Jonestown

Peoples Temple did not begin in Guyana

Peoples Temple began in Indiana in the 1950s under Jim Jones. The movement later relocated to California and developed a strong social, racial, and political identity. Rebecca Moore, in contemporary academic analysis, warns that Peoples Temple cannot be understood only through its final day in Jonestown.

We have to follow:

• the migration from Indiana;
• development in California;
• religious ideas;
• political ideas;
• the communal economy;
• the later move to Guyana.[2]

If we begin only with the bodies in 1978, we do not understand:

why the movement could become attractive in the first place.

Racial integration was not merely a propaganda slogan

Peoples Temple offered a distinctly integrated religious environment during an era of deep racial segregation. For many members, that was genuinely important. Demographic research indicates that around 70 percent of Jonestown residents were African American; Black women alone made up almost half of the entire community.[1]

A large share of Black members came from families connected to the Great Migration from the American South to California.[1] This means the story is not primarily:

white hippies following an eccentric guru.

That popular image erases a large part of the actual membership.

But racial equality in membership did not mean equality in power

Here an important paradox appears. Although the great majority of members were Black, the highest structures of authority were disproportionately white. Moore’s demographic analysis points directly to this divide between:

• the racial composition of the community

and

• the composition of the leadership cadre.[1]

This matters for our broader model. An institution can sincerely advocate a moral value and at the same time:

fail to realize it within its own structure of power.

Why did people come?

Peoples Temple meant different things to different people. For some:

• a religious community.

For others:

• racial integration.

For others:

• a socialist or communal alternative.

For older members:

• social and everyday support.

For idealistic younger members:

• a chance to live in a community that was supposed to be more just than the surrounding society.

This is an important lesson. A person does not necessarily enter a high-control system because they want control. They may enter because of:

a value that is attractive in itself.

“Why didn’t they just leave?” is a question asked too late

When we look at the end of the story, we see:

• Jones;
• armed guards;
• poison;
• bodies.

And we ask:

“How could they not see where this was going?”

But years earlier, a member did not join:

Jonestown on November 18, 1978.

They joined an earlier version of Peoples Temple. This is an example of incremental commitment. The system changes. The person adapts. Each new step is judged against the previous one, not against the final outcome that could not yet be seen.

The move to Guyana

In the 1970s, Peoples Temple developed an agricultural settlement in northwestern Guyana. Guyana had a political interest in developing its sparsely populated interior, and U.S. diplomatic records show that the Peoples Temple project aligned to some degree with the country’s development goals at the time.[3]

Some Guyanese officials initially saw the project as:

• a productive agricultural community;
• an example of immigration;
• a potential model for development of the interior.[3]

This matters because it prevents the simplification:

“Everyone around them must have known what was happening.”

Not necessarily. Outside visitors could see a different community from the one members experienced.

Isolation changed the balance of power

Jonestown was geographically remote. Travel was logistically difficult. Communication with the outside world was far more controlled than it had been in San Francisco. Remoteness by itself is not proof of abuse. But remoteness changes the exit cost.

If a person wants to leave an urban church, they can:

walk out the door.

If they want to leave a remote settlement in another country, they need:

• transportation;
• documents;
• money;
• contact with the outside world;
• a way to reach authorities.

Geography can therefore become part of organizational power even without a formal prison.

The critic becomes the enemy of the community

Peoples Temple increasingly portrayed outside critics as part of a coordinated persecution campaign. Diplomatic documents show that Temple representatives told Guyanese officials and U.S. diplomats about:

• the FBI;
• the CIA;
• right-wing forces;
• racist persecution;

as elements of a broader pressure campaign against the movement.[3] Some external prejudice and hostility were real features of American society. But the organizational problem begins when criticism can no longer mean:

“perhaps we have a problem.”

It always means:

“the enemy is attacking us.”

A self-sealing structure

This directly connects to our foundational article When Doubt Becomes Identity. If a former member criticizes the group:

proof of betrayal.

If relatives demand contact:

proof of conspiracy.

If authorities begin checking allegations:

proof of persecution.

If a media outlet writes negatively:

proof of a coordinated campaign.

Such a system can absorb almost any outside information as confirmation of its own explanation. External pressure therefore does not necessarily reduce leadership authority. It can increase it.

John Victor Stoen and the conflict that became a symbol of siege

One important conflict concerned custody of John Victor Stoen. U.S. diplomatic records show that the dispute entered the Guyanese court system and that U.S. diplomats primarily pressed for the matter to proceed according to due process.[4]

In a diplomatic record from the period, a Peoples Temple representative said that people in Jonestown would rather die than allow the child to be taken away.[4] That is an important early signal. Even before mass death occurs, we have the language of:

death as a more acceptable option than defeat of the community.

White Nights

Jonestown held crisis events that became known as White Nights. Such events included:

• community mobilization;
• talk of an attack from outside;
• discussions of death;
• in some cases rehearsals or “dry-run suicide drills.”

In an internal briefing in November 1978, the U.S. State Department recorded that former members had reported weapons, physical abuse, and such drills before Ryan’s visit.[5] Important:

before the tragedy, these were allegations by former members.

The diplomatic document simultaneously states that approximately five consular visits since June 1977 had found no clear indications of abuse.[5] Both pieces of information must be preserved.

Deborah Layton warned of tragedy

Deborah Layton, a former member and financial secretary of Peoples Temple, signed an affidavit after escaping Guyana in June 1978 warning that the lives of Jonestown residents were in danger.[6] She also alleged that:

• members were prepared for questions before visits;
• apparently free answers were in fact shaped by fear;
• people were frightened of possible retaliation.[6]

Such an affidavit by itself was not yet proof of every allegation. But it was a very serious signal.

Why did official visits not resolve the problem?

Here Jonestown is exceptionally useful for our KNOWLEDGE CHAIN. We have: SIGNAL: allegations from relatives and former members. OFFICIAL VISITS: several consular visits. OBSERVATION: no clear direct evidence of abuse. COUNTER-CLAIM: Layton alleges that members were prepared for visits and afraid.[6]

This reveals a limitation of conventional inspection. If an institution knows:

when the inspector is coming,

it can create a representative scene. So the question becomes:

Does the inspection have a method capable of detecting the type of control being alleged?

An inspector can look without gaining access to reality

A visitor may see:

• orderly buildings;
• smiling members;
• a cultural program;
• a communal meal.

But if the purpose is to determine:

whether a member can leave freely,

there must be an opportunity to speak:

• without leadership;
• without the group present;
• without advance warning;
• with a safe possibility of exit.

This is the same problem we encounter with:

• closed institutions;
• labor exploitation;
• high-control organizations.

Leo Ryan

U.S. Congressman Leo Ryan began investigating complaints from constituents whose relatives lived in Jonestown in 1978. State Department records show that Ryan’s delegation communicated with the Department repeatedly before departure and that it was known:

• Peoples Temple opposed the visit;
• allegations existed regarding conditions;
• travel was logistically and potentially security-sensitive.[5]

Ryan nevertheless traveled to Guyana.

The visit on November 17 and 18

The delegation reached Jonestown on November 17. It included:

• Congressman Ryan;
• members of his staff;
• U.S. diplomat Richard Dwyer;
• journalists;
• relatives of members;
• attorneys for Peoples Temple.[7]

The visit was relatively calm at first. But the following day, several residents expressed a desire to leave Jonestown with Ryan’s group.[7][8] That is directly relevant to the question:

“Did people want to stay?”

Some did. Some clearly did not.

An attempt to leave changes the situation

When a member of a high-control system considers leaving, they do not risk only:

• a change of address.

They may lose:

• family;
• friends;
• property;
• identity;
• moral status.

In Jonestown, the cost was even greater because of:

• geographic isolation;
• communal life;
• political language of betrayal.

A defector therefore was not merely someone who:

wanted to go elsewhere.

They could become:

a traitor to the project.

The attack on Ryan before departure

While still in Jonestown, Donald Sly attacked Ryan with a knife, but others stopped him.[8] The delegation and members who wanted to leave then departed for the Port Kaituma airstrip. This is an important point in the timeline.

The conflict had already become physically violent:

before the group reached the planes.

Port Kaituma

A truck carrying armed Peoples Temple members arrived at the airstrip. The attackers opened fire. At the same time, Larry Layton, who had joined the departing group, began shooting inside one of the planes.[7][8] Five people were killed:

• Congressman Leo Ryan;
• three journalists;
• a Peoples Temple member who was trying to leave.[7]

Several others were wounded. This is not a broadly disputed attribution. The core of the attack is well documented in:

• diplomatic records;
• the FBI investigation;
• the congressional report.[7][8][9]

Here the final phase begins

After the attack at the airstrip, the final mass meeting began in Jonestown. Recording Q042, the so-called Death Tape, contains Jones’s speech and people’s responses during the final stage of the event.[10] Jones interprets the attack as an event after which the community has no future.

He presents the solution as:

“revolutionary suicide.”

The language matters. Death is not presented only as escape. It is presented as:

a political and moral act.

The tape does not show perfect unanimity

This is one of the most important details. The Death Tape is not simply a recording of:

the leader speaks, everyone agrees.

We also hear dissent. Christine Miller challenges Jones and asks about alternatives.[10] That matters because it destroys the myth that:

“everyone collectively and freely made the same decision.”

At least some internal dissent is directly documented on the recording.

What happened to the children?

This is the point where the expression “mass suicide” becomes inadequate. Children cannot meaningfully consent to a political-religious collective death. Contemporary academic literature therefore describes Jonestown as a combination of:

mass murders and suicides.[2]

The children were killed. Among adults, the relationship between:

• voluntary participation;
• ideological conviction;
• psychological coercion;
• direct physical coercion

varied and cannot be reliably reconstructed for every individual.

909 people in Jonestown

Approximately 909 people died in the settlement itself on November 18. More than 900 people died primarily through poisoning, and children made up a large share of the dead.[8][11] It was one of the largest mass deaths of U.S. citizens in the twentieth century outside war.

But the number itself conceals:

• children;
• elderly people;
• families;
• individuals who did not have the same degree of autonomy.

918 deaths connected with the events in total

The Peoples Temple demographic research archive uses a total figure of 918 deaths connected with the Jonestown events. That includes:

• approximately 909 dead in the settlement;
• five killed at Port Kaituma;
• four deaths in Georgetown.[1][12]

This explains why different sources use the numbers:

909

and

918.

They do not necessarily describe the same geographic scope.

Georgetown

On the same day, Sharon Amos and her three children died in Georgetown. FBI records treat their deaths as part of the same wider event and investigation.[12] This further complicates the phrase:

“Jonestown suicide.”

The tragedy was not confined to the main settlement.

Jim Jones did not die by the same mechanism as most of the others

Jones was found dead with a gunshot wound. This is another reason why the simple formula:

“they all drank poison together”

is historically inadequate. Different people died in different ways and under different circumstances.

How many people were physically forced?

Here THY-REALITY has to remain cautious. We have:

• survivor testimony;
• evidence of armed security;
• the status of the children;
• the final tape;
• a limited number of postmortem examinations.

But systematic autopsies were not conducted on every victim. The forensic literature on Jonestown explicitly warns about difficulties in interpreting postmortem findings and notes that detailed autopsies were performed on only a small number of victims.[13]

It is therefore not fair to assign a precise percentage to:

how many adults were murdered

and

how many voluntarily died by suicide.

“Suicide or murder?” can be too binary a question

Imagine an adult who:

• has spent years hearing that the outside world is deadly;
• believes that enemies will torture their children;
• lives in isolation;
• sees that the children are already dead;
• is surrounded by the community and a security structure;
• hears the leader say there is no alternative.

Is that person’s decision:

entirely voluntary?

Or:

physically forced?

It may not fit neatly into either category. Analysis therefore has to include the:

coercive environment, not only the final physical moment.

Agency must not disappear

At the same time, people should not be described simply as empty puppets. Peoples Temple members had:

• political beliefs;
• religious beliefs;
• interpersonal relationships;
• idealism;
• different degrees of loyalty.

Some actively participated in the system. Some opposed it. Some tried to leave. Some survived because they were elsewhere or escaped. The explanation:

“brainwashed followers”

is too simple.

Why is the racial context so important?

If we reduce Jonestown to:

“stupid people believe a guru,”

we lose the fact that for many African American members the movement offered something American society often did not:

• an integrated community;
• social assistance;
• a sense of dignity;
• the promise of economic and racial justice.

That does not excuse later control. It explains:

why the original offer could be genuinely attractive.

A good idea can become legitimacy capital

If an organization does something genuinely good, members develop trust. That trust can later transfer to completely different questions. For example:

“Jones fought racism.”

can subtly become:

“Therefore he must also be right about our outside enemies.”

That is an invalid epistemic transfer. Being right on one moral question:

does not automatically confer authority on every other question.

Charisma becomes epistemic power

A leader in a high-control environment does not determine only:

what we do.

They begin to determine:

what an event means.

A critic is not simply a critic. They become:

a traitor.

An investigation is not merely an investigation. It becomes:

an attack.

Failure is not failure. It becomes:

proof of persecution.

This is a higher level of control:

control over the interpretation of reality.

Death as a solution to the problem of falsification

If a community believes:

the outside world will come and destroy us,

there is a dangerous possibility. If the community survived and people were able to leave freely:

the myth could be tested.

Collective death removes the future in which members might discover:

that the predicted catastrophe was not correct.

This is an extreme form of self-sealing ideology:

the system destroys its own carriers before reality can correct it.

Ryan’s visit as an epistemic threat

Ryan was not dangerous only because he was a congressman. The visit opened:

an alternative channel of reality.

Members could:

• speak with outsiders;
• ask to leave;
• see a physical possibility of exit.

When several people expressed a desire to leave, something became visible that the closed system had tried to minimize:

not everyone wanted to stay.

Exit is the strongest test of voluntariness

An organization can say:

“Everyone is here voluntarily.”

The best test is not:

ask people in front of leadership.

It is:

Can a person actually leave without punishment, loss of documents, threats, or impermissible pressure?

This is useful far beyond religion.

Outside criticism can also strengthen a high-control system

This is an uncomfortable truth. An outsider can:

• correctly identify abuse;

and at the same time:

• use sensationalist language;
• humiliate members;
• treat the group as subhuman.

Leadership can use this as:

evidence that all previous warnings were correct.

Criticism of a high-control group therefore requires precision. Not only moral outrage.

“Cult” does not explain the mechanism

The FBI today uses the word “cult” for Peoples Temple.[8] In academic study of new religious movements, however, the term is contested and often analytically too imprecise. If we say:

“they died because it was a cult,”

we have explained nothing. We need mechanisms:

• concentration of authority;
• isolation;
• information control;
• sanctions on dissent;
• exit costs;
• an apocalyptic crisis frame;
• legitimated violence.

Jonestown is not a model for all new religious movements

This is important. We must not infer from Jonestown:

strong religious leader → mass murder.

The vast majority of new religious movements do not end in mass violence. Contemporary academic literature on NRMs therefore treats Jonestown as an important but extreme case and warns against equating the entire category of new religions with abuse or lethal violence.[14]

High commitment is not the same as high control

People can voluntarily:

• pray a great deal;
• work a great deal;
• live communally;
• donate money;
• accept strict rules.

That alone is not abuse. The problem becomes greater when the configuration is:

high demand + restricted information + sanctioned dissent + costly or dangerous exit + absolute authority.

Jonestown on our three axes

If we apply the model from the umbrella article:

Apocalypticity

High in the final phase. The community expected violent catastrophe and an outside attack.

Organizational control

High. Documented or well-supported elements include isolation, disciplining of information, restricted exit, and strong authority.

Legitimation of violence

Extreme in the final phase. Violence against those leaving and collective death were presented as a moral-political response to crisis. But this configuration did not exist at the same intensity throughout the entire history of Peoples Temple.

COST OF ERROR

Our fourth dimension is:

what happens when the leader’s interpretation may be wrong?

In a healthy system:

it can be corrected.

In Jonestown, the cost of criticism became increasingly high. Ultimately, the system was structured so that leadership error was almost impossible to test:

• outside sources were suspect;
• departure was moralized;
• the critic was an enemy;
• crisis confirmed Jones’s framework.

The cost of correction became higher than the cost of continuation.

KNOWLEDGE CHAIN — Jonestown

SIGNAL

Former members and relatives report abuse, fear, and suicide rehearsals.

WHO KNEW

Some of the information reaches:

• U.S. diplomats;
• Congressman Ryan;
• the media;
• relatives.

OFFICIAL CHECK

Consular visits do not obtain clear direct evidence of abuse.[5]

COUNTER-EVIDENCE

Layton alleges that visits are announced and members prepared.[6]

ESCALATION

Ryan organizes a personal visit.

OBSERVATION

Some members ask to leave.

VIOLENCE

Ryan’s group is attacked at Port Kaituma.

FINAL DECISION

Jones calls for “revolutionary suicide.” This is almost a textbook example of why:

the existence of a warning is not the same as a system that can successfully detect and act on the warning.

EVENT / ATTRIBUTION / INTENT / COMMAND

EVENT STATUS — DOCUMENTED

The Port Kaituma attack and the mass deaths of November 18, 1978 are exceptionally well documented.

ATTRIBUTION STATUS — STRONGLY SUPPORTED / DOCUMENTED CORE

The airstrip attack was carried out by members or affiliates of Peoples Temple; Larry Layton fired inside one of the planes.[7][8]

INTENT STATUS

For children: death was caused by adults and cannot be treated as voluntary suicide. For adults: the degree of individual voluntariness varied and has not been reconstructed for every victim.

COMMAND STATUS — STRONGLY SUPPORTED

The final recording, testimony, and overall structure of the event strongly support Jones’s central leadership role in directing collective death.[8][10]

What is not proven?

It is not fair to claim:

every adult was physically forced.

It is equally unfair to claim:

everyone voluntarily died by suicide.

The evidence does not permit such a simple universal division. It is also not fair to claim:

U.S. or Guyanese authorities knew the full extent of the abuse and deliberately allowed the tragedy.

The documents show:

• warnings;
• official visits;
• institutional limitations;
• political and legal complications.

A stronger claim of intentional facilitation would require much stronger evidence.

Guyana: a relationship without simplification

U.S. diplomatic records show that Peoples Temple initially had relatively good relations with parts of the Guyanese state and that the project fit some political goals concerning development of the interior.[3] The same documents also contain:

• concerns;
• legal complications;
• questions about local influence.

Some later allegations speak of corruption or improper relationships. We must not automatically convert these into facts. Our standard remains:

relationship ≠ capture ≠ corruption.

Institutional failure or an impossible task?

Reading Layton’s affidavit today creates the temptation to say:

“The authorities should have known.”

But that is partly hindsight bias. At the time, authorities saw:

• serious allegations;
• contrary statements from members;
• a settlement in another sovereign country;
• limited jurisdiction of U.S. consular officials.

That does not mean the response was optimal. It means:

we should evaluate the effectiveness of the response using the information and powers that existed at the time, not only the knowledge we have after the tragedy.

At the same time, “we did not see it” is not the end of the analysis

If a conventional visit failed to detect the problem, we need to ask:

was the method suitable for the type of alleged abuse?

If the allegation is:

people are speaking under pressure,

then a group interview in front of leadership is not a strong test. This is a broader lesson for any oversight system:

the method has to be capable of detecting the phenomenon it is meant to examine.

What does the Death Tape tell us?

Q042 is an exceptionally powerful primary source. It tells us:

• what Jones was saying;
• how he framed death;
• that at least some verbal dissent existed;
• that children were dying during the course of the final meeting.[10]

But even this recording does not tell us:

• everything happening outside the microphone;
• the individual state of every person;
• the precise degree of physical coercion in every case.

Even a dramatic primary source has a limited evidentiary scope.

What does Deborah Layton tell us?

Her affidavit is an exceptionally important pre-tragedy source. It establishes:

that a former high-ranking member publicly warned before the tragedy about danger and described alleged mechanisms of control.[6]

It does not, by itself, automatically prove every individual claim. Its evidentiary weight later increased because several key elements:

• suicide drills;
• the danger of mass death;
• information control;

received support from other sources and later events.

How does evidence change after the event?

Here we have to beware hindsight. Before November 18, the claim:

“mass death could occur”

was a warning. After November 18, we know:

mass death occurred.

That does not mean:

every other claim by the same witness is therefore automatically confirmed.

Good research always distinguishes:

what was specifically corroborated later

from

what remained an allegation.

Why is Jonestown so important for the series?

Because it combines almost all of our foundational mechanisms.

Epistemic authority

Jones’s interpretation of the world becomes dominant.

Framing

The outside critic becomes enemy and persecutor.

Conspiracy theory

Opposition is interpreted as a coordinated attack.

Propaganda

Members receive an internal information frame.

Institutional silence

External oversight fails to detect the full problem.

Control

Isolation and security structures raise the exit cost.

Evidence

Different sources have different evidentiary reach.

Uncertainty

Individual deaths cannot all be placed into a simple binary category. Jonestown is therefore an ideal first case-study stress test for the entire THY-REALITY methodological system.

What must not happen in our article

We will not:

• mock members;
• reduce their deaths to a slogan;
• use children as sensational visual material;
• equate every new religious movement with Jonestown;
• use “cult” as an explanation;
• ignore the racial and social attractions of Peoples Temple;
• describe every victim as a voluntary suicide.

Nor will we turn the case into:

“it was all a state conspiracy.”

The current documentation does not provide a sufficient basis for that claim.

What about the phrase “drink the Kool-Aid”?

The expression became an idiom for:

blindly following a group or idea.

But its use trivializes an event in which:

• children were killed;
• coercion existed;
• many people occupied profoundly unequal positions.

Historically, it also shifts attention:

away from the structure of control

and toward

the supposed stupidity of the victims.

For THY-REALITY, the phrase is not appropriate as the central frame.

The biggest wrong lesson from Jonestown

The easiest lesson is:

“Do not follow a strange leader.”

That is too shallow. Many dangerous systems do not initially look:

strange.

They look:

• moral;
• humane;
• solidaristic;
• effective.

A better lesson is:

do not give any institution so much epistemic and social power that a person loses a safe possibility of doubt and exit.

Seven warning signals from the Jonestown case

1. The leader becomes the principal interpreter of reality.
2. Outside information becomes morally suspect.
3. The critic is redefined as a traitor.
4. Exit becomes costly or dangerous.
5. Crisis rhetoric becomes a permanent condition.
6. The group rehearses or normalizes an extreme outcome.
7. Correcting the leader’s interpretation becomes harder than continuing the system.

No single signal by itself proves that a group will become violent. A configuration of multiple signals, however, matters.

The most important question

For any community, we can ask:

If a member realizes tomorrow that leadership is wrong—what can happen to them?

Can they:

• ask questions;
• verify;
• speak to outsiders;
• keep their family;
• leave;
• retain documents and resources?

If the answers are negative, we have much more than:

“a strong community.”

We have a system in which truth is increasingly dependent on authority.

Conclusion: Jonestown is not a story about one day

November 18, 1978 was the end. It does not explain the beginning. The tragedy developed through a process:

ideal → community → authority → isolation → external threat → internal discipline → crisis → violence.

But even that chain is not automatic. At every step, a different direction was possible. That is why such cases need to be studied. Not so that we can marvel at the people who died.

But so that we can recognize the moments at which:

the community stops serving the person and the person begins serving the survival of the community.

Jonestown therefore does not only tell us:

what happened to them.

It asks a much more uncomfortable question:

What mechanisms would need to exist in our own group, institution, or belief system so that we could discover in time that we had gone too far?

THY-REALITY CASE STATUS

FACT STATUS

DOCUMENTED

• existence and development of Peoples Temple;
• the Jonestown settlement in Guyana;
• Ryan’s visit;
• members who wanted to leave;
• the Port Kaituma attack;
• the mass deaths of November 18, 1978;
• Jones’s central role in the final gathering.

ATTRIBUTION STATUS

DOCUMENTED / STRONGLY SUPPORTED

• the Port Kaituma attackers were connected with Peoples Temple;
• Jim Jones directed the final process of mass death.

INTENT STATUS

MIXED BY VICTIM / NOT UNIVERSALLY RECONSTRUCTABLE

• children: murder;
• some adults: ideological participation or acceptance;
• some adults: psychological and/or physical coercion;
• a reliable individual classification of all 909 dead is not possible.

INTERPRETATION STATUS

STRONGLY SUPPORTED CORE / DEBATED DETAILS Strongly supported:

• concentration of authority;
• isolation;
• high exit costs;
• a self-sealing conflict frame;
• legitimation of collective death.

Open or contested:

• the precise degree of voluntariness for each adult victim;
• the extent of some alleged external political relationships and improper influence.

Methodological note

The term “mass murder-suicide” is used because “mass suicide” cannot adequately describe the deaths of children and does not capture the documented or well-supported coercive context. The article does not claim that every adult resident was physically forced to die.

Nor does it claim that every individual death was a voluntary suicide. In discussing relationships between Peoples Temple and authorities, we distinguish among:

• documented official contact;
• political or development-related favorability;
• allegations of improper influence;
• proven corruption.

These categories are not interchangeable.