R361 SeriesWho decides what is true? Part 2 / 26

How Is Reality Shaped?

Agenda-setting, framing, repetition, propaganda, and the boundary between informing and steering

If someone lies, the problem appears simple. There is a true state of affairs and there is a false claim. But the more interesting cases begin when individual pieces of information are not necessarily invented.

Only certain facts are selected. Others are left out. Something is placed on the front page. Something else is buried at the end of the article. One event is described as an “attack,” another as a “response.”

Someone becomes a “rebel,” an “activist,” a “terrorist,” a “fighter,” a “victim,” a “suspect,” or a “hero.” All of these labels can refer to the same person, but they do not create the same world in the reader's mind.

So the question of informational power is not only:

Who is telling the truth and who is lying?

It is also:

Who decides what we will think about in the first place, which part of an event we will see first, and which frame we will use to understand it?

This is the next step in the series WHO DECIDES WHAT IS TRUE?

The world is too large to receive directly

As early as 1922, Walter Lippmann emphasized in Public Opinion a fundamental problem of modern society: we do not experience most of the events about which we form opinions directly.[1] We read about war. We watch a recording of parliament.

We read a summary of a scientific study. We see photographs of a protest. We form an image of a country we have never visited. Our political and social reality is therefore, to a large extent, made of mediated representations.

Lippmann connected this to the “pictures in our heads”—internal images of the world formed from limited information.[1] The problem is not only propaganda. The problem begins with a physical limitation:

no one can see everything.

So someone has to select.

The first power is the power to choose the topic

In 1972, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw published their famous study of the agenda-setting function of mass media.[2] The basic idea is simple: the media may not directly determine what a person must think, but they can strongly influence what the person will think about and which issues will seem important. If a particular topic is:

  • on the front page every day;
  • the first item in the news;
  • the subject of multiple commentaries;
  • accompanied by large photographs;
  • repeated for several weeks,

it will probably acquire greater psychological weight. No lie is required. The event may be entirely real. Agenda-setting already begins with the answer to the question:

Which of today's thousand events gets five minutes, and which gets five seconds?

Missing information is harder to notice than false information

A false fact can sometimes be checked. Something else is much harder to check:

What was I not shown?

If a news outlet reports on five protests and omits the sixth, the reader does not see an empty space on the page. If a documentary uses six witnesses from one side and none from another, the viewer does not see the interviews that were left out.

If an algorithm does not recommend a particular post, the user often does not even know that it existed. This does not mean every omission is manipulation. Every medium must select. Time, space, and attention are limited.

The real question is:

By what criterion is the selection made—and can the reader see that criterion at all?

Framing: the same fact, a different meaning

In 1993, Robert Entman described framing as the process of selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient, so that a message promotes a particular definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or proposed solution.[3] This is more significant than simple bias. Imagine an economic statistic:

unemployment is 6 percent.

Possible frames:

“94 percent of the labor force is employed.”

or:

“Almost one in sixteen members of the labor force is out of work.”

The number may be identical. The psychological effect need not be. Framing therefore does not require falsifying the number. It is enough to decide:

  • what the problem is;
  • who caused it;
  • who the victim is;
  • what is morally important;
  • which solution feels natural.

Words are already interpretation

A journalist, activist, politician, company, or religious organization never describes the world with a perfectly neutral vocabulary. Example: “Reduction in public spending” can become: “austerity” or: “cuts to the welfare state.” The same act can be described as:

  • reform;
  • attack;
  • protection;
  • restriction;
  • liberation;
  • regulation.

A word is not only a label. It carries a frame. This does not mean that there is some perfectly neutral language that we simply need to discover. It means we should notice when description:

does not merely report, but already steers the moral interpretation of an event.

Framing is not automatically propaganda

This distinction is crucial. Every act of communication contains selection. Every article has a headline. Every documentary has editing. Every historian chooses which events to include. If we called all of that propaganda, the word would lose its meaning.

Jowett and O'Donnell define propaganda as a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, influence cognition, and direct behavior in ways that further the desired intent of the propagandist.[4] Here, intention matters. Framing can be:

  • unconscious;
  • a professional editorial decision;
  • a consequence of time constraints;
  • a consequence of cultural context.

Propaganda, in this classical communication definition, is planned persuasive activity.

Propaganda is not only state propaganda

For most people, the word propaganda evokes:

  • a wartime poster;
  • dictatorship;
  • state television;
  • a totalitarian ministry.

But the communication literature makes clear that the propagandist does not have to be a state.[4] Propagandistic communication can be carried out by:

  • political organizations;
  • states;
  • corporations;
  • religious movements;
  • interest groups;
  • activist organizations;
  • private individuals;
  • online networks.

That still does not mean every attempt at persuasion is propaganda. A company that openly says:

“Buy our product because we believe it is better.”

is advertising. The more problematic form appears when:

  • the true source is hidden;
  • the purpose is hidden;
  • contrary facts are systematically omitted;
  • the message is presented as independent information even though it is part of a coordinated campaign.

Information, persuasion, propaganda, misinformation, disinformation

It helps to separate these terms.

Information

The main purpose is to convey a fact or explanation. That does not mean it is necessarily correct.

Persuasion

The purpose is to convince someone. This is a normal part of politics, law, advertising, education, and everyday life.

Propaganda

Systematic and purposeful shaping of perceptions and behavior in service of the propagandist's objective.[4]

Misinformation

False or misleading information, regardless of whether it was shared with the intention to deceive.[5]

Disinformation

False or misleading information that is created or disseminated deliberately in order to deceive.[5] Importantly: propaganda does not have to be false. A propagandistic message can consist of true facts selected and arranged to produce a particular effect.

The most powerful propaganda often needs no invention

Imagine one hundred verified facts about a country, a corporation, or a person. We select ten negative ones. All ten are true. We publish them without the other ninety. Did we lie? In a narrow sense, perhaps not.

Did we create a representative picture? Perhaps not. That is why the comparison base matters when analyzing informational influence. We need to ask:

  • How many cases exist?
  • Why were these particular cases selected?
  • Do we know the base rate of the phenomenon?
  • Does the example represent the rule or the exception?

A dramatic example can radically alter our intuitive sense of how common something is without anyone stating a false number.

A 1917 Four Minute Men poster showing the U.S. Capitol and naming the Committee on Public Information.
1917: the Four Minute Men and the Committee on Public Information. The poster promotes a network of speakers who delivered short, coordinated messages for the U.S. government during the First World War. It documents an organized state communication apparatus; by itself it does not establish whether any particular claim was true or false. Image: H. Devitt Welsh / Library of Congress / Wikimedia Commons Public domain

Repetition: what is familiar begins to sound true

One of the most robust findings in the psychology of information is the illusory truth effect. When people encounter a statement repeatedly, they may begin to rate it as more plausible or more true than a comparable new statement.

A contemporary review finds that repetition increases perceived truth even for misinformation, and that the effect can appear even for claims that are implausible or conflict with prior knowledge.[6] A newer meta-analysis describes the effect as small, but robust and dependent on conditions.[7] That wording matters. It does not mean:

“Repeat a lie often enough and everyone will believe it.”

It means:

familiarity is one of the cues the mind can use when judging whether something is true.

Why familiarity works

When we see something for the second or third time, we process it more easily. That processing fluency can produce a feeling:

“This is familiar.”

But familiarity can be misread as:

“I have already heard this from several sources.”

or even:

“This is probably true.”

That is why an information ecosystem is especially problematic when the same claim appears:

  • on multiple profiles;
  • in multiple articles;
  • in videos;
  • in comments;
  • in memes.

A person can get the impression of several independent confirmations even though all the sources derive from the same original story. Here, the psychology of repetition meets the problem of source provenance.

Five pages are not necessarily five pieces of evidence

If five websites copy the same wire-service report, we have:

five publications,

not necessarily:

five independent confirmations.

If ten profiles repeat the same anonymous claim, quantity does not prove truth. One of the most important information habits is:

trace the claim back to its origin.

Ask:

  • Who first published it?
  • What document is it based on?
  • Is the second source merely citing the first?
  • Do we have another independent path to the same fact?

The internet produces an extraordinary amount of apparent independence.

Emotion is not evidence—but it strongly directs attention

Research on misinformation often examines the role of emotion, but the field is more complex than the slogan “emotion makes us irrational” suggests.[5] Fear, anger, surprise, and other strong emotions can increase:

  • attention;
  • memorability;
  • readiness for rapid reaction;
  • desire to share.

But effects depend on context and on the type of emotion, and researchers caution that we must distinguish between a person's pre-existing emotional state and the emotion elicited by the information itself.[8] A better practical rule is therefore:

The more strongly a piece of information activates me emotionally, the more useful it is to slow down the verification process.

Not because the information is necessarily false. But because we are probably less neutral observers at that moment.

Moral clarity is communicatively efficient

Complex events have:

  • multiple causes;
  • multiple actors;
  • uncertainty;
  • conflicts of interest;
  • unintended consequences.

Communication becomes easier if it simplifies the world into:

victim / perpetrator good / evil us / them savior / enemy.

In a given case, such a frame may even be justified. Some events do have a very clear moral dimension. The problem begins when moral judgment replaces verification of the factual description. The question:

“Is this terrible?”

is not the same as:

“Did it happen as described?”

We need to be able to separate the two.

An image can become an argument

A photograph is strong evidence that something resembling the captured scene existed in front of the lens at a particular moment. But the photograph by itself does not necessarily tell us:

  • what happened a minute earlier;
  • who initiated the event;
  • what lies outside the frame;
  • where it was taken;
  • whether the date is correct;
  • whether the caption interprets the scene correctly.

A documentary image is therefore not merely an illustration. It is a source that needs provenance. In an era of generative imagery and effortless recycling of old photographs, this matters even more. THY-REALITY must ask the same question of images as it asks of text:

What does this evidence actually prove?

A headline can be more influential than the article

A large part of the audience reads the headline and not the full text. That makes the difference between:

“Study proves ...”

and

“Small study suggests ...”

enormous. An article may contain many limitations while its headline is absolute. In such a case, the outlet can formally say:

“We explained the details in the article.”

But the psychological effect on most of the audience may be created primarily by the headline. So with sources, it is not enough to check only whether the article contains correct information. We must also ask:

Does the headline fairly represent the actual content?

Agenda-setting is not a theory of total control

An important limit must be drawn here. McCombs and Shaw did not prove that the media program people's thoughts like a machine. Agenda-setting is a theory of salience—the perceived importance of topics, not total mental control.[2]

People have:

  • personal experience;
  • family;
  • friends;
  • alternative sources;
  • prior beliefs.

The relationship is also two-way. Media select topics that interest audiences. Audiences influence media through clicks and ratings. Politicians and organizations try to influence both. So the real information system is not a one-way pipe.

It is a feedback loop.

Framing is not automatically manipulation either

Framing is unavoidable. If we ask:

“What happened?”

we must select some elements from an infinite amount of information. Every historical article, including THY-REALITY, therefore uses a frame. The honest goal is not:

to remove framing.

That is impossible. The better goal is:

to make the framing visible.

We can tell the reader:

  • which aspect we are analyzing;
  • which other frames exist;
  • why we selected particular examples;
  • what we cannot conclude from the sources.

A transparent frame is not the same as a hidden frame.

“Manufacturing consent” as an influential critique, not a universal law

Walter Lippmann already used the phrase “manufacture of consent” in his discussion of public opinion.[1] Later, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky developed a propaganda model of mass media in Manufacturing Consent. In their model, economic and institutional structures—ownership, advertising, access to sources, and other pressures—systematically filter which stories receive attention and how they are presented.[9]

The model is highly influential. But it should not be used as:

“proof that mainstream media are always propaganda.”

That would be exactly the kind of self-sealing epistemology this series criticizes. The propaganda model is a theoretical framework for analyzing structural pressures on media, and there is academic debate about both its explanatory power and its limitations.[9]

It is useful as a question:

Which institutional interests may influence the selection of information?

Not as an automatic answer:

Everything published by a large institution is a lie.

Bernays and the birth of modern management of public opinion

Edward Bernays titled his 1928 book simply Propaganda. At the time, the word had not yet acquired quite the same negative weight it would carry after the Second World War. Bernays argued that in a complex mass society public opinion could be shaped systematically through an understanding of psychology, symbols, and publics.[10]

His historical importance lies especially in the transition he represents:

from spontaneous persuasion

to

professionalized management of public perception.

From this developed modern practices of public relations, political communication, advertising, and crisis communication—although it would be inaccurate to equate modern PR as such with propaganda.[4]

Correcting false information does not always erase its influence

Psychological research describes the continued influence effect. A person receives a false explanation of an event. Later, they are clearly told that the information was wrong. Yet the original explanation may continue to influence their reasoning to some degree.[5]

The reason is understandable. If we remove the information:

“the fire was caused by a fuel container”

a gap may appear in the person's mental model:

“Then what caused it?”

Correction is therefore more effective when it does not merely say:

“That is not true.”

but provides a correct alternative explanation.[5]

The myth of the universal “backfire effect”

For years, public discussion often repeated the claim:

“If you correct someone's false belief, they will believe it even more strongly.”

That is an overgeneralization. Contemporary reviews find that corrections are often effective, while a reliable general “worldview backfire effect” is not as common as some early studies suggested.[5][11] This matters for THY-REALITY. There is no reason for cynicism:

“There is no point showing people evidence.”

There is. But the way correction is done matters.

A better correction

Reviews of the research suggest several useful principles.[5][11] Start with the fact. Then briefly identify the false claim. Explain why it is false or which manipulation technique was used. Provide an alternative explanation. End with the fact.

That is very different from:

“How can you believe something so stupid?”

Mockery can strike a person's identity rather than the structure of their argument.

Prebunking: recognize the technique before the claim

Psychological inoculation theory uses an analogy with the immune system. Instead of waiting for every specific false story, we expose people in advance to a weakened form of a manipulation technique and show them how to recognize it.[11]

For example:

  • false dilemma;
  • personal attack instead of argument;
  • manufacture of false expert consensus;
  • emotional manipulation;
  • selective use of evidence.

Contemporary research has therefore partly shifted from fact-based prebunking toward technique-based prebunking.[11] This fits the goal of this series very well. THY-REALITY cannot fact-check every future claim in the world. But it can show readers a method of verification.

An echo chamber is stronger than a filter

C. Thi Nguyen distinguishes between an epistemic bubble and an echo chamber.[12] In an epistemic bubble, certain voices are absent. In an echo chamber, outside voices are actively discredited. That difference is crucial. If a person has simply never seen a source, we can show it to them.

But if they have been taught:

“Every outside source is part of the conspiracy against us,”

a new fact alone may not help. First, trust in the possibility of outside evidence has to be rebuilt.

Algorithms are not magical brainwashing machines

On social media, one often hears:

“The algorithm radicalizes people.”

Reality is more complicated. Algorithms undeniably filter and rank content. But their effects on political attitudes and polarization are not a simple linear relationship. A large Facebook study discussed in Nature in 2023 found that algorithms influence the amount of political content people receive from ideologically like-minded sources, but an experimental feed change that reduced such exposure did not, during the study period, produce a corresponding reduction in measured political polarization.[13]

This is an excellent example for our methodology. The correct conclusion is not:

“Algorithms have no effect.”

Nor is it:

“Algorithms have been proven to cause polarization.”

A more honest formulation is:

Algorithms shape information exposure, while effects on beliefs and polarization depend on multiple factors.

Propaganda-like effects can emerge without a central propagandist

The digital environment introduces an interesting development. In the classical model we imagine a center:

someone writes a message → a medium distributes it → an audience receives it.

Today, content can explode without a single controller. Users:

  • imitate one another;
  • compete for attention;
  • optimize for the algorithm;
  • reward emotional content;
  • create memetic variations of the same story.

The result can resemble the communicative effects of organized propaganda even when there was no single command room. We therefore need to distinguish between: coordinated manipulation and emergent information behavior of a crowd. A similar outcome does not prove the same cause.

A source has an interest—but interest is not proof of deception

Almost every communicator has an interest. A newspaper wants readers. A politician wants support. A company wants sales. An activist organization wants change. A government agency wants legitimacy for its work. An independent author wants an audience.

THY-REALITY also wants the reader to regard an article as worth reading. So the question:

“Does the source have an interest?”

is not enough. Better questions are:

  • Is the interest disclosed?
  • Are the data verifiable?
  • Does the source distinguish fact from opinion?
  • Does it show contrary evidence?
  • Does it acknowledge uncertainty?
  • Does it correct errors?

A conflict of interest increases the need for verification. It does not automatically prove a lie.

“Mainstream” and “alternative” are not epistemological categories

One of the most dangerous informational shortcuts is:

mainstream = falsehood

or, conversely:

alternative source = disinformation.

Both categories mainly describe position within the information ecosystem, not the quality of a particular claim. A large media outlet may have:

  • stronger editorial procedures;
  • more sources;
  • legal accountability;

and at the same time:

  • commercial interests;
  • institutional blind spots;
  • an editorial ideology;
  • errors.

A small independent outlet may have:

  • greater freedom;
  • specialized knowledge;
  • the courage to cover a topic others ignore;

and at the same time:

  • weak fact-checking;
  • dependence on one person;
  • financial incentives for sensationalism;
  • a highly homogeneous audience.

THY-REALITY therefore must not ask:

“Is the source mainstream or alternative?”

as a substitute for:

“How good is the evidence for this specific claim?”

What is the strongest form of informational manipulation?

Not necessarily a large lie. Perhaps the strongest combination is: topic selection + moral frame + repetition + apparent independence of sources + emotional activation + discrediting alternative information. Each element can be a normal part of communication on its own.

Together, they can create an information environment in which it becomes very difficult for a person to notice:

that their picture of the world is not only the product of facts, but also of the architecture through which those facts were presented.

How should THY-REALITY therefore be read?

Not by asking:

“Do I trust the author?”

But by asking:

“Which part of this article can I verify?”

For an important claim, the reader should be able to follow the path: claim → source → original document/data → context → alternative interpretations. If that path does not exist, the degree of confidence should be lower. This rule must also apply to articles whose conclusions we like.

Especially to them.

Editorial test: ten questions before publication

Before publishing a sensitive article, we can ask ten questions:

  1. Does the headline say more than the sources prove?
  2. Did we select only examples that support our thesis?
  3. Do we know the origin of the key claim?
  4. Do multiple sources actually mean multiple independent sources?
  5. Did we separate factual description from moral judgment?
  6. Is the photograph correctly dated and placed in context?
  7. Can the reader see the relevant uncertainty?
  8. Did we include an important piece of evidence that cuts against our interpretation?
  9. Would we apply the same standard if the article supported the opposite position?
  10. What would force us to correct the article later?

If we do not have a good answer to the tenth question, we have the same problem as the institutions we are studying.

The goal is not to eliminate influence—the goal is to make it visible

A completely unmediated informational reality does not exist. There will always be:

  • selection;
  • limited space;
  • language;
  • perspective;
  • ordering;
  • editorial judgment.

So the goal is not:

“pure information without interpretation.”

A more realistic goal is:

transparent interpretation that allows the reader to verify it.

The difference between investigation and propaganda is not only which conclusion we reach. The structure of the process matters too: Are the evidence visible? Is contrary evidence allowed? Is correction possible? Can a reader reach a different conclusion without first being stripped of legitimacy?

Conclusion: reality is not shaped only by lies

The most misleading information is not always invented. Sometimes it is a real photograph. A real quotation. A real statistic. A real crime. A real document. But without the right context, a true fact can create a false picture of the whole.

That is why one of the most important information skills is the ability to ask:

Why am I seeing this in particular?

What was selected?

What was omitted?

What frame is the message offering me?

How many times have I heard this claim, and from how many genuinely independent sources?

What would be the strongest explanation offered by someone who interprets the same evidence differently?

And most importantly:

Can I reach the primary data before accepting the interpretation?

When we can do that, propaganda does not disappear. Framing does not disappear. Agenda-setting does not disappear. But something changes: they become visible. And when the mechanism is visible, the individual has a better chance of preserving their own judgment.

Methodological note

This article deliberately does not claim that:

  • all media are propagandistic;
  • framing is the same as lying;
  • agenda-setting means control over thought;
  • repetition always persuades;
  • emotionally charged content automatically means disinformation;
  • algorithms alone cause polarization;
  • “mainstream” or “alternative” status determines reliability by itself.

All of the concepts used here are presented as analytical tools with limits.

Sources and further reading

  1. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, 1922. Historical source for the problem of mediated reality, stereotypes, and “pictures in our heads.” Source
  2. Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2), 1972, 176–187. Source
  3. Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43(4), 1993, 51–58. Source
  4. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion; also summarized in the systematic review by Lock & Ludolph, 2020. Used for the communication definition of propaganda and its distinction from broader persuasion. Source 1 Source 2
  5. Ullrich K. H. Ecker et al., “The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction,” Nature Reviews Psychology 1, 2022, 13–29. Used for misinformation, the continued influence effect, psychological factors, and correction of false information. Source
  6. Jessica Udry & Sarah J. Barber, “The illusory truth effect: A review of how repetition increases belief in misinformation,” Current Opinion in Psychology 56, 2024, 101736. Source
  7. Systematic review and meta-analysis of the evidence for an illusory truth effect and its determinants, 2026. Used for the more cautious formulation that the effect is small, robust, and condition-dependent. Source
  8. “Emotions in misinformation studies: distinguishing affective state from emotional response and misinformation recognition from acceptance,” 2024. Used for methodological caution in linking emotion to misinformation. Source
  9. Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, 1988. The propaganda model is presented in this article as an influential theoretical framework, not as automatic proof about any particular media organization. Additional use: academic debate around the model. Source
  10. Edward Bernays, Propaganda, 1928. Historical primary source for the professionalization of public-opinion management and early public-relations terminology. Source
  11. Sander van der Linden, “Misinformation: susceptibility, spread, and interventions to immunize the public,” Nature Medicine 28, 2022, 460–467. Used for debunking, limits of the alleged backfire effect, and psychological inoculation/prebunking. Source
  12. C. Thi Nguyen, “Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles,” Episteme 17(2), 2020, 141–161. Source
  13. David Garcia, “Influence of Facebook algorithms on political polarization tested,” Nature, July 27, 2023; commentary on experimental Facebook/Instagram studies of the 2020 election. Used only for the cautious claim that reducing exposure to like-minded political content in that study did not automatically reduce measured polarization. Source