SeriesWho Owns the World? Part 34 / 37

How Do Financial Institutions Lobby for the Rules That Govern Them?

Investigates how financial institutions seek to influence regulators and rule-making, distinguishing documented conduct from allegations.

Symbolic editorial illustration generated with AI.

Financial institutions do not merely operate within the rules established by governments and regulators. They also participate in shaping them. Banks, asset managers and their trade associations propose legislative changes, prepare expert analyses and explain the consequences of proposed measures to regulators. Economic power is therefore not simply a question of who owns capital, but also of who can influence the rules governing its use.

Lobbying as an economic mechanism

Lobbying is an organised effort to influence public decision-making. The financial sector has a particular interest in this process: rules on bank capital, fund management, disclosure and fees determine operating costs, exposure to risk and revenues. A change to an apparently technical provision can affect which activities are profitable, who can enter a market and who bears the costs of financial risks.

Institutions exert influence directly or through trade associations that pool their members' expertise, resources and common interests. Public consultations and expert submissions can be legitimate and help regulators understand the practical consequences of regulations. Large market participants, however, generally have more resources to devote to lengthy and demanding proceedings than individual savers. This imbalance in capacity does not in itself prove that a regulator is subordinate to the industry, but it is a reason to examine whose arguments actually influenced a decision.

How can we follow the money and contacts with decision-makers?

The US Lobbying Disclosure Act requires registered lobbyists or organisations to file quarterly reports. These contain information about clients, issue areas, institutions targeted by lobbying, and estimated income or expenses. A report can help us identify who funded the activity and which issues they sought to address. It does not necessarily reveal how much was spent on each individual legislative provision or which argument changed the decision. [1]

In the European Union, a 2021 interinstitutional agreement governs the Transparency Register. Covered activities include meetings, consultation submissions and the preparation of position papers when intended to influence European policy. Registration is a condition for certain contacts and activities, rather than a universal requirement for every political contact. In a 2024 special report, the European Court of Auditors found that the register provided useful information, but that during the audited period of 2019–2022 there were gaps in the coverage of activities, data quality and enforcement of requirements. [2][3][4]

Tracing financial connections therefore does not end with the register. The specific proposal, stakeholder responses, any available meeting records, the final decision and its rationale must also be examined. Only by comparing these documents can we establish how far the evidence of influence extends.

Investment Company Institute: a case study in investment fund regulation

The Investment Company Institute (ICI) is a major US investment fund trade association. In an LD-2 report signed on 19 July 2024, it disclosed estimated lobbying expenses of US$1,250,000 for the reporting period. Among the issues listed were proposals by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concerning fund liquidity, mandatory swing pricing and an order-submission cut-off time. The House of Representatives and the Senate were identified as the institutions lobbied on financial issues. The amount covers reported lobbying throughout the reporting period, not just the SEC proposal in question. [5]

Glass façade of the SEC headquarters with three flags in front of the entrance.
Headquarters of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Washington, 13 October 2009. The photograph shows the institution, not meetings in the case discussed. Image: AgnosticPreachersKid / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 3.0 CC BY-SA 3.0

Among other objectives, the SEC's November 2022 proposal sought to limit the transfer of transaction costs to investors who remain in an open-end fund when other investors subscribe or redeem their holdings. Swing pricing adjusts a fund's net asset value per share so that trading costs arising from net inflows or outflows are borne to a greater extent by investors associated with those flows. The mechanism was also intended to reduce the incentive to redeem quickly during market turmoil. [6]

On 14 February 2023, ICI opposed the proposal, arguing that the proposed combination of rules would create operational difficulties and impair investors' access to funds. By contrast, in its response dated 1 February 2023, CFA Institute supported the proposed swing pricing mechanism as a means of allocating costs more fairly and reducing the risk of widespread redemptions. Its submission addressed swing pricing, not the SEC proposal as a whole. The regulatory docket also contains published records of meetings with representatives of ICI and other participants, including BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Global Advisors. [7][8][9]

On 28 August 2024, the SEC adopted some of the proposed changes, primarily concerning reporting on Forms N-PORT and N-CEN, and issued guidance on liquidity risk. It did not adopt mandatory swing pricing or the proposed cut-off time in that decision. In explaining the final rule, the SEC considered comments from various participants and also referred to ICI. In April 2025, it postponed the effective date of the N-PORT amendments. [10][11]

With respect to the two omitted measures, the outcome was consistent with ICI's position. The documents thus establish organised advocacy and partial alignment with the regulatory outcome. They do not establish that ICI's lobbying was the decisive cause or that the association determined the final wording. The importance of this case lies precisely in our ability to trace the public record from proposal to decision without speculating about private arrangements.

Basel III: when banks participate in setting capital requirements

Capital requirements determine how much capital a bank must hold in relation to its activities and risks. Greater loss-absorbing capacity can reduce risk to the financial system, but changes in requirements can also affect banks' funding costs and business decisions. This is where the interests of banks, borrowers and regulators intersect.

White stone façade of the Marriner S. Eccles Building with its central entrance and flag.
Marriner S. Eccles Building, headquarters of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Washington, 13 August 2008. The photograph provides institutional context for the discussion of capital requirements. Image: AgnosticPreachersKid; popravek perspektive in izrez / perspective correction and crop: Jbarta / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 3.0 CC BY-SA 3.0

In response to the US Basel III Endgame proposal, the Bank Policy Institute (BPI) and the American Bankers Association submitted joint comments on 16 January 2024. They argued that the proposed requirements were inadequately justified and would increase the cost of credit and harm the economy. On the same day, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association warned of consequences for capital market activities. These are the positions of organisations representing the affected sector, not independently established future effects. [12][13]

On 10 September 2024, Michael S. Barr, then the Federal Reserve's Vice Chair for Supervision, announced that he would recommend a revised proposal containing significant changes. He explicitly linked the anticipated adjustments to the feedback received during the public consultation, while noting that the regulators had not yet made their final decisions. His position did not constitute a new rule in force. On 19 March 2026, US banking regulators released three new proposals to adjust the capital framework; in a separate statement, Barr opposed the package as a whole because of the anticipated reduction in requirements. [14][15][16]

The case shows that financial institutions can publicly challenge regulators' calculations and that regulators can change course following consultations. In assessing such changes, we need to examine whether the original models genuinely mismeasured risk or whether the changes primarily reduced the burden on regulated institutions. Both are possible, and one does not exclude the other. The timing of industry responses alone does not establish who caused a particular change.

The European Union: the dispute over investment sales commissions

On 24 May 2023, the European Commission presented its retail investment strategy. Proposed measures included stricter procedures for assessing the balance between the costs and benefits of investment products, benchmarks, and restrictions on inducements for sales without investment advice. When a distributor receives payment from a product provider, there is a risk that its recommendations or offerings will be shaped partly by its own revenues rather than solely by investors' needs. [17]

Hemicycle of the European Parliament in Brussels during a plenary session.
Plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels, 29 November 2023. The photograph does not establish that the specific retail investment strategy was being debated. Image: TCsongor / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0 CC BY-SA 4.0

In its August 2023 response, the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) warned of possible adverse effects from uniform quantitative benchmarks. In its November position, it proposed dropping the ban on commissions for non-advised sales and adopting a different approach to assessing benefits for investors. The European consumer organisation BEUC, by contrast, considered even a partial ban too modest a measure and called for more extensive action to eliminate the conflict of interest. [18][19][20]

On 18 December 2025, the Council of the EU announced a political agreement with the Parliament. With respect to inducements, the agreement envisaged stronger rules on acting in clients' best interests, a requirement for a tangible benefit to clients and more transparent cost disclosures; Member States would still be permitted to introduce a ban. This describes the political agreement reached, not a claim that these rules are already in force. [21]

Here too, part of the outcome moves towards the industry's demands, while some investor protection requirements remain. To examine individual changes, it would be necessary to trace proposed amendments, negotiating documents and explanatory statements. Divergent interests are not unusual. The democratic question is whether we can understand why decision-makers preferred one solution to another and whose costs and benefits were taken into account.

The historical dimension: funding the Trilateral Commission

Influence on public policy is not limited to direct lobbying during legislative proceedings. Private capital can also support long-term research and discussion infrastructure through which policy proposals are developed, contacts are established and ideas are exchanged. A historical example is the Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 with David Rockefeller playing a major initiating role.

A 2011 finding aid from the Rockefeller Archive Center identifies David Rockefeller, the Kettering Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Lilly Endowment and the Ford Foundation in connection with early funding. The Commission itself states that Ford Foundation support was the most important component of its funding during its first three years, 1973–1976. Fundraising subsequently became decentralised, and corporate contributions grew in importance in the United States. The finding aid also notes that some routine financial documentation was removed before the records were transferred to the archive. The specific Ford grant document, its amount and its terms were not obtained directly in the course of this research. [22][23]

Financial support enables such an organisation to operate, but does not by itself establish that the funder dictates its conclusions or that the organisation controls governments. To make such a claim, we would need specific documents concerning the terms of funding, a connection between a particular proposal and a government decision, and other independent evidence. The distinction between the infrastructure available for political influence and the actual exercise of public authority is essential. Historical networks are therefore treated here as a separate form of potential influence, not as evidence of lobbying under contemporary registration rules.

From access to regulatory capture

Regulatory capture is the risk that an authority charged with overseeing a sector in the public interest begins systematically to prioritise the interests of the entities it regulates. It does not necessarily involve bribery or unlawful conduct. It can also develop through reliance on industry data, imbalances in technical expertise or a narrow circle of stakeholders consulted. Its existence, however, must be established through patterns of decisions and institutional conduct, not merely through the number of meetings.

When examining a particular case, we must ask four questions: who funded the advocacy, what change did they seek, who made the decision, and what consequences did the decision have for different groups? Lobbying data help answer the first questions, regulatory documents the second and third, and actual data on business operations and outcomes the fourth. Expenditure, access, alignment between positions and outcomes, and demonstrated causation are different levels of evidence.

Financial institutions can contribute valuable expertise to the development of rules. Democratic oversight, however, must enable us to examine their claims, compare them with other positions and determine whether risks and costs were distributed fairly. Decision-makers must be accountable to the public, not merely to the organisations with the greatest resources to gain access to them.

Who determines the rules of capital?

Economic power is not measured solely in assets and voting rights. The ability to influence the framework within which profits are generated, risks are transferred and costs are distributed matters too. This ability is most apparent when we have actual disclosures of lobbying expenses, stakeholder positions and reasoned decisions by public authorities before us.

The next article in the series will examine a different but related mechanism: the influence of the advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis on shareholder decisions. There, too, it is essential to distinguish between a recommendation, an actual vote and the right to make a decision.

Sources and further reading

  1. U.S. Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 1604 — Reports by registered lobbyists. Source
  2. European Parliament, Council, European Commission. Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 on a mandatory transparency register. Source
  3. European Union. Transparency Register — Guidelines. Source
  4. European Court of Auditors. Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities. Source
  5. Investment Company Institute. LD-2 lobbying report, signed 19 July 2024. Source
  6. SEC. Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Swing Pricing; Form N-PORT Reporting, proposed rule, 33-11130, 2 Nov 2022. Source
  7. Investment Company Institute. ICI Comment Letter on Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Swing Pricing, 14 Feb 2023. Source
  8. CFA Institute. Comment Letter to the SEC, File S7-26-22, 1 Feb 2023. Source
  9. SEC. Public comments and meeting memoranda, File S7-26-22. Source
  10. SEC. Form N-PORT and Form N-CEN Reporting; Guidance on Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs, IC-35308, 28 Aug 2024. Source
  11. SEC. Form N-PORT Reporting; Extension of Effective and Compliance Dates, IC-35538, 16 Apr 2025. Source
  12. BPI, American Bankers Association. BPI and ABA Comment on Basel Endgame Proposal, 16 Jan 2024. Source
  13. SIFMA, ISDA. SIFMA Responds to U.S. Basel III and G-SIB Surcharge Consultations, 16 Jan 2024. Source
  14. Michael S. Barr, Federal Reserve. The Next Steps on Capital, 10 Sep 2024. Source
  15. Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC. Agencies request comment on proposals to modernize the regulatory capital framework and maintain the strength of the banking system, 19 Mar 2026. Source
  16. Michael S. Barr, Federal Reserve. Statement on Bank Capital Proposals, 19 Mar 2026. Source
  17. European Commission. Proposal for a Directive as regards the Union retail investor protection rules, COM(2023) 279 final, 24 May 2023. Source
  18. EFAMA. EC Have Your Say consultation on the EU Strategy for Retail Investors, 28 Aug 2023. Source
  19. EFAMA. Retail Investment Strategy: Positive elements for European Investors and ones that should be reconsidered, 27 Nov 2023. Source
  20. BEUC. European Commission proposes insufficient reform to fix broken retail investment market, 24 May 2023. Source
  21. Council of the European Union. Retail investment strategy: Council and Parliament agree on package to empower consumers while boosting markets, 18 Dec 2025. Source
  22. Robert Battaly, Rockefeller Archive Center. The Trilateral Commission (North America) Records, finding aid, April 2011. Source
  23. The Trilateral Commission. North America — North American Group. Source