SeriesU.S. Presidents and the Human Cost of War Part 7 / 11

George W. Bush — Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror

Two wars launched through two presidential decisions raise markedly different questions of evidence.

Editorial illustration.

Two wars launched through two presidential decisions raise markedly different questions of evidence. Both had real human consequences, but not every death during either war establishes the same kind of American responsibility or personal responsibility on the part of the president.

Two wars that must not be collapsed into one story

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda carried out attacks on New York and the Pentagon using hijacked passenger aircraft; a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania. The attacks killed 2,977 victims, excluding the nineteen hijackers. Those deaths were the responsibility of the attackers, not entries on a later list of people killed by U.S. military forces. Yet the attacks transformed the political setting in which President George W. Bush made decisions about the use of military force. [1] [2]

The war in Afghanistan began in connection with the sanctuary the Taliban regime afforded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission described their longstanding relationship: Afghanistan hosted training camps, a logistical network and leaders of the organization that carried out the attacks. But the distinction matters even here: evidence that the Taliban regime provided sanctuary is not evidence that its leadership itself planned the aircraft hijackings. [2]

There was no equivalent initial connection in Iraq in March 2003. The Iraqi regime did not carry out the September 11 attacks, and the Commission found no evidence that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda had developed into operational cooperation in attacks against the United States. The war against Iraq must therefore be assessed against different claims: weapons of mass destruction, a supposed future threat, compliance with Security Council resolutions, and the political decision to replace the regime. Treating both wars as a single, self-evident response to September 11 erases a crucial difference between their starting points. [2]

Afghanistan: from demands to the Taliban to the use of force

On September 20, 2001, Bush presented the Taliban leadership with demands in an address to Congress: hand over al-Qaeda leaders, close terrorist training camps, release foreign detainees, and allow the United States to verify compliance. The ultimatum left no room to negotiate the conditions laid down by the U.S. administration. [3]

This episode is often told in two opposing but equally oversimplified ways. One version says the Taliban never raised the possibility of handing over bin Laden. The other claims that a peaceful handover had virtually been agreed and that the United States rejected it without reason. The historical record supports neither certainty. Taliban representatives proposed conditional arrangements, including transfer to a third country, but the conditions, jurisdiction and enforceability of those proposals were disputed; Bush did not accept them as compliance with his demands. [4]

The U.S. domestic legal basis was explicit. In September 2001, Congress adopted an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), permitting the president to use necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for September 11 and those who aided or harbored them. Internationally, UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 condemned the terrorist attacks and recognized the right of self-defense; the United States also notified the UN of its operation under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is not the same as saying the Security Council passed a specific resolution directly ordering or expressly authorizing the invasion conducted as Operation Enduring Freedom. [5] [6]

The alliances also require accurate labels. NATO invoked Article 5 after the attacks, but the initial Operation Enduring Freedom was not conducted under direct NATO command. It was a U.S.-led coalition involving the United Kingdom and other countries. This distinction later matters when determining which country's aircraft, munitions or chain of command was linked to a particular incident.

What did Bush actually order?

There is no need to speculate about whether Bush made the decision to begin the war. The 9/11 Commission recorded approvals of military plans at meetings on September 21 and October 2. On October 7, 2001, the president publicly confirmed that attacks on al-Qaeda camps and Taliban military installations had begun on his orders. This is a directly documented presidential decision to launch an operation — P1 in this series' methodology. The campaign's broader duration and objectives belong to the P2 framework; individual strikes generally constitute operational execution, P3, unless there is separate evidence of an additional presidential order. [7] [8]

The air war was intertwined with operations by the CIA, special forces and Afghan anti-Taliban groups, particularly the Northern Alliance. Cooperation with local armed forces accelerated the fall of the Taliban regime but created several parallel chains of causation. A death caused by a U.S. bomb is not the same as a death caused by a local allied unit; both may be connected to the wider war, but they do not carry the same direct attribution. [7]

By the end of 2001, Tora Bora revealed another limit of presidential responsibility: the boundary between political decision-making and military execution. A later report by the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee assessed that bin Laden had escaped from Tora Bora to Pakistan in December 2001. It criticized reliance on Afghan partners and the insufficient American blocking of escape routes; then-CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks disputed the certainty with which bin Laden's precise location could have been known during the operation. The difference between those assessments merits examination, but the episode cannot simply be turned into another entry in a civilian-death tally. [7] [9]

Civilians, bombs and incomplete counts

There was no single, complete, independent register of civilian deaths during the first months of the Afghan war. Journalists and humanitarian organizations could not reliably reach every location, and the U.S. military did not publish a complete incident-by-incident count. This produced estimates whose differing methods do not permit them to be combined into one definitive number.

In a study for the Project on Defense Alternatives, Carl Conetta estimated approximately 1,000–1,300 civilian deaths from bombing during the initial campaign through January 1, 2002. For the calendar year 2001, Neta C. Crawford of the Costs of War project estimated approximately 1,537–2,375 civilian deaths from direct war violence (Table 5 and the methodological appendix). The first figure estimates one type of attack within one period; the second is an annual estimate, not a verified list assigning each death to a specific perpetrator. Both are uncertain and must not be added together. Neither is a definitive list of people Bush personally ordered killed. [10] [11]

The evidence can be firmer for individual incidents. In the village of Thori, Human Rights Watch documented at least 23 civilians killed by U.S. bombs in October 2001. For Chowkar-Karez, the organization reported at least 25 deaths, while witness accounts also suggested a figure of about 35. These are instances of documented direct U.S. causation, not proof that the president personally selected the village or approved every target. The classification is DIRECT-US / P3. If these deaths are already included in broader bombing estimates, they cannot be added a second time. [12] [13]

Cluster munitions brought a different kind of danger. Human Rights Watch reported that approximately 1,228 U.S. cluster bombs containing some 248,056 submunitions were dropped between October 2001 and March 2002. It documented direct civilian deaths in investigated strikes, as well as later deaths and injuries caused by unexploded remnants. Its figure of at least 127 civilians killed or injured by submunitions by November 2002 does not mean 127 people were killed. The immediate effects of an attack and the later legacy of unexploded ordnance are connected but distinct categories. [14]

Some dramatic events cannot fairly be described as ordinary civilian deaths from bombing. At Qala-i-Jangi, a prisoners' uprising was followed by fighting involving Afghan forces and U.S. air support; the prisoners' legal status and the exact share of deaths caused by U.S. action call for separate investigation. At Dasht-i-Leili, reports described the deaths of prisoners held by forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, a U.S. partner. The link to an American ally raises serious questions about support, oversight and responsibility, but it does not itself prove that Bush directly ordered these prisoners' deaths. [15] [16]

It would be particularly wrong to attribute every death in the twenty-year Afghan war, which ended in 2021, to a single president's ledger. The war spanned several administrations and involved Afghan government forces, the Taliban, other armed organizations and foreign troops. Responsibility for starting the war is one question; the direct cause of a particular death and responsibility for later decisions by subsequent presidents must be assessed separately.

Iraq: between a real history of weapons programs and the claims of 2003

Saddam Hussein had previously pursued chemical and biological weapons programs and, before 1991, a clandestine nuclear program. Iraq had used chemical weapons and repeatedly violated or evaded international disarmament obligations after the Gulf War. That history is real. But it does not logically establish that Iraq possessed the large operational weapons stockpiles in March 2003 that the administration portrayed as an immediate threat. [17]

The October 2002 U.S. intelligence assessment made serious claims about Iraqi weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. A subsequent Senate review found that important key judgments had been overstated or inadequately supported. In its 2004 report, the same committee found no evidence that erroneous or exaggerated intelligence assessments resulted from political pressure. A separate, later Senate inquiry examined whether the administration's public presentation went beyond the available intelligence. An analytical error and a public political assertion are different questions; an honest but mistaken belief must likewise be distinguished from a knowingly false statement. Historical records can show what analysts concluded, which uncertainties appeared in their reports, and how the government presented their findings; a conclusion about a particular person's actual knowledge and intent requires additional evidence. [17] [33]

The case of high-strength aluminum tubes is especially instructive. Some intelligence agencies associated them with centrifuges for uranium enrichment, while experts at the U.S. Department of Energy and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) warned that they were more likely intended for a conventional rocket program. This disagreement was also included in reporting to decision-makers. Public claims about a nuclear threat could be considerably more categorical than the underlying evidence. [17]

The claim that Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from Africa followed a similar pattern. On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told the Security Council that documents supporting the alleged transaction between Iraq and Niger were not authentic. By then, the IAEA had also found no evidence or convincing indication that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons program. This does not establish that every historical intelligence concern was fabricated; it is, however, important evidence about what had actually been verified before the decision to invade. [18]

With chemical and biological weapons programs, UNMOVIC head Hans Blix pointed to unresolved questions about records, stockpiles and cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. Inspectors had not declared disarmament fully and conclusively complete, but neither had they substantiated all the strongest public claims about current programs. They did not leave Iraq in March 2003 because Saddam had expelled them in those days. UNMOVIC recorded a U.S. warning on March 16, final limited inspections on March 17, and an organized withdrawal on March 18, following the UN Secretary-General's decision based on security information from the United States and the United Kingdom. [18] [19]

Legal basis and the order to invade

In November 2002, Security Council Resolution 1441 found Iraq in serious breach of its disarmament obligations and offered the country a final opportunity to cooperate. The United States and the United Kingdom argued that earlier authorizations, together with Iraqi breaches, permitted renewed use of force; several other Council members maintained that a new Security Council decision was necessary. No new resolution explicitly authorizing this war was adopted before the invasion. The international legal assessment therefore remains a significant and clearly articulated legal dispute, not a question that can fairly be settled with a political slogan. [20]

On the other hand, in October 2002 the U.S. Congress adopted a specific authorization for the use of force against Iraq, Public Law 107-243. The House approved it by 296 votes to 133, and the Senate by 77 to 23. Domestic political responsibility for authorizing force was therefore not the president's alone. But congressional authorization and the president's final decision to begin a war are not the same act. [21]

When Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons on March 17, 2003, the political basis of the final phase was already clear. On March 19, in Washington, the president publicly announced that coalition forces had begun striking militarily significant targets on his orders. His direct decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom is therefore documented: P1. The plan, political objectives and duration of the war also fall within the broader P2 framework; individual attacks carried out by units and commanders are generally P3 unless a source demonstrates otherwise. [22]

Precision bombs and mistaken targets

The initial invasion was a large coalition operation. An official U.S. Air Force historical overview records more than 41,000 coalition sorties in the first six weeks, including more than 24,000 U.S. Air Force sorties. Another official account, using a somewhat different reporting period, gives different operational totals; without an explanation of their statistical methods, they cannot be merged into a single time series. Sorties and bombs dropped are not casualty numbers, nor are they a list of strikes personally ordered by the president. [23]

Among the most troubling operations were rapid strikes against suspected locations of Iraqi leaders. Human Rights Watch described approximately fifty strikes against high-ranking leaders; its investigation found that none killed the intended senior target, while the cases it investigated caused civilian deaths and injuries. The technological precision of a missile or bomb cannot correct faulty intelligence about who is supposed to be present at the target location. Actual U.S. strikes entail direct operational responsibility, but a failed strike alone does not establish that Bush personally selected each target. [24]

Cluster munitions also created immediate and lasting dangers. In al-Hilla, Human Rights Watch identified 551 civilian casualties from submunitions in hospital and morgue records it examined: 19 killed, 515 injured, and 17 whose status was not precisely classified. This record is not a comprehensive count of every death in the city; HRW also described different local records concerning particular neighborhoods. The figure 551 cannot therefore be turned into “551 dead,” and distinct records cannot be added together uncritically. Unexploded submunitions require a further category for subsequent harm. [24]

How many people died during the initial invasion?

The difference between serious data collection and political arithmetic is particularly clear in two early estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. In its early dossier, Iraq Body Count reported 7,299 documented civilian deaths across all recorded perpetrator categories during the invasion period through April 30, 2003. Within that same report, 6,882 deaths in the invasion phase were attributed to U.S.-led forces. These are related but different figures from one dataset. The latter is not a complete incident-by-incident identification of every exclusively American action either; it is a reporting and causal classification within IBC's evidence base. [25]

For a somewhat differently defined period of major combat, the Project on Defense Alternatives estimated approximately 3,200–4,300 noncombatant deaths. The differences arise from the time frames, definitions, and data-gathering and estimation methods. It would therefore be wrong to average these sources into a third supposedly “true” figure. Nor should individual incidents already covered by broader records be added again if doing so would count the same people twice. [26]

This distinction is not an attempt to minimize human suffering. On the contrary, if we want to understand responsibility, readers need to know which deaths a source actually documented, when, by what method, and to whom it attributed them. Without that, a number chiefly conveys an impression rather than a verifiable claim.

Medical assistance given to an injured Iraqi civilian near Umm Qasr in March 2003.
Medical assistance given to an injured Iraqi civilian near Umm Qasr in March 2003. The public-domain designation refers to the United States; other jurisdictions may require separate assessment. Image: Cpl. Anthony R. Blanco / U.S. Marine Corps Public domain (US Marine Corps; territorial caveat)

After May 1: the war did not end

On May 1, 2003, Bush declared major combat operations over, but a period of occupation, insurgency, political breakdown and increasingly complex violence followed. U.S. and coalition forces, Iraqi groups, militias, al-Qaeda in Iraq, local security agencies and criminal actors were not one and the same perpetrator. Later Iraqi data are therefore even less suited to direct conversion into a presidential “death toll.” [27]

At Abu Ghraib, documented detainee abuses required a different kind of record from bombing. An official U.S. Department of Defense review examined investigations into abuse; for the death of Manadel al-Jamadi, a specific military Criminal Investigation Division (CID) investigation, described in the ACLU archive, recorded the medical examiner's classification of the manner of death as homicide. The case belongs among deaths in U.S. detention or interrogation settings. This is a serious finding about a death in custody, but the medical classification is not itself a final judicial determination of an individual's criminal guilt, nor does it prove a personal order from Bush. [28]

Two major battles took place in Fallujah in 2004, in April and November. Sources differed on the numbers killed, particularly on the division between civilians and combatants. American use of white phosphorus in combat was also documented, but the available evidence does not yield a reliable separate total of civilian deaths caused specifically by that weapon. Numerous weapons systems and opposing parties were active in the same battlespace. A single definite, flawlessly attributed “Fallujah figure” would therefore be misleading. [29]

At Haditha in November 2005, 24 Iraqi civilians died in an incident involving U.S. Marines after an explosion killed a U.S. Marine. In its May–June 2006 report, UNAMI described ongoing investigations into alleged intentional killings; a U.S. congressional hearing recorded the deaths of 24 civilians and the continuing investigation. The type of death is therefore classified as DIRECT-US / P3, while individual criminal guilt cannot be determined solely from descriptions of initial investigations. The incident does not prove that the president personally ordered the killings. [30]

The public annual table maintained by Iraq Body Count records a total of 106,397 documented civilian deaths from violence across the six calendar years 2003–2008 (the sum of the annual entries shown on the page, checked on November 19, 2026). The table is updated over time; this total is therefore not an immutable historical export as of September 25, 2026, and the 2003 calendar-year entry includes five cases recorded before March. More importantly, the number reflects a multi-actor war context, not 106,397 deaths directly caused by Americans or by Bush's personal orders. It includes people killed by other Iraqi and foreign actors. [31]

Postwar weapons findings and the weight of the decision

After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group examined Iraq's weapons programs and anticipated stockpiles. Its findings did not substantiate key prewar claims of a revived active nuclear weapons program, large existing chemical weapons stockpiles, or mobile biological weapons facilities in the form suggested by the public arguments for war. Investigators also emphasized Saddam's previous activities, concealment, aspirations for future capabilities and retained expertise. The precise conclusion is not “Iraq never had anything,” but that key representations of an imminent threat in 2003 proved unsupported in important respects. [32]

Does this prove that Bush personally lied with full knowledge? Such a conclusion would require direct evidence of his knowledge and intent. The Senate reviews better support two different, verifiable findings: several intelligence judgments were inadequately substantiated, and some public statements by the administration were more categorical than, or exceeded the reliability of, the available evidence. Historical assessment does not require speculation about every actor's psychological state; we can compare documents, expert warnings, public statements, choices made and their consequences. [17] [33]

What does presidential responsibility mean?

George W. Bush made directly documented decisions to begin two wars. That is no minor finding: a presidential decision sets military, political and human consequences in motion that extend well beyond the first day. In Iraq, it matters particularly that public justifications included claims later evidence did not substantiate and that the armed intervention contributed to conditions in which many actors committed violence.

Yet historical, political, command and direct causal responsibility are not the same thing. The first can encompass the decision to wage war and its foreseeable consequences. The second involves decisions about strategy and continuation. The third requires examination of the chain of command. The fourth requires evidence of who actually caused a death in a particular incident. Collapsing every category into one number also obscures precisely those cases in which the evidence of direct U.S. causation is strongest.

The opposite error would be to use these distinctions to diminish the significance of the political decision to wage war. Someone who decides to launch an invasion has a duty to reckon with its consequences and answer for them politically, even without personally selecting individual targets. The same standard must apply to every state and every leader. A fair historical assessment therefore does not search for a president on whom every death can indiscriminately be pinned; it identifies specific orders, actual causal pathways, documented violations and responsibility for decisions that enabled further violence.


Sources and further reading

  1. National September 11 Memorial & Museum, 9/11 FAQs (number of victims of the attacks). Source
  2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, especially Chapters 2 and 5. Source 1 Source 2
  3. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, White House Archive. Source
  4. The Washington Post, reporting on a conditional Taliban offer and Bush’s refusal to negotiate, October 15, 2001. Source
  5. U.S. Congress, Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40 (2001). Source
  6. UN Security Council, Resolutions 1368/1373 (2001); U.S. letter S/2001/946 invoking Article 51, October 7, 2001. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  7. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10, Wartime. Source
  8. George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation, October 7, 2001, White House Archive. Source
  9. Majority staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today, November 30, 2009, S. Prt. 111-35; majority-staff report, not a unanimous finding by the full committee. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  10. Carl Conetta, Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties, Project on Defense Alternatives, 2002. Source
  11. Neta C. Crawford, Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001–2011, Costs of War, Brown University, 2011; estimate for 2001, not a comprehensive incident-by-incident record. Source 1 Source 2
  12. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: U.S. Bombs Kill Twenty-three Civilians, October 26, 2001. Source
  13. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: New Civilian Deaths Due to U.S. Bombing, October 30, 2001, and follow-up call of November 1, 2001. Source 1 Source 2
  14. Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and their Use by the United States in Afghanistan, 2002. Source
  15. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: U.S. and U.K. Should Provide Logistic Support for Detention of Captured Fighters, December 1, 2001 (call for an independent investigation of Qala-i-Jangi; not a final judicial finding). Source
  16. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002: Afghanistan, published March 31, 2003; §§ 1.a and 1.g on Qala-i-Jangi and Dasht-i-Leili. The original official archive returned a technical error on direct access; the full text is available in UNHCR Refworld. Source 1 Source 2
  17. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, review of prewar Iraq intelligence assessments (2004), committee archive; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (2005), especially the analysis of differing DOE/INR positions on aluminum tubes and Niger. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4
  18. UN Security Council, S/PV.4714, 4714th meeting, March 7, 2003; official record of statements by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei (especially pp. 7–8 on Niger and aluminum tubes). The original legacy press URL is retained for provenance although presently unavailable; the mirror is supplementary, not the primary evidence. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4
  19. UNMOVIC, Thirteenth Quarterly Report, S/2003/580 (2003), Chapter VI, paras. 125–128: warning, preparations and withdrawal on March 16–18; Office of the UN Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman ... on the Withdrawal of United Nations Staff from Iraq, March 17, 2003; three original press.un.org URLs were inaccessible when checked. Additional archival record: Iraq’s letter to the UN of March 18, S/2003/296. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7
  20. UN Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002); Security Council debates at the beginning of the war in March 2003; and U.S. letter S/2003/351 of March 20 (the U.S. argument concerning earlier resolutions). The old press.un.org URL was unavailable when checked. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  21. U.S. Congress, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Public Law 107-243. Source
  22. George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation, March 19, 2003; War Powers letter, March 21, 2003. Source 1 Source 2
  23. U.S. Air Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, official historical overview; War and Peace: A Look at Operation Iraqi Freedom, April 2003. Source 1 Source 2
  24. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, 2003. Source
  25. Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003–2005, 2005, especially “The Killers: Fact Sheet 2” (figures 7,299 and 6,882). Source
  26. Carl Conetta, The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict, Project on Defense Alternatives, Research Monograph 8, Executive Summary, October 20, 2003; major-combat period through April 20 and a distinct definition of noncombatants. Source
  27. George W. Bush, address announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, May 1, 2003. Source
  28. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Report No. 06-INTEL-10: Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse, 2006 (not a standalone Taguba report); ACLU archival description of the original military CID investigation into Manadel al-Jamadi’s death and the autopsy finding (homicide); Human Rights Watch, No More Excuses: A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture, 2015 (secondary investigative/legal interpretation). Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4
  29. Amnesty International, Iraq – Falluja: assurances needed for the protection of civilians, MDE 14/054/2004, November 4, 2004, and Iraq: Fears of serious violations of the rules of war in Falluja, MDE 14/056/2004, November 12, 2004; official U.S. acknowledgement of white-phosphorus use against insurgents and denial of intentionally targeting civilians as reported by The Washington Post (November 16, 2005), with additional legal analysis by ASIL. CORRECTION: the original MDE 14/007/2004 URL actually concerns Basra and al-Amara, so it is not evidence about Fallujah and is no longer cited in support of this statement. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4
  30. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report: 1 May–30 June 2006, para. 79: initial investigations into alleged intentional killings of 24 civilians in Haditha; U.S. Senate hearing, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism (2006), concerning the circumstances and investigation. Source 1 Source 2
  31. Iraq Body Count, Database: annual civilian death figures and classification of perpetrators. Source
  32. Iraq Survey Group / Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (original report September 30, 2004; expanded edition with appendices catalogued by GovInfo in 2005). For interpretive context, see also the Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs and Outstanding U.N. Issues. The National Security Archive excerpt and archived State Department link remain supplementary sources; a review of every chapter of the official report has not been completed. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6
  33. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence (2008). Source