Settlers, the Military, and the State: Who Enables the Occupation?
Who enables the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank? We examine settlers, the military, state decisions and the legal framework.
Conceptual illustration of settlement development, infrastructure and restrictions on movement in the occupied West Bank. The scene is not a documentary photograph or an exact depiction of a specific location.
Introduction: Who Decides, Who Acts, and Who Is Responsible?
Consider a situation in which an Israeli settler erects a fence in an area where a Palestinian family has grazed livestock for decades. At first glance, it may appear to be a dispute between neighbors. But if a road, an electricity connection, a military restriction on approaching the area, and a subsequent administrative decision follow the fence, the question is no longer simply what one individual did. We must also ask who made the decision, who provided the land and infrastructure, who is responsible for protecting residents, and to whom responsibility can be attributed.
Settlement policy in the occupied West Bank is not merely the sum of private initiatives. Official Israeli descriptions of the Civil Administration expressly set out public powers over spatial planning, land registration, state land, and building enforcement [3] [4] [5] [6]. The European Union documented extensive approvals of new settlements and planning schemes in 2025 [8]. At the same time, it would be unjustified to infer from the actions of institutions that every attack by an individual settler is ordered by the government, or that all Israeli officials support violence.
This article therefore distinguishes between settlement policy, administrative decisions, individual attacks, action or inaction by the police and military, and different forms of legal responsibility. It draws on official documents, court decisions, UN and EU data, and reports by Israeli research and human-rights organizations. An organization's findings are not automatically judicially established facts; nor is an official position, in itself, proof that a particular action is lawful.
How Today's Settlement Network Emerged After 1967
Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, during the June 1967 war. Settlements subsequently expanded under different political administrations: sometimes through direct government decisions, and sometimes through initiatives by settler movements that later received state support or recognition. Historically, Israel's administrative classification of these areas must be distinguished from their status under international law.
The Oslo agreements of 1993 and 1995 provided for an interim arrangement. Oslo II divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, envisaging the transfer of certain powers and further negotiations on final-status issues including settlements, Jerusalem, and borders [17]. Interim authority in Area C is not equivalent to Israeli sovereignty over that area under international law. Nor should the planning and building rules governing East Jerusalem be treated as entirely identical to the Area C regime: its administration differs under Israeli domestic law, while international law continues to regard it as occupied territory.
In 2005, Israel removed its civilian settlements from Gaza. This is an important qualification in any historical account: the current network of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is not the same as the position of civilian settlements in Gaza after the 2005 withdrawal. Nor can Gaza's wider legal and security regime be explained by that fact alone.
Administrative changes introduced from 2023 onward marked another important turning point. In report A/80/337, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry describes the transfer of some civilian powers on February 23, 2023, to a settlements-related structure within the Ministry of Defence, and a change to the procedure for approving plans on June 18 of that year [7]. This is the account of a UN investigative body; assessing any particular administrative decision still requires examining its own document, signatory, and date.
Which Institution Does What?
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are the principal military security force in the occupied West Bank. Other actors include the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the Civil Administration and its land and planning departments, the Israel Police and Border Police, government ministries, and municipal or settlement local authorities. Their responsibilities differ: security operations, land decisions, planning, and criminal investigations are not the same function.
The Civil Administration's official description of its Central Planning Bureau says it manages planning policy, considers plans and building permits in Area C, and supports planning committees. Among the functions listed on the official website is the handling of licensing and construction in what the agency calls the “Palestinian sector” [3]. The Land Registry maintains ownership records and registration procedures [4], while the Custodian of Government and Abandoned Property deals with state parcels, land disputes, infrastructure works, and allocations under the Israeli rules applicable to the territory [6]. These descriptions establish that the settlement landscape is connected to public administration; they do not establish whether a particular parcel in a particular dispute was lawfully acquired.
When an authority declares land to be “state land,” the designation has practical consequences. But the label does not neutrally resolve every ownership question: the legal basis, existing rights of users and owners, opportunities for objection, and limits imposed on occupation administration by international law all need to be examined.
The changing position of civilian authorities also matters. According to UN reporting, transfers of powers since 2023 have strengthened the role of civilian political structures in settlement policy [7]. It would nevertheless be excessive to attribute every subsequent police, military, and land decision automatically to an individual minister. Responsibility must be determined by reference to concrete powers and acts.
| Actor | What can be documented | What this does not establish by itself |
|---|---|---|
| Civil Administration / planning bodies | Plans, permits, designated areas, and procedures [3] | That every planned building has been constructed or every act is lawful |
| Land Registry / land custodian | Registration, administration, and allocations [4] [6] | Final resolution of all private property rights |
| IDF / security bodies | Security measures, access restrictions, implementation of specific orders | That every such measure is equivalent to a police investigation |
| Police and prosecutors | Arrests, investigations, and indictments | That a suspect is guilty, or that an indictment is a conviction |
| Municipalities and ministries | Initiatives, infrastructure programs, and tenders | That funds have already been disbursed or a project completed |
Plans, Permits, and Tenders: How Policy Changes the Landscape
To understand settlement expansion, it is essential to distinguish the stages: a proposal and planning scheme, possible approval of that scheme, publication of a tender, submission of bids, selection of a contractor, contracts, building permits, and only then construction. The precise sequence can vary between projects and administrative regimes. Housing units approved in planning are not housing units already built.
On July 17, 2026, the European External Action Service published its report covering the 2025 calendar year. It states that Israel approved plans for 54 new official settlements in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, while 86 new outposts were established according to its monitoring [8]. These are different categories: the first refers to official planning approvals for new settlements, the second to reportedly newly established outposts. Adding them together and claiming that “140 settlements were built” would be incorrect.
The same report identifies 27,941 housing units proceeding through planning processes in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem and another 35,370 units in East Jerusalem, for a total of 63,311 planned units in 2025 [8]. The EU institution expressly cautions that plans have not yet been implemented. This measures the scale of planning activity, not the number of new homes whose keys have been handed over.
By contrast, demolition of an existing Palestinian structure is a physical action that has an immediate impact. When comparing settlement plans with demolition statistics, we must therefore preserve the different units of measurement: projected housing units on the one hand, and structures already demolished and people displaced on the other.
Official Settlements and Outposts Without Domestic Authorization
Under Israel's domestic administrative framework, a distinction exists between an approved settlement and an outpost lacking the necessary formal authorization. That distinction matters: it can affect enforcement against unauthorized construction, land allocation, or the removal of an outpost. Yet even if Israeli authorities subsequently recognize an outpost, that does not resolve the international-law question of transferring the occupying power's civilian population into occupied territory.
In Resolution 2334 (2016), the UN Security Council determined that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of international law [2]. In its advisory opinion of July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed settlement policy as part of Israel's unlawful continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory and stated that Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity and evacuate settlers [1]. This is an international-law assessment of the state and its obligations, not a criminal judgment against every resident of a particular settlement.
Israel has also taken steps to restrict certain outposts. On November 11, 2026, the Israeli outlet The Times of Israel, reporting statements by the security forces, said that Israeli forces had removed four unauthorized outposts over November 9 and 10. The military described these outposts as sites from which repeated violence and unlawful activity had originated. It also reported the arrest of four suspects in connection with a separate September attack on security forces; the removals and arrests were distinct measures, not four arrests for the four outposts [14]. This is a documented countermeasure, not proof that the wider problem of violence has been solved.
Judicial oversight is also significant. On June 9, 2020, Israel's Supreme Court struck down, in case HCJ 1308/17, legislation that had allowed retrospective regularization of certain settlement construction on land including privately owned Palestinian property. According to a legal summary by the US Library of Congress, the court found, among other things, disproportionate interference with Palestinian residents' property rights, equality, and dignity [15]. This example demonstrates that Israeli courts have not invariably upheld actions by their own legislature and executive. But invalidating that law in 2020 was not a blanket judicial ban on all settlements.
When Violence Occurs: Police, Military, and the Protection of Victims
Settler violence is not the same act as approving a planning scheme. For any individual attack, the alleged perpetrator's identity, the location, available evidence, and the conduct of the police and other competent forces must be established. Conversely, the conduct of the authorities matters precisely because security and justice institutions determine whether people at risk are protected and whether attacks are effectively investigated.
OCHA recorded 1,828 attacks by Israeli settlers causing casualties and/or property damage in 2025; the EU cites that figure in its annual report [8]. Between October 27 and November 2, 2026, OCHA recorded 64 such attacks in the West Bank, identifying 41 incidents related to the olive harvest in the detailed narrative. A prominent graphic in the same report also uses the broader figure of 64 for olive-harvest-related attacks. This research therefore follows the detailed text and flags the inconsistency in the presentation [11]. OCHA also reports incidents in which, according to affected people, Israeli forces participated in or were present during settler attacks; these are reports about incidents, not automatically final criminal findings.
The Israeli NGO Yesh Din monitors police files involving ideologically motivated offenses by Israeli civilians against Palestinians. In a data sheet published in January 2026 covering 2005–2025, it reports that 93.6% of the investigation files it monitored were closed without an indictment, while 3% of monitored files resulted in a full or partial conviction [12]. Both indicators concern files monitored by the organization: the 3% figure is the share of files leading to full or partial convictions, not the percentage of convicted people among all residents or a measure of the entire state's criminal statistics. This denominator must be distinguished from the number of all incidents, complaints, and files in official national records. Yesh Din interprets the findings as evidence of a systemic law-enforcement failure; any conclusion about intentionality is the organization's interpretation and requires additional evidence in a particular case.
Police action has also been documented. According to a police account reported by The Times of Israel on October 19, 2026, officers detained ten Israeli suspects in connection with reported attacks on Palestinians, foreign diplomats, and a photojournalist [13]. This establishes that investigators acted, not that all suspects were later indicted or convicted. On the same day, Israel’s defense minister said that responsibility for dealing with settler violence — including prevention, investigation, and prosecution — should lie with the Israel Police [20]. This is his stated allocation of responsibility; it does not by itself establish the legal division of functions between investigators and prosecutors. Statements defining responsibility must, however, be tested against how that responsibility is carried out in practice.
The most consequential question is not whether one can find an example of inaction or an example of an arrest. Both exist. The question is whether the authorities consistently, impartially, and effectively protect people at risk, regardless of nationality, and how the long-term outcomes of investigations relate to the official policy governing the territory.
E1 and Ma’ale Adumim: Tracing Decisions Through to Demolitions
The E1 area east of Jerusalem, next to the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, offers an especially revealing case study. Planning documents, tenders, political objectives, legal proceedings, and consequences for Palestinian Bedouin communities can all be examined in relation to the same area.
In August 2025, plans for 3,401 housing units in E1 received final planning approval. On August 18, 2026, a tender for 1,234 units was published and opened for bids; the remaining planned tranche comprises 2,167 units. Together these amount to 3,401 units: they are not 6,802 separate housing units [8] [9]. According to Peace Now, the deadline for submitting bids for the first tender was October 19, 2026. After intervention by Israel’s attorney general during the election period, the opening of the tender box and consideration of bids were postponed until no earlier than November 19, 2026; as of the November 12 research cutoff, this date remained in the future [10].
For the second tranche of 2,167 units, Ir Amim reported in September that bidding was scheduled to open on October 25, but the announced opening did not take place [9] [21]. According to newer reporting dated November 10 and 11, 2026, citing a joint statement by Ir Amim, Bimkom, and Peace Now and a published revised timetable, bidding was expected to open on December 1, 2026, with a submission deadline of December 28 [22]. These are announced future dates, not proof that bidding had already opened, contractors had been selected, or construction had started. The original tender portal entry and complete administrative decision setting this revised timetable were not independently examined for this article.
The essential distinction, therefore, is that units put out to tender are not finished homes. In September 2026, Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which emphasizes Israeli strategic interests, itself expressly noted that issuing a tender is not the start of construction. Its analysis describes E1 as significant to Israeli security and transportation strategy, while warning that unilateral action could undermine prospects for an agreement and Palestinian territorial contiguity [18]. Thus, criticism of E1 is not confined to Palestinian or international organizations.
One event that is more than a plan on paper is the demolition in Bir al-Maskub. In a joint publication dated November 9, 2026, Ir Amim, Bimkom, and Peace Now stated that Israeli authorities had demolished roughly half the structures of this Bedouin community inside the E1 area on November 3: approximately four clusters of residential and auxiliary structures, displacing around 20 residents, according to the organizations [21]. They also cite a statement by the mayor of Ma’ale Adumim, Guy Yifrah, that the demolition was initiated by the municipality following a request submitted to COGAT. This is a documented claim about an institutional initiative, which the organizations attribute to a public statement by the mayor; it is not a substitute for reviewing the original administrative demolition order, land documentation, and enforcement file. Those documents were not examined directly in this editorial revision.
The organizations interpret the demolitions as the beginning of implementation of the wider settlement plan. The temporal and geographic connection does not, by itself, conclusively establish as a matter of law that every removed structure was demolished under a contract awarded to an E1 building contractor. Such a conclusion would conflate two processes: demolishing Palestinian structures and awarding a contract to construct housing. What can be documented is that the consequences of reshaping the territory for settlement can be felt before residential construction begins.
E1 Timeline — as of November 12, 2026
| Date | Event | What is established, and what remains unproven |
|---|---|---|
| August 2025 | Plans for 3,401 units approved | A planning milestone, not construction [8] |
| August 18, 2026 | Tender issued for 1,234 units | Beginning of the bidding procedure [9] |
| September 2026 | Timetable announced for opening bids for 2,167 units on October 25 | Later changed or not implemented [9] [21] |
| October 19, 2026 | Bidding closed for the first tender (1,234 units) | Selection of winning bidders postponed [10] |
| November 3, 2026 | Demolition in Bir al-Maskub | Physical demolition and displacement reported by three organizations [21] |
| November 10–11, 2026 | Revised timetable for the second tranche reported | Bidding expected from December 1 to 28; secondary source, not proof that the process occurred [22] |
| November 19, 2026 | Earliest scheduled opening of bids for the first tender | Still a future date at the research cutoff; no outcome established [10] [23] |
| December 1, 2026 | Announced opening of second tranche (2,167 units) | Future date; no outcome available on November 12 [22] |
Who Provides Roads, Infrastructure, and Funding?
Settlement does not depend on housing alone. It also requires access roads, water, electricity, land, administrative services, and security. Examining financial and infrastructure decisions is therefore essential to understanding how a political objective can gradually become a more permanent presence on the ground.
In September 2025, when an outline agreement to develop Ma’ale Adumim and E1 was announced, Peace Now summarized claims by Israel's housing ministry that approximately three billion Israeli shekels in infrastructure investment were envisaged for the broader area, associated with approximately 7,600 housing units, including around 3,400 in E1 [19]. This does not prove that the three billion shekels had already been paid to contractors, nor is it the construction cost of the 3,401 E1 apartments themselves. It is a development funding framework, whose actual payments and beneficiaries would require examining contracts and budget execution reports.
The UN Commission of Inquiry's August 2025 report also describes state channels for financing settlements, including ministries and related organizations [7]. Nevertheless, every financial claim should distinguish among a commitment, a budget line, a tender, a contract, and a payment. Which political or economic actors actually benefit financially from these decisions is the central subject of the next article, PL-07. For the present discussion, the important point is that settlement infrastructure is developed through public institutions and financial mechanisms, not solely through private purchases by individuals.
Who in Israel Opposes Settlement Encroachment and Violence?
The notion that all Israelis agree on settlement policy is factually incorrect. Organizations such as Yesh Din, Peace Now, Ir Amim, and Bimkom publicly document violations, examine planning schemes, initiate legal challenges, and report on attacks or evictions. These organizations have openly advocacy-oriented or critical perspectives; their documentation should therefore be checked and attributed to them by name, not dismissed in advance.
Israel's judiciary, too, has in some instances stopped legislation or executive decisions. The 2020 judgment concerning the law intended to retroactively regularize certain disputed settlement construction is a concrete example of substantive judicial review [15]. In the E1 case, according to Peace Now, Israel's Supreme Court in October 2026 rejected challenges brought by the Ma’ale Adumim municipality and Minister Bezalel Smotrich against the attorney general's decision to postpone opening bids because of elections [10]. That decision did not invalidate E1 as such; its significance was different and narrower.
Similarly, Israeli security agencies reported arrests of violence suspects and removal of contested outposts in autumn 2026 [13] [14]. Those actions contradict any claim that state agencies never intervene. Yet the large number of recorded attacks and low indictment rates in Yesh Din's monitored sample raise a legitimate question about the scope, effectiveness, and impartiality of these interventions. Answering it requires comparing investigations opened, evidentiary decisions, and final outcomes — not merely individual media headlines.
State policy, the conduct of a particular ministry, judicial practice, and the conduct of Israeli citizens are not one and the same. Likewise, criticism of a particular Israeli settlement policy is not criticism of Jews as a religious or ethnic community.
When Can Responsibility Be Attributed to the State, and When to an Individual?
Responsibility must be assessed on several evidentiary levels. The first is a documented state measure: is there an order, plan, land allocation, tender, or implementation? The second is the conduct of a public official: who signed or carried out a decision? The third is protection against violence: what did the authorities know, what could they have prevented, and how did they respond? The fourth is individual responsibility: who committed an attack, what does the evidence show, and was that person found guilty through the appropriate legal process?
In its 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice specifically examined violence against Palestinians in paragraphs 148–154 and concluded that the systematic failure to effectively prevent or punish attacks by settlers, as well as excessive use of force by Israeli authorities, was inconsistent with Israel's obligations. In paragraphs 155–156, it concluded that Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the associated regime, had been established and maintained in violation of international law [1] [24]. This is a significant international judicial assessment of state responsibility, not merely a finding by an individual NGO.
Individual criminal responsibility for assault, arson, threats, or abuse of authority, by contrast, requires proof of the act, the applicable mental element, and any other legal elements of the offense. The ICJ's findings do not replace an investigation of a perpetrator, an indictment, or a criminal judgment. The international-law illegality of settlement policy does not automatically make every individual settler criminally guilty. Conversely, a particular arrest does not resolve whether state bodies have, through their policies, created conditions in which abuses recur.
Israel has long based its official legal argument on the claim that the territories are “disputed” rather than occupied, on historic Jewish connections to the land, on security needs, and on the need for final-status negotiations [16]. This position should be presented fairly; the cited source is an archived foreign ministry publication from 2004, not a new statement from November 2026. The existence of historical connections or security concerns does not, in itself, determine the territory's status under international law or the legality of a particular settlement activity.
The prevailing international-law assessment is different. In Resolution 2334, the Security Council affirmed the illegality of settlement activity in 2016 [2], and in its 2024 advisory opinion the ICJ found Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful and identified the state's related obligations [1]. The advisory opinion is an authoritative interpretation of international law, but it is not a criminal conviction of named individuals. A Security Council resolution, an advisory opinion, an administrative decision, and a criminal conviction are distinct legal instruments and should never be conflated.
Conclusion: The Mechanism Matters More Than a Single Face
Investigating who enables settlement expansion reveals more than a list of violent individuals. The documents expose a chain of state, administrative, financial, and security powers that determines where new construction may take place, which land is allocated, who gains access to roads, and who faces demolition or restrictions on movement. This institutional dimension is documented in official descriptions of powers, European reports, judicial decisions, and the E1 case study.
At the same time, the distinction between this broader pattern and proof of an individual criminal offense must be preserved. Some attacks are documented by OCHA and human-rights organizations, some suspects have been arrested, and for many other cases no publicly verified final judicial outcome is available. Claiming that the government directly ordered every attack would go beyond the available evidence. Claiming that the state has nothing to do with settlement policy, however, would contradict its own descriptions of administrative authority and official programs.
The moral question, then, is not simply whether an individual may lay claim to a particular piece of land, but whether a political and legal system can equally protect the homes, safety, and dignity of everyone who lives there. The security of one population cannot automatically cancel the rights of another; violence against civilians does not become permissible because of religion, citizenship, or historical memory. That same standard must guide our assessment of state decisions, attacks by settlers, and institutional responses.
Sources and further reading
- V01] International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, advisory opinion, July 19, 2024. Official case page: source ; UN publication and summary: source . An advisory opinion, not an individual criminal judgment. Source 1 Source 2
- V02] UN Security Council, S/RES/2334 (2016), December 23, 2016, operative paragraphs 1–2: source . Source
- V03] Israeli Civil Administration/COGAT, Central Planning Bureau, official description of responsibilities: source . Source
- V04] Israeli Civil Administration/COGAT, Land Registry: source . Source
- V05] Israeli Civil Administration/COGAT, Supervision Unit, description of responsibilities: source . Source
- V06] Israeli Civil Administration/COGAT, Government Property & Abandoned Lands: source . Source
- V07] UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/80/337, August 14, 2025, especially paragraphs 27–37: source . Findings reached using the Commission's methodology; not criminal judgments on every individual event. Source
- V08] European External Action Service, 2025 Report on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, published July 17, 2026: source . For 2025, the EU reports 54 approvals of new official settlements, 86 new outposts, and 63,311 housing units in planning procedures (not completed). Source
- V09] Peace Now, E1 Tender Published and Open for Bidding, published August 19, 2026 (event on August 18): source ; Ir Amim, notice concerning 2,167 units, September 16, 2026: source . Historical September timetable; for the later November revision, see [PL06-V24]. The official tender portal was not examined directly. Source 1 Source 2
- V10] Peace Now, report on an Israeli Supreme Court decision and the postponement of opening bids until November 19, 2026, published October 26, 2026: source . Includes a link to an official court document in Hebrew; the finding drawn from it here is limited to the timetable of the procedure. Source
- V11] OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Report, October 15 and November 5, 2026: source ; source . Incident monitoring according to OCHA's methodology; the November report contains an inconsistency between its highlighted figure and detailed narrative on the olive harvest. Source 1 Source 2
- V12] Yesh Din, Data Sheet: Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank (Settler violence) 2005–2025, January 1, 2026: source . The figures of 93.6% and 3% refer to monitored investigation files, not the entire official record. Source
- V13] The Times of Israel, report of a police account concerning ten detained suspects, October 19, 2026: source . Detention is not conviction. Source
- V14] The Times of Israel, removals of four outposts and arrests according to official accounts, November 11, 2026: source . Source
- V15] US Library of Congress, legal summary of Israeli decision HCJ 1308/17 (judgment of June 9, 2020): source . A summary of the judgment; the full original judgment was not directly examined. Source
- V16] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, archived official argument concerning the status of the “disputed” territories, February 17, 2004: source . Historical official position, not the latest interpretation of international law by an international court. Source
- V17] Oslo II, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1995, text hosted in a UN collection: source . Source
- V18] Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), E1 – Construction Today, Undermining an Arrangement Tomorrow, September 2026: source . Strategic analysis by an Israeli research institute, not a judicial decision. Source
- V19] Peace Now, Netanyahu to Sign Agreement for Accelerated Development in Maale Adumim and E1, September 11, 2025: source . Report on a framework investment of approximately NIS 3 billion, based on housing ministry statements; original financial disbursements were not verified. Source
- V22] The Times of Israel, defense minister's statement on police responsibility for settler violence, October 19, 2026: source . A political/executive position, not the outcome of investigations. Source
- V23] Ir Amim, Bimkom, Peace Now, Israel Begins Demolishing Palestinian Bedouin Community in E1 Settlement Area, November 9, 2026: source . Report by three organizations with stated advocacy interests; their documented claims should be distinguished from interpretations concerning purpose and direct causation. Source
- V24] Anadolu Agency, reporting dated November 10, 2026 (Turkish edition) and November 11, 2026 (English edition) on statements by Ir Amim/Bimkom/Peace Now and the revised timetable for the second E1 tender (2,167 units: December 1–28, 2026): source . Secondary evidence of a planned schedule; the original tender portal was not directly verified. Source
- V25] Peace Now, Ir Amim, Bimkom and Peace Now to the Attorney General: Freeze the Tender in E1 Until a New Government is Formed, November 11, 2026. Hebrew-language publication verified at source ; previously listed English URL source was not directly accessible during C5. Records a request by the organizations to delay opening bids for 1,234 units; it does not establish that the request was granted. Source 1 Source 2
- V26] UN / International Court of Justice, officially published summary of the July 19, 2024 advisory opinion, sections Violence against Palestinians (paragraphs 148–154) and Conclusion on settlement policy (155–156): source . An official summary of the ICJ's legal assessment, not a criminal judgment against individuals. Source