Two Different Paths out of Yugoslavia: North Macedonia and Montenegro — From a Relatively Peaceful Exit to Ohrid 2001 and the 2006 Referendum

On names: Macedonia and North Macedonia

For the period 1991–2019, the country today called: the Republic of North Macedonia used the constitutional name: Republic of Macedonia. At the United Nations from 1993 to 2019 it was provisionally referred to as: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM. This article therefore uses: Macedonia / Republic of Macedonia for historical events, and: North Macedonia for the present-day name.

1991: a different referendum from Slovenia and Croatia

On 8 September 1991 Macedonia held a referendum on its state status. The question was not simply: “Are you in favour of independence?” Instead it asked whether voters supported: “a sovereign and independent state of Macedonia, with the right to enter a future union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia.”[1] That wording matters. The referendum supported sovereignty and independence, while at the same time it did not close the possibility of: a new, voluntary association of sovereign Yugoslav states.

The result was very clear among those who participated. According to the official parliamentary history, the referendum option was supported by: 95.09% of participating voters, which represented approximately: 72.16% of all registered voters.[1] On 17 September parliament confirmed the result through a declaration establishing: a sovereign and independent state.[1] A new constitutional framework followed on 17 November.[1] But the Albanian boycott showed that political unity was incomplete.

A significant part of the ethnic Albanian population: boycotted the referendum. A later US human-rights report linked that boycott principally to dissatisfaction regarding the constitutional position of Albanians, their classification as a minority/nationality, representation in the police and armed forces and language and educational questions[2]. That does not change: the referendum result. It does show that at the birth of the new state another question was already open: how should the new state function as a shared state of more than one ethnic community?

Independence without a major war. Macedonia was exceptional among the Yugoslav republics. It did not experience a ten-day war like Slovenia, a multi-year war like Croatia and a war on the scale of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In February 1992 the Macedonian presidency and the JNA reached an agreement on: withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army.[3] By the end of March the JNA had withdrawn from the republic without a major armed confrontation.[3]

Why was the exit more peaceful? No single cause can be proven. Important factors included the absence of a large compact Serbian minority comparable to the Krajina, Kiro Gligorov's leadership seeking a negotiated exit, the JNA focusing its principal military priorities elsewhere and an agreement between Skopje and Belgrade on withdrawal. This article therefore does not create the myth: “Macedonia was peaceful because its politicians were morally superior.” More precisely: the structure of the conflict and the alignment of interests were different.

A peaceful exit did not mean a secure geopolitical position

In November 1992 President Kiro Gligorov asked the United Nations for an international presence because of the danger that wars elsewhere in former Yugoslavia could: spill over into Macedonian territory.[4] The Security Council then extended UNPROFOR to Macedonia. This became the first major example of: preventive UN peacekeeping deployment. The mission later received the separate designation: UNPREDEP. The state joined the UN — but under a provisional name.

Because of the dispute with Greece over the country's name, the Security Council in 1993 recommended UN admission under the provisional reference: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.[5] The General Assembly admitted it on 8 April 1993. Resolution 817 did not decide: which historical interpretation of the name was correct. It established: a provisional diplomatic compromise pending settlement of the dispute.[5]

The dispute with Greece was a state-to-state problem, not the same problem as the dispute with the Albanian community. This distinction matters. Greece. The dispute concerned the name, symbols, historical interpretation and alleged implications of the name. The Albanian community in Macedonia. The dispute concerned mainly political equality, language rights, representation, local self-government and the state's status as a multiethnic community. Both affected stability. But they were not: the same conflict.

The 1990s: tensions did not disappear. Albanian political parties participated in parliamentary life and governments, but questions remained concerning representation in public administration, representation in the police, university education in Albanian, local use of language and constitutional symbolism[2]. The Macedonian majority often understood some demands as: a threat to the unitary state. Some Albanian politicians saw the state order as: insufficiently inclusive.

Kosovo 1999 increases the pressure. The Kosovo war had direct consequences for Macedonia. The country received a large wave of Kosovo refugees. At the same time there was greater movement of weapons, movement of armed people and tension along the Kosovo border. That is not proof that the conflict of 2001 was: simply “imported from Kosovo.” But it is important regional context.

The beginning of armed conflict in 2001

In early 2001 fighting between Macedonian security forces and armed ethnic Albanian groups calling themselves the National Liberation Army — NLA / UÇK. intensified near the Kosovo border and then around Tetovo, Kumanovo and other areas of the north and west[6]. In March 2001 the OSCE warned that the violence represented: a serious escalation of regional tension.[6] What did the NLA demand?

The NLA publicly connected its actions primarily to improving Albanian rights, constitutional change and more equal representation. But there were: different interpretations of its broader aims.[7] This article therefore does not say: “The NLA was proven to be seeking the partition of Macedonia.” Nor does it say: “It was merely a peaceful civil-rights movement.” It was: an armed insurgent structure that pursued political objectives partly through violence.

State security forces were not free of abuses either. During the conflict there were documented arbitrary detentions, beatings, mistreatment and attacks on or destruction of civilian property. by members of state security units.[7] On the other side, the NLA and associated forces carried out kidnappings, abuse of civilians, expulsions of some Macedonian residents from areas under their control and attacks on security forces[7].

This was not a repetition of Bosnia. The conflict was serious. But it did not reach the scale of the Bosnian war, a multi-year territorial partition and the industrial scale of ethnic cleansing and mass killing seen in Bosnia. At the height of the fighting, US estimates citing UN figures put displacement at approximately: 170,000 people.[7] A large proportion later returned. The international community insists on preservation of the state.

The EU, NATO and OSCE did not support ethnic partition of the country and changing borders through violence. The Ohrid Framework Agreement explicitly stated: the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unitary character of the state are inviolable.[8] At the same time it required: preservation and reflection of the multiethnic character of society in public life.[8] That was the core compromise.

Ohrid, 13 August 2001

The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed by President Boris Trajkovski, leaders of the principal Macedonian political parties and leaders of the principal Albanian political parties. with political support from representatives of the EU and United States.[9] The agreement rejected: violence as a means of achieving political objectives.[8] What did Ohrid actually change? The agreement established a framework for greater decentralization, more equitable representation of communities in public administration, changes in language use, special parliamentary safeguards for certain identity and local-government issues and police reform[8].

Language: the 20-percent rule. The proposed constitutional changes established that: Macedonian remained the official language throughout the state. A language spoken by at least: 20% of the population would receive additional official functions provided by the constitution and law.[10] In practice this principally meant: Albanian. Ohrid did not create a federal state. The agreement did not divide the country into ethnic republics, create an Albanian entity and recognize a right to secession. On the contrary, it explicitly rejected: territorial solutions to ethnic issues.[8] The compromise was therefore: expanded collective and language rights within a preserved unitary state. NATO: Essential Harvest.

After Ohrid was signed and with the consent of state authorities, NATO launched: Operation Essential Harvest. Its purpose was: the voluntary collection of weapons from Albanian armed groups.[11] During the roughly 30-day mission NATO collected almost: 4,000 weapons.[12] NATO did not arrive to conquer the country. The operation took place at the request of President Boris Trajkovski, after a political settlement, under an agreed ceasefire and with an agreement on voluntary surrender of weapons[11]. This was a very different model from: NATO's bombing of the FRY in 1999. Constitutional changes and amnesty.

Constitutional changes connected with Ohrid were adopted in autumn 2001. In 2002 parliament also enacted an: amnesty for most acts connected with the insurgency, except acts falling under ICTY jurisdiction.[13] The intention was to enable disarmament, restoration of policing, political reintegration of former combatants and stabilization of the state. Did Ohrid solve every problem? No. Ohrid: ended the main armed conflict and changed the institutional framework. It did not eliminate ethnic distrust, disputes over language, symbolic disputes, questions of equitable representation and political polarization. It was: a peace and constitutional compromise, not the end of politics. The key Macedonian lesson.

Macedonia showed in 1991 that it was possible to leave Yugoslavia: without a major war. The year 2001 then showed: a peaceful exit from a federation does not automatically produce internal social integration. State status and: the internal legitimacy of the state model are two different questions. 1992: Montenegro chooses a different direction. While Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were leaving the Yugoslav state framework, Montenegro held a referendum in 1992 and chose: to remain in a new common state with Serbia.[14] That enabled creation of: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — FRY.

It is therefore wrong to present independence in 2006 as fulfilment of one unchanged plan dating from 1991. In 1992 a majority of participating voters supported: a common state with Serbia. The Venice Commission in 2005 expressly recalled that the 1992 referendum had decided that Montenegro would be: part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[14] Independence in 2006 was therefore the result of: political evolution over the following fourteen years.

Montenegro was also part of the early-1990s war context

In the early 1990s Montenegro's state and political apparatus was closely connected with Belgrade, the FRY, the JNA and Milošević's regional political bloc. Montenegrin reservists and units also participated in wartime operations connected with the Dubrovnik area. That means early Montenegro did not stand: outside the Yugoslav wars. Later distancing does not erase the earlier role. This is a methodological safeguard. Podgorica's later policy became more autonomous, more Western-oriented and more confrontational toward Milošević's Belgrade. But that does not justify the retrospective claim: that Montenegro had opposed Milošević's policy continuously since 1991. Its political orientation: changed.

The 1997 turning point

The 1997 presidential election became a symbol of the political rupture inside the previously dominant Democratic Party of Socialists. The main candidates were Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović. After the second round, the OSCE concluded that the preliminary results: reflected the will of the Montenegrin electorate.[15] Đukanović won. Why was this more than a personal conflict?

Bulatović remained more closely aligned with: Milošević's Belgrade. Đukanović's political bloc increasingly advocated greater Montenegrin autonomy, a separate economic policy and more direct relations with the West. Thus began: a gradual institutional distancing of Podgorica from the federal centre. 1998: elections consolidate the new direction. The May 1998 parliamentary election took place under intense pressure from the question: what should Montenegro's relationship with Belgrade and the FRY be? The OSCE observed the election as a distinct Montenegrin political process.[16] Đukanović's bloc consolidated its power.

Kosovo 1999: Montenegro inside the FRY, but politically increasingly separate. During NATO's 1999 bombing, Montenegro was: formally part of the FRY. Federal military installations were therefore also located on its territory. But Podgorica's political relationship to Milošević's regime was: substantially different from Serbia's. This increased tensions between Montenegrin republican institutions, federal authorities and the Yugoslav Army. Less and less remained of the federation.

By the early 2000s Montenegro had developed much of its own economic policy, customs practices, separate monetary system and direct external relations. This created an unusual situation: formally one state, but in practice two increasingly separate economies and political administrations. After Milošević's fall, negotiated separation becomes possible. After 2000 Belgrade became more democratic and internationally open. But that did not produce: a return to the old federation. The question was now whether to rebuild the common state, whether to allow independence and/or whether to create an intermediate solution.

The Belgrade Agreement — 14 March 2002

With strong mediation by the European Union and Javier Solana, Serbia and Montenegro reached the: Belgrade Agreement.[17] Its purpose was to replace the FRY with: a looser state union. The EU presented the agreement as a way to address the status question through: dialogue rather than confrontation or unilateral action.[17] Serbia and Montenegro — 2003. On 4 February 2003 the Constitutional Charter was adopted. The FRY became: the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.[18] The common state was much less integrated than the former federation. The member states retained a large share of their own economic systems, institutions and policies.

The crucial provision: a referendum after three years. The constitutional arrangement allowed that after: three years either member state could initiate a procedure to: change its state status or leave the union on the basis of a referendum.[18] This means the 2006 referendum was not: a sudden unilateral constitutional revolution. It was envisaged: inside the agreed institutional framework itself. Why did the EU not want immediate independence?

After the violent breakup of the 1990s, the European Union was cautious about new: status ruptures. The Belgrade Agreement therefore postponed the final decision, required a period of continued common statehood and created a legal path toward a later referendum. This can be interpreted as a stabilization compromise and/or postponement of an unavoidable question. This article does not choose between those political evaluations. It documents: the mechanism.

The 55-percent referendum rule. Before the 2006 referendum a political compromise was reached a simple majority of valid votes would not be enough for independence. At least: 55% of valid votes had to support independence.[19] A minimum-turnout rule was also established. This was a very high political threshold in a closely divided society.

21 May 2006

The referendum asked voters whether they wanted Montenegro to become: an independent state with full international and legal personality. The official final result was:

• 55.5% of valid votes for independence;
• 44.5% against;
• turnout approximately 86.5%.[19]

The result: narrowly but clearly exceeded the agreed 55-percent threshold. OSCE: the referendum enabled a legitimate and peaceful decision. OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the referendum gave citizens: a genuine opportunity to determine their future state status and allowed the long-standing issue to be resolved: peacefully, legitimately and with certainty.[19] The organization also recorded individual procedural irregularities, cases of group voting and several suspicious incidents, but not at a scale that election bodies assessed could have changed the outcome.[19]

3 June 2006: declaration of independence. The Montenegrin parliament: declared independence on 3 June 2006.[18] Serbia then continued: the international legal continuity of Serbia and Montenegro's UN membership, while Montenegro applied for membership as a new state.[20] Montenegro was admitted to the United Nations on 28 June 2006.[20] Why did separation not become a war?

There is no single reason. But important differences from the early 1990s included the referendum had been provided for in a jointly agreed legal framework, Belgrade and Podgorica accepted the referendum process, the EU actively mediated, an internationally agreed threshold existed, OSCE and other observers monitored the process, there was no major territorial dispute between Serbia and Montenegro and there was no military project to retain the republic by armed force. This shows the importance of: an institutionalized procedure.

But the referendum did not mean Montenegrin society was united. The result: 55.5 to 44.5 shows deep political and identity division. Questions of Montenegrin identity, Serbian identity, language, church and historical relations with Serbia. did not disappear with the declaration of statehood. As in Macedonia: state status is not the same as complete social consensus. Macedonia: statehood first, internal compromise later. Sequence:

1. 1991 referendum;
2. independence;
3. peaceful JNA withdrawal;
4. international recognition;
5. internal interethnic tensions;
6. 2001 conflict;
7. Ohrid constitutional compromise.

Montenegro: common state first, independence later. Sequence:

1. 1992 referendum for a common state with Serbia;
2. FRY;
3. political rupture in 1997;
4. gradual institutional autonomization;
5. Belgrade Agreement 2002;
6. State Union 2003;
7. referendum 2006;
8. independence.

Neither path was inevitable. It is dangerous in history to look backward and say: “it was always obvious where this would lead.” In 1991 it was not obvious that Macedonia would face an Albanian insurgency ten years later, that Montenegro would be independent in 2006, that Đukanović would become an opponent of Milošević's political centre and that the FRY would be replaced by a very loose state union. Political identities and interests: change.

What prevented a larger war? In both cases an important factor was: the absence of a multi-sided territorial military project comparable to Croatia or Bosnia. But also important were negotiations, international mediation, accepted institutional procedures and political compromise. Macedonia in 2001 came: dangerously close to a broader civil war. Ohrid helped stop it. Montenegro in 2006 had the opportunity to resolve status: through rules established before the vote.

The most important common point: sovereignty did not solve identity

After 1991 Macedonia still faced the question: how Macedonian and Albanian communities understood their common state. After 2006 Montenegro still faced the question: how its citizens identified themselves in relation to Montenegrin and Serbian national identity. A state border can answer: who is sovereign. By itself it cannot answer: who are we.

What can we state with high confidence from the evidence?

Macedonia's referendum was held on 8 September 1991. The referendum question preserved the option of a future union of sovereign Yugoslav states. More than 95% of participating voters supported the referendum option. A significant part of the Albanian population boycotted the referendum. The boycott was linked to constitutional status, representation and rights. Macedonia left Yugoslavia without a major war. The JNA withdrew in 1992 on the basis of an agreement. Because of fears of spillover from surrounding wars, the UN preventively deployed forces in Macedonia.

The state entered the UN in 1993 under the provisional FYROM reference. The dispute with Greece and the internal Macedonian-Albanian dispute were the same issue. The 2001 conflict involved the NLA and state security forces. The NLA was merely a nonviolent political movement. State security forces were free of serious abuses. The 2001 conflict reached the scale of the Bosnian war. The Ohrid Agreement was signed on 13 August 2001. Ohrid rejected violence and territorial solutions to ethnic questions.

Ohrid preserved the unitary character of the state. Ohrid expanded language, representation and local-government rights of communities. Ohrid created an Albanian federal entity. Operation Essential Harvest was carried out at the request of Macedonian authorities. NATO collected NLA weapons voluntarily after a political agreement. Montenegro voted in 1992 to remain in a common state with Serbia. Independence in 2006 was an unchanged plan of the Montenegrin authorities since 1991. The 1997 Đukanović–Bulatović rupture was an important point in distancing Montenegro from Milošević's Belgrade.

OSCE assessed that the 1997 presidential election result reflected the will of voters. The Belgrade Agreement was signed on 14 March 2002. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was established in 2003. The Constitutional Charter permitted a referendum after three years. Independence required at least 55% of valid votes. The final result was 55.5% for independence with approximately 86.5% turnout. OSCE characterized the referendum as a process that enabled a peaceful and legitimate decision.

The referendum was free of any irregularities. The documented irregularities were shown to have changed the result. Montenegro declared independence on 3 June 2006. Serbia continued the former state union's UN membership after separation. Montenegro was admitted to the UN on 28 June 2006. The most precise answer to the question: why did these two republics leave Yugoslavia differently? Because they did not have: the same demography, the same military structure, the same relationship with Belgrade or the same political moment.

Macedonia. obtained statehood early and relatively peacefully, then nearly a decade later had to redefine: its internal ethnic compromise. Montenegro. first remained in a common state with Serbia, then over more than a decade of: institutional distancing arrived at an agreed referendum. Both stories show: the dissolution of a state is not a single event. It is a process in which state institutions, identities, the international framework and political alliances. can change repeatedly.

Final conclusion of this article

If Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo show how the dissolution of a federation can develop into war, siege, ethnic cleansing and international military intervention. Macedonia and Montenegro show another range of possibilities. Macedonia. peaceful exit → unresolved internal issues → limited armed conflict → constitutional compromise. Montenegro. remaining in a common state → political distancing → loose state union → referendum → peaceful separation. This does not mean: either path was ideal. It means: violence was not an automatic consequence of the very idea of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Whether a political dispute developed into war depended on local demographic conditions, territorial claims, armed structures, leadership behavior, the international environment and especially the presence or absence of an accepted procedure for resolving the political dispute.

From here the series returns to Kosovo after 1999. Kosovo after the Bombing: UNSCR 1244, UNMIK, KFOR, Post-War Violence, Status Negotiations and the Road to 2008 continues the chronology from the end of the war into the post-war institutional and status question.