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Governing Through Fear

Fear can alert us to a genuine danger. But it can also become a political instrument, shifting attention from the question of what has been established to the question of whom we must obey.

Symbolic editorial illustration of examining evidence in the face of danger; it does not depict a historical event.

Fear can alert us to a genuine danger. But it can also become a political instrument, shifting attention from the question of what has been established to the question of whom we must obey. There is no sharp line between these possibilities that we can draw from the emotional tone of a speech alone. What matters is the evidence, intentions, specific measures, and the public's ability to challenge them.

How can we distinguish a legitimate warning from the exploitation of uncertainty? Psychological research tells us how a threat can change people's responses; historical documents show what authorities actually did in particular cases. Only by considering both can we assess soberly the exercise of power in the name of danger.

When Danger Becomes Political Permission

When an attack, a disease outbreak, or another genuine danger occurs, public institutions have a responsibility to inform people and take action. It would be misleading to claim that a serious warning is, by itself, manipulation. It would be equally dangerous to conclude that every restriction of freedom is justified merely because those in power have invoked the word “security.” Between identifying a risk and deciding on a measure, there must be a verifiable chain of reasoning: evidence of the threat, an assessment of benefits and harms, lawful authority, and the possibility of correction. The World Health Organization's explanation of its 2018 guidance, for example, emphasizes timely, understandable, and trustworthy communication that enables people to take protective action. These are principles of crisis communication, not an endorsement of every specific government decision. [12]

Governing through fear becomes a subject of inquiry when a warning turns into a demand for unquestioning obedience: when an opponent is no longer someone making a different judgment but is cast as a threat in themselves; when decisions are assessed not by their consequences but by presumed loyalty; or when a temporary measure has no clear endpoint. These are recognizable warning signs, not independent proof of a deliberate plan. A claim of abuse requires documents, procedures, testimony, and verifiable effects, not merely the feeling that a speech has frightened us.

For that reason, the question “who benefits from fear?” does not yet answer the question “who caused it?” A benefit may be a political consequence of an event rather than its hidden cause. Yet that does not mean covert abuses never occur. The task of research is to find the point where a hypothetical pattern meets a documented action and to describe it without exaggeration.

Fear Is Not a Switch That Produces Obedience

In psychology, fear appeals are a particular kind of persuasive communication. A 2015 meta-analysis by Melanie Tannenbaum and colleagues included 127 reports, 248 independent samples, and a total of 27,372 participants. The average effect on a combined measure of attitudes, intentions, and behavior was a standardized effect of d = 0.29. This does not mean that 29 percent of a population obeyed the speaker, nor is it a measure of a political regime's effectiveness. It is an average across different research settings, mainly communication interventions. [1]

The meta-analysis also found that a message may be more effective when, alongside the seriousness of a danger, it explains what an individual can do effectively. Similarly, Kim Witte and Mike Allen found in 2000 that strong warnings combined with high perceived efficacy of the response could encourage adaptive behavior; where perceived efficacy was weak, defensive avoidance and resistance could become more pronounced. This is not a rule that applies to every person or every political setting. [2]

A separate, critical meta-analysis by Gjalt-Jorn Ygram Peters and colleagues cautioned that only a small share of earlier studies clearly distinguished experimental manipulations of threat level from manipulations of efficacy. Six studies met the criteria for their central test of the interaction between these two factors. This narrows confidence in the proposed mechanism, although it does not erase every finding about persuasive messages. Tannenbaum's meta-analysis found no conditions, among the outcomes it measured, in which fear appeals produced an opposite effect on average, while Witte and Allen also examined defensive responses specifically; these different measures must not be conflated. [1] [2] [6]

The crucial distinction is between fear that helps someone recognize danger and take action, and fear that drives them into helplessness. Helplessness cannot automatically be translated into political obedience: a person may fall silent, reject the message, seek other information, or oppose the speaker. Moving from a laboratory or public-health experiment to claims about the long-term control of an entire society would require entirely different evidence.

Election Advertising, Attention, and Different Emotions

In 2005, Ted Brader examined emotional cues in political advertisements in two experiments conducted during a real election campaign. His findings indicated that cues of enthusiasm reinforced the activation of existing political preferences and motivation to participate, whereas cues of fear heightened vigilance, responsiveness to current assessments, and susceptibility to persuasion. This means that the way a message is presented can influence political judgment. It does not mean that a particular advertisement can control a voter's will or that the outcome of a given election can be attributed to a single emotional technique. [3]

It also matters which emotion we are actually observing. In research conducted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Jennifer Lerner and colleagues showed that fear and anger were not equivalent responses when people assessed the risks of terrorism. Within their experimental framework, fear was associated with different risk assessments than anger. If we collapsed both emotions into the single word “panic,” we would lose part of the explanation of political behavior. [4]

In their review of American responses to September 11, Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman emphasized that support for a more forceful government response was associated both with the perceived likelihood of future attacks and with anger toward the attackers. This particular historical context does not tell us how people in every country will react to an epidemic, a war, migration, or an economic crisis. Political messages must therefore be evaluated alongside actual circumstances, rather than through the assumption that there is one universal psychological button. [5]

When Wartime Hysteria Stripped Individuals of Their Rights

On February 19, 1942, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. The order authorized military authorities to designate areas from which people could be excluded. An important detail is that the document itself did not explicitly name people of Japanese ancestry; the mass removal and incarceration of this group followed through the implementation of the measures. Without this distinction, we would attribute words to the historical order that it did not contain. [9]

The subsequent consequence was the forced removal and incarceration of large numbers of people of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens. The war with Japan was real; it did not follow that every person belonging to a particular group had been individually shown to pose a danger. That substitution—treating membership as guilt—is at the center of the case. It shows how collective fear, prejudice, and government powers can together produce a grave injustice without our having to posit a secret global conspiracy. [9] [10]

The U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians concluded in its report Personal Justice Denied, publicly presented in 1983, that the measures were not justified by military necessity. It identified racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership among the principal historical causes; its finding rested on a review of archives and testimony, not simply on a later emotional impression. This is a subsequent, documented assessment by an official investigation, not a psychological diagnosis of every decision-maker at the time. [10]

The case also matters because of the later attempt at redress. In 1988, the United States enacted the Civil Liberties Act, providing an official apology and compensation for eligible survivors. Redress could not erase the years that had been lost, but it showed that a state can publicly confront its own injustice. The story is therefore not only about the power of fear but also about the importance of archives, testimony, investigative commissions, and the right to hold power accountable. [10]

COINTELPRO: From the Presumption of an Enemy to Covert Action

A different documented example is the U.S. FBI's COINTELPRO program. In the 1970s, the Senate's investigative committee, known as the Church Committee, investigated clandestine intelligence activities and uncovered operations intended to disrupt and discredit organizations or individuals deemed socially dangerous. Among the targets were groups within the civil rights movement, opponents of the Vietnam War, and individuals including Martin Luther King Jr. [11]

This is not merely a theory that authorities might act covertly against their opponents. The congressional investigation examined programs that had actually been carried out, along with the documentary record. But we must respect another boundary: evidence of an intention to disrupt or discredit does not, without further sources, allow us to calculate how many people lived in fear, or establish that every action had precisely that psychological goal. A documented covert operation is a fact; its individual emotional effects require separate investigation. [11]

In assessing the case, it is also useful to hear the response of the institution under investigation. In its historical account, the FBI notes that its then director, Clarence Kelley, pointed to the security demands of the period and inadequate earlier investigative guidelines. The FBI also acknowledges that the program came under criticism and that reforms followed the investigation. These arguments explain the institutional context, but they do not overturn the Senate's findings about actual abuses. [11] [14]

The Church Committee recommended strengthening legal and congressional oversight of intelligence activities. That is not a marginal detail: when an institution can secretly intrude into people's lives, the question of democracy moves from fine declarations to demonstrable limits on authority, access to records for oversight bodies, and opportunities for legal redress. [11]

Emergency Powers Are Not Beyond the Law

A genuine crisis may require temporarily faster decision-making, but danger does not eliminate the need for legal scrutiny. In General Comment No. 29 on Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Human Rights Committee explains the strict conditions for derogations from certain obligations during an officially proclaimed public emergency. Such measures must be limited to the extent strictly required by the circumstances and cannot serve as a means of arbitrarily abolishing all rights. [13]

General Comment No. 34 on Article 19 of the same Covenant is also important when freedom of expression is restricted. Restrictions require a legal basis, a legitimate objective, necessity, and proportionality. These standards do not mean that every restriction on speech is unlawful: legitimate aims may include protecting the rights of others and safeguarding public health or security, provided the strict conditions are met. Different legal systems have additional rules and case law; a general comment is not a ruling on a specific national case. [7]

In its explanation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Kingdom's Equality and Human Rights Commission emphasizes the importance of being able to criticize those in power without unjustified fear of prosecution. At the same time, freedom of expression is not unlimited, and lawful criticism must be distinguished from genuine threats and other restrictions defined by law. Criticism of a measure is not automatically denial of a danger. [8]

Perhaps the most important practical question is very simple: who decides that a measure is still necessary, and who has the authority to verify that answer? Time limits, publicly explained evidence, judicial protection, parliamentary scrutiny, and opportunities for review are not luxuries reserved for peaceful times. They become more valuable precisely when citizens are most afraid and political debate is therefore at its most difficult.

How to Distinguish Protection From Manipulation

An honest assessment must begin with four separate questions. Is the threat real, and how reliably has it been measured? Does the message explain uncertainty and offer practicable means of protection? Does the proposed measure actually reduce danger, and at what cost? And can the public inspect documents and challenge decisions without unjustified punishment? None of these questions requires prior trust in the authorities, nor does any require a prior conviction that every warning conceals a conspiracy.

A health warning about an infectious disease can save lives if it rests on understandable evidence, explains uncertainties, and enables reasonable protective action. The World Health Organization's 2018 explanation therefore highlights engagement with communities, trust, and timely communication. Such aims do not prove that every individual campaign is sound or proportionate; they are, however, an important counterargument to the claim that every warning of danger is a tool of subjugation. [12] [1] [2]

Conversely, the risk of manipulation increases when a message continually offers only two choices—obedience or catastrophe—when different questions are branded as betrayal, or when measures remain in place without public scrutiny. These, too, are diagnostic clues, not a verdict on any particular person. If we claim that someone deliberately created a threat, we must establish that very intention. If we claim that someone unlawfully restricted rights, we need an account of the law, what was actually done, and the relevant legal assessment. [7] [13]

This distinction is especially important when investigating hidden mechanisms. The history of COINTELPRO shows that covert operations must not be dismissed as impossible; the history of Japanese American incarceration shows that state power can cause demonstrable injustice even when security is its publicly stated purpose. Neither example by itself proves the existence of a unified system that controls every crisis or every emotion. Our conclusion must be as sharp as the evidence is strong—not as sharp as the subject matter is disturbing. [9] [10] [11]

Power That Does Not Need to Rule Through Fear

Fear is part of the human capacity to survive, so it makes little sense to condemn it morally. Without it, we might also overlook genuine threats. The political problem emerges when our vulnerability is used to deprive us of judgment: when fear replaces evidence, when group membership replaces individual responsibility, and when emergency becomes routine. The two historical cases show that such shifts are possible; scientific findings, meanwhile, reject the idea of a simple, invariably effective button for securing mass obedience.

The ethical premise of this series is that power is not the same thing as coercion. Power can mean the ability to protect others, explain a decision, acknowledge a mistake, and allow disagreement; coercion, by contrast, can rest on silencing people and creating the impression that there is no choice. This is a philosophical judgment, not a laboratory measurement. Precisely for that reason, it need not be presented as a scientifically established law of human nature.

Governing through fear is therefore a documented historical problem and, at the same time, a research question for which there is no single answer applicable to every society. Its strongest alternative is not the denial of danger but the ability to confront it with reliable information, accountable government, and human dignity intact. A citizen who can ask a question without being branded an enemy is not an obstacle to security. That citizen is one of the conditions that prevent security from becoming a pretext for power without limits.

Documentary sources and archive links

These links lead to documents, archival records or photographs hosted by their original source institutions.

Sources and further reading

  1. Tannenbaum, Melanie B., et al. (2015). “Appealing to Fear: A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeal Effectiveness and Theories.” Psychological Bulletin. source Source
  2. Witte, Kim, and Mike Allen (2000). “A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns.” Health Education & Behavior. source Source
  3. Brader, Ted (2005). “Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions.” American Journal of Political Science. source Source
  4. Lerner, Jennifer S., Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff (2003). “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment.” Psychological Science. source Source
  5. Huddy, Leonie, and Stanley Feldman (2011). “Americans Respond Politically to 9/11: Understanding the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath.” American Psychologist. source Source
  6. Peters, Gjalt-Jorn Ygram, et al. (2013). “Threatening Communication: A Critical Re-analysis and a Revised Meta-analytic Test of Fear Appeal Theory.” Health Psychology Review. source Source
  7. United Nations Human Rights Committee (2011). General Comment No. 34: Article 19 — Freedoms of Opinion and Expression. source Source
  8. Equality and Human Rights Commission (United Kingdom). Article 10: Freedom of Expression. source Source
  9. U.S. National Archives (1942). Executive Order 9066: Resulting in Japanese-American Incarceration (original order, February 19, 1942, and archival explanation). source Source
  10. U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives. Long Road to Redress (account of the findings of the Personal Justice Denied commission, 1983, and the Civil Liberties Act, 1988). source Source
  11. U.S. Senate, Senate Historical Office. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee, 1975–1976 investigation, COINTELPRO). source Source
  12. World Health Organization. Emergencies: Emergency Risk Communication Guidance (official explanation of crisis communication principles and guidance). source Source
  13. United Nations Human Rights Committee (2001). General Comment No. 29: Article 4 — Derogations during a State of Emergency. source Source
  14. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime and Corruption Across America, 1972–1988 (official historical overview, section “A New Era in Domestic Intelligence,” FBI response to the Church Committee). source Source