting financing for actors enabling displacement; checking public procurement and investments; demanding accountability for attacks against civilians; and supporting internationally monitored agreements protecting the rights of both peoples.

Israeli and international security concerns, including attacks against civilians and hostage-taking, deserve serious attention. So does the Palestinian population's right to self-determination and protection against permanent dispossession. Recognizing both facts is not a contradiction. The legal and ethical danger arises when protecting one community is used as a permanent exception to the fundamental rights of another.

Editorial conclusion: International responsibility neither begins nor ends with a statement that the occupation is unlawful. It begins with a state's willingness to translate its legal duties into verifiable action. At the same time, it would be unjust to label every diplomat, company or citizen an accomplice without evidence. The strongest criticism identifies the decision, establishes its legal framework, demonstrates its effects and clearly states what remains unproved.

Sources and further reading

  1. ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, July 19, 2024, especially the dispositif, paragraph 285. source Source
  2. ICJ, summary of the advisory opinion, part B, paragraphs 273–279. source Source
  3. Reproduction of the July 19, 2024 ICJ advisory opinion in International Legal Materials, published online in February 2025; see especially paragraphs 278–279. source Source
  4. UN News, summary of Israel's response and emphasis on direct negotiations, July 19, 2024 (secondary account of Israel's position). source Source
  5. UN General Assembly, A/RES/ES-10/24, September 18, 2024. source Source
  6. UN Digital Library, voting record for ES-10/24 (124–14–43). source Source
  7. UN Security Council, draft S/2025/353 and outcome on June 4, 2025. source Source
  8. UN Security Council, meeting record S/PV.10000, September 18, 2025, vote on S/2025/583. source Source
  9. UN Security Council, S/RES/2334 (2016), especially operative paragraph 5. source Source
  10. European Commission, EU–Israel Technical Arrangement and explanation of origin rules for settlement products. source Source
  11. Dutch House of Representatives, government letter dated June 3, 2026 on the May 22 Trade Council, including lack of EU support for several proposed measures. The same document also supports V19. source Source
  12. Court of Justice of the EU, C-363/18, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot, November 12, 2019, especially paragraphs 48–58 and the operative part. source Source
  13. Council of the EU, press release on four entities and three individuals, May 28, 2026. source Source
  14. Council of the EU, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1177, May 28, 2026. source Source
  15. Spain, Real Decreto-ley 10/2025, BOE-A-2025-18831, September 23, 2025. source Source
  16. Spanish Tax Agency, updated postal-code list for Article 3, February 2026. source Source
  17. Irish Revenue, implementation of the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Prohibition of Importation of Goods) Act 2026, beginning September 15, 2026. source Source
  18. Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), judgment concerning F-35 parts and export-licence reassessment, October 3, 2025. source Source
  19. Dutch House of Representatives, government report dated June 3, 2026 on the May reassessment of the F-35 licence and the continued exclusion of Israel as a final destination. source Source
  20. United Kingdom, notice to exporters concerning the suspension of selected licences, September 2, 2024. source Source
  21. United Kingdom, Foreign Secretary's statement to Parliament, September 8, 2026. source Source
  22. UK Parliament, response concerning licences that would materially contribute to the occupation, September 16, 2026. source Source
  23. Government of Slovenia, decision no. 51000-20/2025/2 concerning arms, July 31, 2025. source Source
  24. Government of Slovenia, 346th correspondence session, starting points for economic measures, August 6, 2025. source Source
  25. Government of Slovenia, second regular session, revocations and explanations, June 11, 2026. source Source
  26. White House archive, presidential statement of September 14, 2016 on the USD 38 billion FY2019–FY2028 security-assistance memorandum. This accessible archived primary statement replaces a State Department archive link that returned a technical error during C5. source Source 1 Source 2
  27. US Department of State, U.S. Relations with Israel, fact sheet, January 30, 2023. This archived page is indexed, but direct access was intermittently blocked in C5; the White House sources V26 and V33 corroborate the memorandum amounts. source Source 1 Source 2
  28. OHCHR, A/HRC/63/20, database of businesses associated with settlement-related activities, September 2026. source Source
  29. EUR-Lex, procedure 2025/0890/NLE, proposal COM(2025) 890 dated September 17, 2025; status at research cut-off: ongoing. source Source
  30. UK Parliament, written answer HL3677, October 1, 2026: secondary legislation expected within six to nine months; the new export criterion already applied. source Source
  31. UK Parliament, written answer to question 39624 (answered November 10, 2026), confirming that legislation and detailed guidance for the new settlement-related regime remained forthcoming. source Source
  32. Spain's Official State Gazette (BOE), resolution of February 10, 2026, BOE-A-2026-3268: updated locality and postal-code list for implementing Article 3. source Source
  33. White House (archive), Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel, September 14, 2016; USD 33 billion in FMF and USD 5 billion for missile-defence programmes in FY2019–FY2028. source Source

Note on sources: The research cut-off is November 12, 2026, and not all 33 web pages could be accessed directly. Later outcomes of dynamic listings, new laws and administrative licences are not automatically verified. URLs are references, not guarantees that a webpage will remain unchanged at publication. The [V] labels in the text refer to the entries below.