Bill Clinton — War Without a Major Ground Invasion
THY-REALITY · Bloody Presidents · II. The New World Order and American Interventions · US-05
Editorial illustration.
THY-REALITY · Bloody Presidents · II. The New World Order and American Interventions · US-05
In the final years of the twentieth century, the United States was able to employ substantial military force without deploying a large ground army for every operation. Cruise missiles, strategic bombers, precision-guided weapons, and multinational air campaigns made a different form of warfare possible. But for people living near the targets, the distance separating the president, the pilot, and the target offered no guarantee of safety. An airstrike could hit a military facility, a civilian building, or a place intelligence officials mistakenly believed to be military.
Bill Clinton directly authorized military operations in Afghanistan and Sudan, then the bombing of Iraq alongside the United Kingdom, and, in 1999, the participation of US forces in NATO's campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. His orders are documented in these cases. That does not mean he personally selected every target, that US forces carried out every coalition strike, or that all deaths in a multinational war can simply be described as “Clinton's.” Three levels matter to historical assessment: the presidential decision to use force (P1), the broader campaign framework (P2), and decisions about individual targets and their engagement (P3). It is equally essential to distinguish people killed by a US strike, a strike by allied coalition forces, or the actions of entirely different perpetrators.
From the Embassy Bombings to Clinton's Order
On August 7, 1998, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. According to the FBI's record, 224 people died, including 12 Americans, and more than 4,500 were injured. Responsibility for the attacks was linked to the al-Qaeda network. That tragedy provides crucial immediate context for Clinton's subsequent decision, but those killed by the embassy bombers were not killed by American missile strikes. [1]
On August 20, US forces launched missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Clinton addressed the operation publicly and informed Congress the following day that he had ordered the strikes. He invoked self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the danger of further terrorist attacks. This is a directly documented P1 decision. It is, however, the US legal justification—not an independently adjudicated finding under international law concerning every target attacked. [2] [3]
Operation Infinite Reach was limited in duration but not insignificant in effect. The existing research record gives a total of 79 Tomahawk missiles launched in the operation. A historical account in a professional publication of the US Naval Institute also supports that overall figure; direct access to the originally cited Navy webpage was unsuccessful during the review. Differing breakdowns between targets in Afghanistan and Sudan are therefore not presented here as independently reverified facts. [4]
Afghanistan: The Camps Were the Targets, but Who Did the Missiles Kill?
In Afghanistan, the targets were camps that Washington associated with bin Laden's network. The 9/11 Commission later reported an estimate of approximately 20–30 people killed at the camps struck. That figure alone does not establish how many of those killed were armed members of the organization, how many were other people present, or whether everyone was correctly identified. It cannot automatically be treated either as a civilian death toll or as a count of confirmed terrorists killed. [3]
The strike also had consequences across a border. According to the same commission, one missile went astray and hit a village in Pakistan, killing several people. The locked research does not establish the exact number or the status of everyone who died. The distinction matters: an error in execution is a consequence of the US use of force even though the village was not the intended target. The president's authorization of the operation and the direct causation of harm by a stray missile are distinct but connected levels of responsibility. [3]
Al-Shifa: A Destroyed Factory and an Uncertain Intelligence Basis
The target in Sudan was the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. The US administration linked it to bin Laden's network and suspected the presence of substances useful in producing chemical weapons. Yet the plant also manufactured actual medicines; its pharmaceutical role was not merely a fabricated Sudanese defense. At the same time, producing medicines would not, by itself, exclude the possibility of an illicit program at the site. The historical question is what evidence was available before the strike and what that evidence actually established. [3] [5]
The 9/11 Commission described why senior US advisers accepted the intelligence assessment, as well as subsequent doubts about its evidentiary foundations. It also reported that no independent evidence corroborating the CIA's assessment had been presented. Human Rights Watch called for an independent inspection of the facility soon after the strike. Such discrepancies do not justify claiming that all the intelligence was fabricated. Neither do they permit the administration's conviction to be presented as a fact proved after the event. The publicly available basis for the Al-Shifa decision remained seriously contested. [3] [5]
According to Human Rights Watch's research, one person was killed and eleven were injured in the direct strike on the factory. In later years, claims emerged that destroying medicine production had indirectly caused many more deaths. Disruption of medical supplies can be an important consequence of an attack, but the available evidence does not permit a reliable count of additional deaths or the attribution of all later health harms to a single cause. Direct death, injuries, and possible indirect consequences belong in separate categories. [6] [5]
Clinton's domestic political crisis also prompted the suggestion that the attacks were carried out chiefly to divert public attention—the so-called “Wag the Dog” theory. The proximity of political events in time is a legitimate reason to ask questions, but it is not proof of the decision-makers' motives. The 9/11 Commission found no reason to doubt the participants' testimony that their advice had been based on national security considerations. That finding cannot establish every private motive with certainty in retrospect. It does, however, mean that there is no basis for treating the diversion theory as an established fact. The claim that the strikes were designed to conceal a scandal is therefore not substantiated as a settled historical conclusion. [3]
Iraq: When an Inspectors' Crisis Becomes a Four-Day War
In December 1998, Clinton authorized another operation, this time against Iraq, alongside the United Kingdom. Its background lay in Iraq's obligations following the 1991 war and long-running disputes about monitoring prohibited weapons programs. A report by the chief weapons inspector, Richard Butler, concluded that Iraq had failed to provide the cooperation it had promised. But UNSCOM and the IAEA had different specialized mandates: on certain matters, the assessment of Iraqi cooperation with nuclear verification differed from UNSCOM's overall assessment. Saying simply that all inspectors reached the same conclusion would erase a significant distinction. [7] [8]
It would also be misleading to say that Iraq merely expelled the inspectors on December 16, making an attack “inevitable.” The inspectors withdrew ahead of the impending bombing, after an earlier period of Iraqi obstruction and interruption of cooperation. Both parts of that history matter, and their chronological order must be preserved. [7] [8]
Operation Desert Fox began on December 16 and lasted about 70 hours. In a letter to Congress, Clinton expressly stated that the US strikes had been conducted at his direction. That establishes P1. British forces also took part, however, so the effects of the whole operation cannot automatically be classified as exclusively American strikes. [9] [10]
What Was Desert Fox Supposed to Achieve, and Who Authorized the Use of Force?
Washington and London presented the strikes as a response to Iraqi violations of disarmament obligations and an effort to diminish Iraq's military capabilities and its ability to employ weapons of mass destruction. The US account of the legal basis under international law relied on earlier Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, arguing that renewed material breaches could revive the authority to use force. But the Security Council did not adopt a new resolution explicitly authorizing Desert Fox in December 1998. The legal doctrine of reviving an earlier authorization remains contested; this was neither undisputed permission nor an issue that can be settled merely by the author's moral judgment. [9] [11] [12]
According to a US military historical account, US and British forces attacked 97 targets, flew more than 600 sorties, and employed approximately 325 Tomahawk missiles and 90 air-launched cruise missiles, in addition to other air-delivered munitions. The figures in these separate statistics measure different things and must not be added together indiscriminately. Targets were not limited to alleged laboratories: they also included air defenses, command facilities, military infrastructure, and sites associated with the Republican Guard. [10] [13]
Official damage assessments described harm to military and missile capabilities. Yet physical destruction of infrastructure is not proof that an entire weapons-of-mass-destruction program was eliminated. The air campaign did not restore inspections either: UN-mandated verification remained suspended for several years. [10] [13]
The greatest statistical gap concerns fatalities. Available sources contain differing Iraqi and US estimates of military casualties, often combining deaths and injuries or describing different units. Nor is there a reliable final nationwide civilian death toll for Desert Fox, with deaths attributable separately to US and British strikes. A contemporary Arms Control Association review summarized Washington Post reporting that cited Red Cross representatives and referred to approximately 30–40 dead and 80 injured in the greater Baghdad area. This is a limited, secondhand estimate of people killed in a particular area—not a verified final tally of civilian deaths throughout Iraq. Another source reported approximately 230 injured, said to have been mostly civilians; that is not a death toll either. The opposite assertion, that the strikes caused no civilian deaths, would be equally unsupported. Responsibility for the decision to bomb is documented; the full extent of its fatal consequences is not. [13] [14]
Kosovo Did Not Begin with NATO's First Bombs
When NATO began bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999, armed conflict was already taking place in Kosovo. Serbian and Yugoslav state forces had committed grave abuses against Kosovo Albanians; abductions and other abuses linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were also documented. It would be unfair to reduce that history either to a perfectly peaceful society disrupted only by the bombing or to a claim that every side bore equal responsibility for every type of violence. [15] [16]
The events at Račak became a major turning point in diplomatic and public debate. Conflicting allegations and doubts were voiced at the time; subsequent forensic and judicial material requires us to distinguish the limitations of individual investigations from the broader evidentiary picture. The ICTY Appeals Chamber's judgment in the Đorđević case upheld the finding that 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians were murdered at Račak. It is nevertheless unnecessary to derive from any single forensic report the claim that every question surrounding the events was already beyond dispute at the time. [17]
The Rambouillet negotiations combined a political settlement concerning autonomy with conditions for military implementation. The Kosovo Albanian delegation accepted the proposal; the Yugoslav delegation rejected it. Assessing that rejection also requires examining the envisaged powers and immunities of NATO forces, particularly the provisions of Appendix B. To say merely that “Belgrade rejected peace,” without explaining the proposed military arrangements, is too narrow an account of the negotiations. [18] [19]
Clinton's Decision, the NATO Alliance, and Disputed Authorization
Clinton announced US participation in the strikes on March 24. In a report to Congress dated March 26, he described how US forces had joined the operation at his direction, alongside NATO allies. The decision to participate was therefore P1. Planning the overall campaign took place within the allied framework, P2, while individual strikes and target verification fall under P3. Only by distinguishing these levels can we assess precisely who decided what and who carried it out. [20] [21]
The alliance emphasized the humanitarian urgency of preventing further violence and expulsions of Kosovo Albanians. Yet the Security Council did not give new explicit authorization for the use of force before the strikes began. An attempt to adopt a resolution condemning the bombing was defeated; rejecting a condemnation is not the same as positively authorizing the bombing. The later Resolution 1244 is significant for the international security and civilian presence after the campaign, not as direct retroactive authorization of all the earlier airstrikes. The intervention's standing under international law remains disputed. [22] [23]
Nor was debate in the US Congress a simple “yes” or “no.” The Senate supported a resolution concerning the operation, but the House of Representatives split 213–213 on a specific authorization of the airstrikes. Separate decisions on funding and the defeat of other resolutions were also taken. Thus it would be misleading to say either that both chambers unambiguously gave specific approval for this air war or that Congress simply rejected US participation in its entirety. [24]
How Many Civilians Died During the Bombing?
Operation Allied Force lasted 78 days. In its official history, NATO reports more than 38,000 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties. US forces provided a substantial share of aircraft, support capabilities, and attacks, but NATO is not the United States. Coalition figures for sorties or weapons delivered do not become American figures merely because the United States played a leading role. [25] [26]
On the basis of its investigation, Human Rights Watch estimated 488–527 civilian deaths in 90 documented incidents associated with NATO's air campaign. This is an important research baseline, not a definitive census of all the war's consequences. It concerns allied strikes, not all deaths in the Kosovo war, and not a separately verified US national total. The incidents described below are already included in that broader record; adding their victims again would double-count them. [27] [28]
Đakovica–Dečani illustrates the limits of assigning responsibility by nationality. Human Rights Watch recorded 73 civilians killed and 36 injured. Its reconstruction of several successive strikes also documents a US element involving an F-16, but attributing all 73 deaths exclusively to American weapons would require further evidence. This is a coalition incident with a confirmed direct American element, not proof of the precise American share of all deaths. [29] [30]
At Grdelica, a US F-15E attacked a railway bridge, and a civilian train was also struck. Human Rights Watch listed 20 civilians killed; other institutions have reported different or minimum estimates for the same incident, so that number is not presented as wholly undisputed. The intended bridge target and the actual deaths of passengers are two separate facts. Neither can be erased by the simple label “military target.” Unlike in some other incidents, an American element of the strike is documented here. [31] [32]
In Niš, on May 7, a CBU-87 cluster bomb dropped by a US aircraft caused 14 civilian deaths and 28 injuries. The immediate strike must be distinguished from later casualties caused by unexploded ordnance. People injured must not be counted as killed; nor can the effects of cluster munitions used by different allied countries be labeled exclusively American without evidence. [33] [34]
The attack on the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) building was different: the building was deliberately selected as a NATO target, and 16 civilian employees were killed. Organizations and expert bodies differed in their assessments of military justification and proportionality under the law. NATO documentation alone does not establish the nationality of the aircrew that released every particular weapon. Deliberately targeting a building is not the same as proving an intent to kill its civilian employees, but neither does it remove responsibility for foreseeable dangers to their lives. [35] [28] [36]
The Chinese embassy in Belgrade is a case in which attribution to the United States is clearer: US aircraft struck the embassy, killing three people and injuring more than twenty. US explanations attributed the attack to mistaken target identification and inadequate checking of coordinates and databases. That explanation forms part of the documented official account, but it does not require us to minimize the harm as a mere technical inconvenience. There is no evidence that Clinton personally selected the embassy as a target. [37] [38]
Dubrava shows how dangerous it is to combine deaths caused by different perpetrators. Human Rights Watch's reconstruction of the strikes on May 19 and 21 includes at least 23 deaths caused by NATO bombing. Yugoslav or Serbian government security forces then carried out separate killings of prisoners. Those subsequent executions were real and must be addressed, but they were not deaths caused by NATO bombs. Excluding them from the bombing tally does not deny the victims; it preserves accurate causal responsibility and attribution to the perpetrators. [39] [40]
At Koriša, Human Rights Watch recorded a range of approximately 48–87 civilian deaths. The circumstances were disputed, including questions about attackers' precautions and the possible forced presence of civilians near a military target. Such conflicting findings do not erase the deaths. They require us to distinguish the direct effects of the strike from possibly contributing actions by others, rather than uncritically adopting a single explanation. [41]
What the Hague Prosecutor's Review Says—and What It Does Not
A committee established for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reviewed NATO's air campaign using available documentation and did not recommend opening a criminal investigation. It conducted no field investigation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and did not comprehensively address the legality of the initial resort to force. But that prosecutorial assessment is not a judgment that every strike was lawful, proportionate, or properly planned. Conversely, civilian casualties alone do not prove that a particular individual committed a war crime. Legal assessment requires evidence concerning the target, anticipated civilian harm, information available at the time, and precautions taken. [28]
Nor does the war's outcome support an explanation based on a single cause. Airstrikes affected military and political decisions, but diplomacy, mediation, and the positions of other major powers also mattered to the eventual settlement. Resolution 1244 and the agreement to withdraw Yugoslav forces changed Kosovo's security framework. After the bombing ended, Serbs, Roma, and other communities also faced persecution, attacks, and displacement. These must be treated as postwar violence by local actors, not as additional deaths from NATO bombing. [23] [42]
Presidential Responsibility Without a False Death Toll
Clinton directly decided on US strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan, the launch of the US–British campaign against Iraq, and US participation in the NATO operation. Those decisions are not insignificant simply because they involved missiles and aircraft rather than large ground formations. Once a method of warfare is chosen, the president bears political responsibility for that decision and for the questions he should have asked about targets, evidence, and expected consequences.
Yet a precise account of responsibility is more demanding than an accusatory formula. One person killed and eleven injured at Al-Shifa, estimated deaths at the Afghan camps, unresolved civilian deaths in Iraq, and the 488–527 civilian deaths attributed to the wider NATO campaign are not equivalent figures that can simply be added together. Combining a direct US strike, a coalition attack, a military casualty, indirect mortality, a flawed intelligence assessment, and a crime committed by entirely different perpetrators would create the appearance of evidentiary precision the research does not possess.
The purpose of drawing these distinctions is not to diminish human suffering. Quite the opposite: it is to prevent real deaths from disappearing behind statistical manipulation, or individual victims from becoming instruments of a political conclusion reached in advance. The important question is not only how many people died, but also who made the decision, who carried it out, what information was available, and who bore the consequences. Each answer requires its own evidence.
Sources and further reading
- FBI, East African Embassy Bombings — official historical record of the embassy bombings of August 7, 1998. Source
- William J. Clinton, report to Congress on the strikes of August 20, 1998, August 21, 1998 (Public Papers of the Presidents; the official title as recorded in the original research requires additional confirmation). Source
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 4, especially sections 4.2 and 4.5 (2004). Source
- Naval History and Heritage Command, Today in History: August 20 — original Navy historical overview of Operation Infinite Reach; direct access was unsuccessful at C2. The overall figure of 79 also has separate historical support. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Letter to President Clinton Urges Sudan Factory Inspection, September 15, 1998. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights, section The United States: Diplomacy Revived (2003), paragraph on the Al-Shifa strike. Source
- UNSCOM, report by Executive Chairman Richard Butler on Iraqi cooperation, December 15, 1998 — archival reproduction at GlobalSecurity; the reproduction's official title has not been separately confirmed. Source
- Arms Control Association, UNSCOM Future Unceartain After Strikes on Iraq, Arms Control Today (the archived title contains the spelling error “Unceartain”). Source
- William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Military Strikes Against Iraq, December 18, 1998; primary White House record (direct access to the C2 source link was limited). Source
- Air Force Historical Support Division, 1998 — Operation Desert Fox, historical overview of the operation. Source
- UN Security Council, meeting S/PV.3955, December 16, 1998, and press release SC/6611 (Iraq–Kuwait); the original press release URL returned 404 during C2, while the meeting's identity was verified in UN records. Source
- United States, letter to the UN Security Council S/1998/1181 setting out the justification for the December 1998 strikes; the original PDF was not visually reexamined at C2. Source
- Congressional Research Service, report on the confrontation with Iraq and Operation Desert Fox, archival reproduction; details of the report require direct examination of the PDF. Source
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, historical overview of Operation Desert Fox, PDF; the injury figure is a reported estimate, not a record of deaths. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (2001). Source
- Human Rights Watch, Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (1998). Source
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Đorđević, Appeals Judgment (2014), findings on Račak; the original PDF was not visually reexamined at C2. Source
- US Department of State, fact sheet on the Rambouillet negotiations, March 1, 1999 — archival source. Source
- US Department of State, text of the proposed Rambouillet agreement, including Appendix B — archival source. Source
- William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, March 26, 1999. Source
- William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets, March 24, 1999. Source
- UN Security Council, meeting S/PV.3989, March 26, 1999, and press release SC/6659; draft S/1999/328 was not adopted. The original URL returned 404 during C2. Source
- UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted June 10, 1999. Source
- Congressional Research Service, report concerning Kosovo and the 106th US Congress — legislative and congressional decisions; the PDF was not directly reexamined. Source
- NATO, Kosovo Air Campaign (March–June 1999), official historical account of Operation Allied Force. Source
- US Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-174, review of operational capabilities and the US contribution to the airstrikes; the PDF was not directly reexamined. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000), summary of research into civilian deaths. Source
- Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000), archived at Refworld, including documentation of attacks on the Đakovica–Dečani road. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, archived PDF, section on attacks on civilian convoys; attribution of individual strikes to particular countries requires caution. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign — Photo Gallery, photograph and accompanying account of the Grdelica Gorge strike. Source
- U.S. Naval War College Review, discussion of the attack on the railway bridge at Grdelica — descriptive bibliographic identification; the precise title in the PDF has not been reconfirmed. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, archived PDF; incident involving cluster bombs in Niš. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and their use by the United States in Afghanistan (2002), Section VIII, “Prior U.S. Use of Cluster Bombs: Yugoslavia.” Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, section on the attack on Radio Television of Serbia (RTS). Source
- Amnesty International, statement about the lack of justice for victims of the NATO strike on RTS, 2009; the original Spanish title was not reverified. Source
- US Department of State, statement on the attack on the Chinese embassy, May 27, 1999 — archival primary source. Source
- US Department of State, Pickering's report on the error in identifying the Chinese embassy as a target, June 17, 1999 — archival primary source. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Appendix A on attacks on Dubrava prison. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, section on subsequent executions of inmates at Dubrava. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Koriša case and disputed issues involving precautions and the presence of civilians. Source
- Human Rights Watch, Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo, August 1, 1999. Source