A State Within the State: Parallel Structures of Power
On 3 November 1996, a road accident occurred near the Turkish town of Susurluk. Initially, it appeared to be a tragic road accident.
Editorial illustration contrasting public institutions and informal channels of influence; it does not depict a specific historical event.
On 3 November 1996, a road accident occurred near the Turkish town of Susurluk. Initially, it appeared to be a tragic road accident. But the identities of the passengers raised a question reaching far beyond the collision itself: what were a senior police official, a member of parliament, and a man linked to the criminal underworld doing together? The crash prompted official investigations into relationships between state institutions and illegal organizations. [1] [2]
The expression “a state within the state” often sounds like an explanation for everything we fail to understand about politics. Yet its value for research lies precisely in the opposite: we should use it only when it helps us distinguish more accurately between formal authority, actual informal connections, and covert acts that evade oversight. How can we recognize such a structure without labeling every state secret a conspiracy, or dismissing every investigated abuse as fantasy?
The Crash That Exposed a Network
Susurluk became a symbol because it brought together, in a concrete encounter, worlds that should be kept separate in the exercise of public authority. The car carried MP Sedat Bucak, former senior police official Hüseyin Kocadağ, and Abdullah Çatlı, a wanted figure associated with the far right and criminal networks; Gonca Us was also in the vehicle. The passengers’ identities and the circumstances of the crash sparked a public debate about the police, politics, and unlawful violence. Their presence in the same car, however, did not in itself establish in court every crime that journalists or investigators attributed to the individuals involved. [1] [2]
By decision no. 472 of 12 November 1996, the Turkish parliament ordered an official investigation into links between illegal organizations and the state, as well as the Susurluk crash. In Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights summarized parliamentary and other official reports. In the specific case concerning the murder of lawyer Yusuf Ekinci, the Court did not find it proven that state agents had participated in the killing. It did, however, find a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 because the investigation had been inadequate and ineffective, as well as a violation of Article 13, the right to an effective remedy. This distinction matters: the existence of official investigations and an established failure to fulfil investigative duties do not automatically prove every alleged connection or crime mentioned in the reports. [1]
In its study of impunity for killings and disappearances in Turkey, Human Rights Watch drew attention to investigative reports, subsequent court proceedings, and the limited accountability of some high-ranking officials. The organization states that fourteen individuals from police or related security structures were convicted in connection with Susurluk, while also noting that investigations and court proceedings did not reach every senior official identified in official reports. The ECtHR judgment specifically summarizes a Turkish court decision of 12 February 2001 and a ruling by the Court of Cassation of 23 January 2002. Assessments of the extent of impunity are those of Human Rights Watch; individual convictions have a distinct judicial evidentiary basis. [1] [2]
It is here that the idea of a parallel structure acquires concrete meaning. We do not need to assume the existence of an invisible global headquarters to investigate operational contacts, covert assignments, weapons, protection from prosecution, and obstructed inquiries. We need names, actions, dates, sources of funding, official records, and clearly assigned responsibility. Susurluk demonstrates the seriousness of such questions in a particular historical setting; it does not prove that every country has an identically organized “deep state.”
Power on Paper and Power in Practice
Formal authority operates through constitutions, laws, budgets, assigned powers, and decisions by authorized institutions. Alongside it there is bureaucratic continuity: employees of the administration, security agencies, and other institutions remain in office even after governments change. This is often essential to the functioning of the state. Continuity among specialists, the safeguarding of state secrets, and internal coordination are not, in themselves, evidence of a conspiracy.
A different phenomenon emerges when people entrusted with public authority use unofficial channels, private intermediaries, or concealed resources for acts that authorized oversight bodies cannot effectively scrutinize. Such a network may be unlawful, but secrecy alone should not determine the label we attach to it. First, we must establish which rules applied, who circumvented them, whether an act was authorized, how orders and funds moved, and what can actually be proved.
In public debate, the expression “deep state” often combines three distinct claims. The first concerns enduring informal influence within the state apparatus, which may be lawful or contested. The second concerns specific unauthorized or criminal links between officials and other actors. The third assumes a single, all-encompassing, enduring, and almost omnipotent secret hierarchy. Evidence for the first does not automatically establish the second, and evidence for the second certainly does not establish the third. Comparative political science distinguishes different mechanisms here. Thomas Krumm uses Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of the “dual state” to analyze the coexistence of rule-governed activity and arbitrary exercises of power, while noting the limits of applying a historical concept to contemporary settings. Eda Bektas, meanwhile, examines neopatrimonial rule, in which personal networks and patronage relationships can operate through formal institutions as well. Neither analytical framework, by itself, proves the existence of a unified secret leadership or the specific guilt of actors in Susurluk. [7] [8]
When an Intelligence Service Oversteps Its Bounds
In the 1970s, the United States provided another type of documented case: not necessarily a separate secret state, but institutions with considerable powers that, in some instances, acted contrary to rights and lawful limits. In January 1975, the US Senate established an investigative committee chaired by Senator Frank Church. The committee examined intelligence and security agencies and published findings and proposals to strengthen oversight. [3] [4]
Among the documented activities was COINTELPRO, an FBI program intended to monitor, disrupt, and discredit groups and individuals the Bureau designated as dangerous. The significance of these revelations lies in more than the program’s name. They show that a state apparatus endowed with real powers can develop practices that threaten freedom of association, expression, and political activity. When such actions remain secret, those affected often have no way of knowing who is interfering in their lives or why. [3]
Yet the very existence of the Church Committee highlights another side of the story: the state is not a single actor. The legislative branch investigated executive agencies, documented abuses, and proposed reforms. This does not imply that one autonomous group controlled the entire American state apparatus. It does show, however, that a democratic system does not function merely because rules have been written down. It needs genuine access to information, investigatory powers, and the ability to demand answers from those who act under the banner of national security.
Iran–Contra: A Private Channel Serving State Policy
The Iran–Contra affair of the 1980s shows even more clearly how a formal decision, a covert operation, and a private network can become intertwined. Amid disputes over US support for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, congressional restrictions affected how aid could be financed and delivered. Nevertheless, National Security Council (NSC) staff and private intermediaries developed alternative ways to maintain support. The broader affair also involved secret arms shipments to Iran and the diversion of part of the proceeds. [5] [6]
The congressional investigative report of November 1987 describes a private organization known as the Enterprise, set up by retired general Richard Secord and his associate Albert Hakim, with Oliver North directing much of its activity. In the passages examined, the report refers to Swiss bank accounts and financial flows that enabled covert operations outside ordinary budgetary and oversight channels. Here we are not dealing merely with a generalized suspicion that “someone is pulling the strings,” but with documented operational capabilities, financial routes, and individuals whose actions can be investigated. [6]
At the same time, the case cautions against the simple explanation that “unelected officials seized power from an elected government.” The congressional report also describes political decisions, support, and involvement within parts of the executive branch. A covert channel can arise within the political leadership, not only in opposition to it. The central question, therefore, is not simply whether someone was elected, but whether they acted within lawful powers and whether oversight bodies had real access to information and resources. [6]
Iran–Contra and Susurluk were not the same phenomenon. In the Turkish case, the focus was on allegations and investigations concerning links between security structures and criminal actors; in the American case, on documented covert operations, financing, and relations between the executive and legislative branches. Both nevertheless raise a related question: what remains of public accountability when decision-making moves into networks operating beyond ordinary scrutiny?
Parallel Influence: Similar Questions, Different Mechanisms
| Case | What the cited sources document | What the case does not establish by itself |
|---|---|---|
| Susurluk, Turkey (1996) | Contacts among figures from politics, policing, and criminal networks; official inquiries and certain judicial findings. [1] [2] | That every allegation in the reports was proven or that a single global covert leadership exists. |
| Church Committee, United States (1975–1976) | Investigations and documented abuses by intelligence and security agencies, including COINTELPRO. [3] [4] | That one autonomous secret organization directed the entire state apparatus. |
| Iran–Contra, United States (1980s) | Covert operations and the private operational and financial network known as the Enterprise; conflicts with oversight and congressional restrictions. [5] [6] | That such networks always arose against the political leadership or that this was the same structure seen in Susurluk. |
Three historical cases illustrate different ways oversight can be bypassed. This table summarizes the approved article and is not separate historical proof.
How to Tell Evidence from a Map of Suspicions
Research into hidden power quickly produces elaborate diagrams connecting state officials, private associations, financial institutions, families, and ideological movements. Some lines on such a map may represent documented membership, others personal acquaintance, still others similarities of ideas, and yet others the author’s speculation. One undifferentiated line cannot fairly represent four different kinds of evidence.
Our earlier historical research material also contains references to large hierarchical diagrams of global power and exploratory links between private policy-planning circles and state institutions. For this article, we have not yet independently re-examined the original images, the rights governing their use, or all the primary documents cited in them. We therefore do not use such diagrams as proof of a shared command center, nor do we treat similarities between policy proposals as proof that orders were given. These remain open research questions that require a traceable source record.
The hierarchy of evidence must remain clear. Minutes can establish that a meeting took place. Correspondence and joint activities can show that two people were connected. To show that one person ordered another to take a particular action, however, we need evidence of the actual order or a reliably reconstructed chain of decision-making. A claim of enduring, coordinated direction across several institutions requires more still: recurring links among decisions, money, personnel, implementation, and accountability. A lack of documents does not prove that such connections exist nowhere; nor does it permit us to imagine them as already established.
Who Is Accountable When Power Has No Public Face?
State secrecy can be justified. Revealing the identity of a protected witness, details of an ongoing investigation, or a sensitive security operation can cause real harm. But secrecy that protects a legitimate mission is not the same as secrecy that shields unauthorized conduct from investigation. The distinction becomes visible in the existence of a lawful basis, limits on scope and duration, independent review, and the possibility of establishing an abuse even after an operation has ended.
In this sense, “a state within the state” is not necessarily the name of a single organization. It can be a warning about a situation in which someone uses state resources or powers without being held accountable under the rules that apply to everyone else. The histories of Susurluk, the Church Committee, and Iran–Contra show that this question is not merely a literary invention. At the same time, these cases do not justify the conclusion that one invisible will directs all political events. Real mechanisms are often less tidy: competing interests, rivalries, personal connections, opportunities, fear of exposure, and failures of oversight. [1] [2] [3] [6]
Human freedom is therefore protected neither by automatically trusting an official title nor by automatically distrusting every institution. It is protected by the demand that decisions be open to scrutiny, power be limited, and the rules apply equally to those who have access to information, weapons, and money. When someone claims an exemption from accountability in the name of public safety, that should be the beginning of scrutiny, not the end.
The expression “a state within the state” is useful only to the extent that it brings us closer to concrete answers: who decided, who carried out the act, who paid, who knew, and who was supposed to oversee it. If we do not yet have those answers, we should say plainly that they remain open. If we do have them, we must not obscure them with the comforting notion that a single shadow must necessarily lie behind everything.
Documentary sources and archive links
These links lead to documents, archival records or photographs hosted by their original source institutions.
Sources and further reading
- European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey, application no. 27602/95, judgment of 16 July 2002, particularly §§ 92–110 (Susurluk investigations), 139–146 and 158–160 (assessment of state responsibility and the effectiveness of the investigation), and the operative provisions of the judgment. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Time for Justice: Ending Impunity for Killings and Disappearances in 1990s Turkey, 3 September 2012, section on the Susurluk investigations. Source
- US Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), official history of the investigation, 1975–1976. Source
- US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Related Commissions, index of Church Committee documentation. Source
- US National Archives, Records of Lawrence Walsh Relating to Iran/Contra, archival overview. Source
- US Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 18 November 1987, selected passages of the majority report, transcript hosted by the American Presidency Project. Source
- Thomas Krumm, A Dual State in Turkey? Strengths and Limitations of Fraenkel’s Concept for Contemporary Cases, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 18 (2024), 37–57, DOI: 10.1007/s12286-024-00597-9. Source
- Eda Bektas, Neopatrimonial Rule through Formal Institutions: The Case of Turkey, Government and Opposition, 60(3) (2025), 850–871, DOI: 10.1017/gov.2024.36. Source