SeriesU.S. Presidents and the Human Cost of War Part 9 / 11

Donald Trump — From MOAB to Soleimani

Donald Trump assumed command of the U.S. armed forces on January 20, 2017, at a time when the United States was already involved in several wars and counterterrorism operations. American aircraft were striking targets…

Editorial illustration.

Donald Trump assumed command of the U.S. armed forces on January 20, 2017, at a time when the United States was already involved in several wars and counterterrorism operations. American aircraft were striking targets in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia; local forces were fighting with U.S. support; and the president had several ways to change the rules, priorities, and deployment of forces. Some of Trump's decisions were explicit orders for specific operations. Others established the broader framework within which commanders made decisions about individual strikes.

That distinction lies at the heart of the question: where is a presidential order documented, where does political responsibility lie for continuing or accelerating a war, and where was a death caused by U.S. armed forces? A war conducted during a president's term is not necessarily a war he started. But inheriting a war does not absolve him of responsibility for new decisions. To distinguish levels of responsibility, we use three categories: P1 is a documented presidential decision or order; P2 is a policy or campaign framework; and P3 is execution at the operational level. These categories describe the chain of decision-making, not the number of casualties. This article therefore does not seek a single figure for "Trump's dead." It follows decisions and consequences for which we can say precisely what we know and what we do not.

Mosul and Raqqa: An Inherited War, New Decisions

Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, began before Trump's presidency. By the time he took office, the battle for Mosul had already been underway for more than three months. On January 28, 2017, Trump ordered a new plan to defeat ISIS, including a review of existing restrictions and recommendations for possible changes. That presidential directive is a documented, direct policy decision. It is not, by itself, proof that the president personally authorized every subsequent target or changed the rules of engagement. [1]

At a news briefing on May 19, 2017, Defense Secretary James Mattis described an acceleration of the campaign, greater delegation of decisions, and a tactical shift from pushing the enemy out of territory to surrounding it. In the same briefing, he said the rules of engagement in Iraq and Syria had not changed. Any assessment of responsibility must keep those two statements together: the policy framework was changing, but this does not mean that all restrictions on targeting were formally removed. Moreover, some changes to strike approval procedures had begun as early as December 2016, before the presidential transition. [2] [3]

On March 17, 2017, during the battle for western Mosul, a U.S. aircraft dropped a single GBU-38 bomb on an ISIS fighter. An official investigation confirmed the deaths of 105 civilians in the targeted and adjoining buildings; another 36 people remained unaccounted for. Investigators identified explosives placed inside the building by ISIS as a significant contributing factor. Whatever the explanation for how the buildings collapsed, the use of an American bomb is established, making this an instance of a strike directly attributable to U.S. forces. Public evidence does not, however, show that Trump personally selected the building as a target. Nor can the 36 unaccounted-for people automatically be added to the 105 confirmed dead. [4]

When the inquiry expands to all of Mosul, both the numbers and their meanings change. For the entire battle of Mosul, which had begun in October 2016, Airwars estimated between 1,066 and 1,579 likely civilian deaths from coalition strikes; for the western Mosul phase during Trump's presidency, it estimated at least 626. Amnesty International presented a much broader estimate of 5,805 civilians who may have been killed by Iraqi forces and the U.S.-led coalition combined, covering an area and period defined differently. These findings cannot be added together: they overlap in victims, time, and place, and they define the parties responsible differently. [5] [6]

In the Syrian city of Raqqa, Trump authorized direct arms supplies to Kurdish elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in May 2017. This was a genuine presidential decision about the partner force on the ground. But the offensive that began in June was not an exclusively American ground operation: the SDF led the fighting on the ground, while the coalition supplied air power, artillery, intelligence support, and advice. In a multiyear investigation, Amnesty International and Airwars documented more than 1,600 civilian deaths that they attributed to direct air and artillery strikes by the U.S.-led coalition during the battle for Raqqa. This documentation is an important record of the campaign's human consequences, but a coalition-wide figure is not the same as a separately established total of deaths caused by the U.S. armed forces. [7] [8]

There is therefore no doubt that inherited operations continued during Trump's presidency at high intensity and with substantial harm to civilians. Yet an honest account of causation must examine separately the president's direction, military planning, the execution of particular strikes, and deaths reconstructed by independent investigations. Claiming that every documented civilian death occurred because Trump delegated decision-making would require different evidence from that needed to establish that he supported such delegation.

Afghanistan: The Symbol of a Huge Bomb and the Actual Chain of Command

On April 13, 2017, U.S. forces used the GBU-43/B, known as the MOAB—one of the largest conventional bombs in the American arsenal—against an underground ISIS-K complex in Nangarhar Province. The strike immediately became a symbol of Trump's approach to military force. But the symbolism of a news story is not the same as the documented chain of command: public reports indicated that General John Nicholson already had the authority to use the weapon and did not need specific approval from Trump for that strike. It was an operation carried out by U.S. forces within an existing operational framework, not a documented presidential order to attack that particular target. [9] [10]

Afghan officials initially reported 36 ISIS-K fighters killed, later raising the estimate to approximately 94. The public evidence examined does not establish an independently verified final estimate of the number of fighters killed in this strike. UNAMA's report for the first half of 2017 did not document civilian casualties from the MOAB strike itself. This must be stated precisely: the absence of documented civilian casualties in a particular source is not logically equivalent to absolute certainty that no harm occurred. Nor may the reported number of fighters killed be turned into a personal presidential death toll. [11] [12]

A different evidentiary picture emerged in the summer of 2017. Trump delegated authority over U.S. troop levels to Defense Secretary Mattis and publicly presented his South Asia Strategy on August 21. Rather than advance calendar-based withdrawal deadlines, the strategy stressed conditions on the ground, pressure on armed adversaries, and a wider regional approach that included Pakistan. This was a direct presidential strategic decision. When comparing troop levels, it is important that the Pentagon revised its accounting in 2017: the roughly 8,400 personnel previously reported publicly and the roughly 11,000 actually present before the reinforcement are not equivalent baselines from which to measure an increase. [13] [14]

The intensification of the air campaign is visible in U.S. Air Force statistics. AFCENT recorded 1,337 air-delivered weapons released or expended in Afghanistan in 2016; 4,361 in 2017; 7,362 in 2018; and 7,423 in 2019. These figures count weapons, not strikes, people, or casualties. UNAMA also documented civilian harm from air operations while distinguishing between international forces and the Afghan government's air force. For individual incidents, attribution therefore needs to be established at the national or operational level. The 546 civilian deaths attributed by UNAMA in 2019 to airstrikes by international military forces are not automatically 546 deaths caused by the United States or ordered by the president. [15] [16]

In 2020 the focus shifted toward negotiations and withdrawal. The Doha agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020, provided for a phased reduction of U.S. forces and a further withdrawal subject to conditions and a timetable. It did not mark the achievement of a lasting ceasefire throughout Afghanistan. Trump then separately ordered the reduction of the American military presence to 2,500 troops by January 15, 2021. That decision was his; Biden's subsequent changes to the timetable and the implementation of the final withdrawal belong in the next article. [17] [18]

Syria Beyond the War Against ISIS: Shayrat and Douma

The April 2017 strike on Syria's Shayrat air base belongs to a different framework from Operation Inherent Resolve. On April 6–7, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at the base following reports of a chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun. In its official notification to Congress, the Trump White House explicitly stated that the strike had been carried out on the president's orders. The evidence of a direct presidential decision is considerably stronger here than in the selection of the MOAB target or the target in Al-Jadidah. [19] [20]

But a presidential order to use force does not automatically settle questions of legality or fatalities. Syrian military sources reported six soldiers killed, and state media reported nine civilians killed; U.S. reporting did not confirm the same set of civilian deaths, while a Congressional Research Service review noted the limits of independent verification. Disconnected and conflicting accounts must not be added together to produce a seemingly reliable total. Washington justified the strike domestically by reference to the president's constitutional powers, while its international-law justification, in the absence of a new Security Council authorization or Syrian consent, remained contested. [21]

April 2018 requires a similar distinction between what was known at the time and what became known later. After reports of a chemical attack in Douma, Western countries carried out joint strikes on Syrian facilities on April 13–14. At that point the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had not yet conducted an on-site inspection. Its subsequent Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) found reasonable grounds to conclude that a toxic chemical substance consistent with molecular chlorine had been used; the later Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), in 2023, attributed responsibility to the Syrian air forces and identified 43 named fatalities. Disputes over the investigation and objections to its findings exist and belong in the historical account, but it would be misleading to suggest that the findings of later forensic work were available to the president when he gave the order. Equally, those who died in the original chemical incident were not killed by the subsequent Western retaliatory strikes. [22] [23]

The joint American, British, and French operation employed 105 missiles or other weapons, including 85 American weapons. Trump explicitly ordered the strike, while the military carried out the operational planning and attacks. The Pentagon did not report confirmed civilian deaths from the Western strike at the time; the absence of a positively confirmed figure is not proof about every possible consequence. Here, too, the U.S. domestic legal justification must be distinguished from Britain's invocation of humanitarian intervention and the contested assessment under international law. [24] [25]

Yemen: Direct U.S. Strikes and U.S. Support Are Not the Same Category

Yemen shows how quickly the term "American involvement" can conceal two different stories. The United States directly conducted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and other armed groups, while also supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen's wider war. Support for the coalition had begun in 2015, during Obama's presidency. Trump inherited that policy, continued significant parts of it, and made his own decisions about it. An individual Saudi strike using an American-made bomb is therefore not automatically a direct U.S. airstrike. Yet the United States' logistical, intelligence, and arms-sales roles remain relevant to evaluating its policy and responsibility. [26]

On January 29, 2017, a U.S. special operations unit conducted a raid in Yakla. Planning had its roots in the previous administration, but Trump approved its execution on January 26. This is a clear example in which presidential authorization of an operation must be distinguished from subsequent tactical decisions on the ground. A U.S. special operations servicemember also died during the raid; that was an American operational loss, not the death of a civilian victim of a U.S. strike. [27]

Official and independent assessments of civilian deaths in Yakla differ significantly. A later U.S. military report used a range of four to twelve civilians killed. Human Rights Watch, drawing on field research, reported at least fourteen people killed, including nine children. Researchers from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism published villagers' accounts alleging 25 civilian deaths. These estimates concern the same raid: they are not three separate incidents and cannot be added together. Their differences matter when criticizing transparency and accountability, but do not license an arbitrary choice of the one "correct" number. [28] [29] [30]

The U.S. counterterrorism campaign expanded sharply in 2017; CENTCOM reported more than 120 strikes and additional ground operations. But a high level of military activity is still not a count of the dead. Trump's administration also maintained various forms of support for the Saudi-led coalition. In the August 2018 strike on a school bus in Dhahyan, Human Rights Watch identified 34 civilians killed, including 26 children, and documented a connection to the U.S. origin of the munition used. The strike is attributed to the coalition; the American-made weapon is a significant link to U.S. sales and support policy, but without further evidence it does not make the U.S. Air Force the direct perpetrator. In November 2018, the United States ended aerial refueling for the coalition, but other forms of cooperation did not simply disappear. [31] [32] [33]

Making this distinction is not a moral exoneration. The political question remains what the administration knew about harm to civilians caused by its partners, what options it had to restrict support, and how it used those options. Evidentiary integrity merely prevents support and direct execution from being collapsed into a single category, or all deaths from war, starvation, and disease in Yemen from being turned into a personal tally of Trump's orders.

Somalia: More Strikes and Two Different Records of Civilian Deaths

In March 2017, Trump authorized expanded powers for U.S. precision strikes in parts of Somalia. U.S. operations against al-Shabaab had been underway before then. The policy shift matters because it changed the framework within which commanders could act, but it does not demonstrate that the president personally signed off on every later missile strike. Annual data show a pronounced rise in the number of strikes, although yearly counts can differ across sources and definitions. [34] [35]

The difference is greater still when civilian casualties are considered. AFRICOM initially rejected several allegations of civilian deaths, later acknowledged some incidents, and subsequently reopened investigations. According to official findings recorded in the research through September 25, 2026, at least six civilians killed and eleven wounded were acknowledged across five non-overlapping incidents during Trump's first term. For the April 2018 incident in El Buur, a later official reassessment raised the acknowledged death toll from two to three. For a wider set of reported civilian deaths during the same presidential term, Airwars estimated a range of 134–174 alleged fatalities. The official acknowledged minimum and the independent body of likely or alleged deaths are not two methods of calculating the same certain total: they involve different evidentiary thresholds and different incidents. [36] [37] [38]

As early as 2019, Amnesty International conducted detailed investigations of cases in Lower Shabelle and highlighted how difficult it can be for victims to obtain an investigation when military records initially deny their deaths. Critical assessment therefore needs both: official acknowledgments as verifiable minimum cases and independent investigation as a means of uncovering omitted incidents. Neither kind of evidence is infallible on its own. Accountability is not simply a matter of deciding which number to use, but also whether an institution identifies, corrects, and explains its errors. [35]

In December 2020, Trump ordered most U.S. forces in Somalia to be repositioned elsewhere. The redeployment was a real force-posture decision, not a direct fatal incident and not proof that American counterterrorism capabilities in the region had ceased to exist. The distinction matters for the next administration, which inherited an operational presence in a changed form. [39]

From Baghdadi to Soleimani: When the Presidential Order Is Direct

The October 2019 operation against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had Trump's explicit authorization. A U.S. military commander later explained that U.S. forces directly killed five ISIS members at the compound, while Baghdadi died after detonating his own suicide vest; two children also died in the explosion. Those deaths occurred during a U.S.-authorized operation, but the direct mechanism of their deaths was not an American bomb or bullet. Additional local allegations of civilian harm remain disputed cases and should not be erased merely because the official account did not acknowledge them. [40] [41]

In December of the same year, tensions between U.S. forces and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq escalated into another sequence of attacks. A rocket strike on the K-1 base on December 27 killed an American contractor. The Pentagon attributed the attack to Kata'ib Hezbollah, which rejected the allegation. On December 29, U.S. aircraft struck five militia facilities in Iraq and Syria, reportedly killing around 25 people according to local and militia sources. Those were direct consequences of U.S. strikes, but the public documentation used in the research master is insufficient to claim that Trump personally selected the targets on December 29. The K-1 attack, the U.S. retaliation, and the subsequent attack on the embassy compound were distinct events in the same chain of escalation. [42] [43]

With the January 3, 2020, strike on vehicles near Baghdad airport, the evidentiary trail changes. The U.S. Department of Defense publicly stated that the strike targeting Iranian General Qasem Soleimani had been carried out at the president's direction; Trump confirmed this himself. Later reports said ten people died in the strike, including Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. This is an example of a direct presidential order and deaths directly caused by U.S. force, although it remains necessary to distinguish the confirmed decision, the precision with which all accompanying individuals were identified, and the lawfulness of the attack. [44] [45]

The administration claimed that Soleimani was planning imminent attacks against American personnel and facilities. The public evidence presented was disputed, including Trump's subsequent, more specific claim involving four embassies. Under U.S. domestic law, the administration cited the president's constitutional powers and the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). [46] Before the UN Security Council, it invoked self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. A UN Special Rapporteur offered a contrary legal assessment, which the United States rejected. This was a documented legal disagreement, not a judgment of the International Court of Justice that can be attributed to either side. [47] [48]

On January 8, Iran launched ballistic missiles at bases hosting U.S. troops. No American fatalities were reported from these attacks, but subsequent medical assessments identified 110 cases of traumatic brain injury. These were injuries, not deaths. Amid the wider escalation, Iranian air defenses shot down Ukrainian passenger flight PS752 on January 8, 2020, killing all 176 people aboard. [49] That tragedy belongs in the history of the consequences of dangerous escalation, but a different actor was directly responsible for shooting down the aircraft. Placing it without explanation under a heading of direct U.S. killings would erase precisely the causal distinction this investigation needs. [50]

Accountability Is Not a Single Sum

Trump's first term was neither simply a continuation of existing wars nor simply the beginning of new ones. On one side were Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and counterterrorism operations that his administration inherited; on the other were his own decisions about acceleration, arming partners, redeploying forces, and certain expressly authorized attacks. Some cases allow a precise link between an order and fatal consequences. In others, the broader policy authority is established, while responsibility for execution passes through a multilayered military or coalition chain of command.

Nor is there a single category of "people killed in Trump's wars." An officially confirmed civilian death in a U.S. strike is not the same as an independent estimate of civilian deaths during a coalition campaign. Enemy combatants killed are not civilian casualties; victims of other actors are not victims of direct U.S. strikes; and the wounded are not the dead. Reports may overlap and may be revised later. These distinctions are not an excuse to avoid moral judgment. On the contrary, only by establishing who decided what, what happened, and with what degree of evidentiary confidence can we responsibly judge decisions that cost people their lives.

The public can demand that a president answer for the choice to use or continue military force, the scope of the authority delegated, and the state's ability to acknowledge civilian casualties and investigate its own mistakes. It does not need an invented total to ask a serious question: how much responsibility rests with the person who has the power to issue an order, how much with the person who carries it out, and what do both owe to those who never chose to bear the consequences?

Sources and further reading

  1. White House, NSPM-3 (January 28, 2017). Source
  2. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Mattis/Dunford/McGurk briefing (May 19, 2017). Source
  3. Human Rights Watch (HRW), strike-vetting changes preceding Trump, December 2016. Source
  4. CENTCOM, executive summary of the Al-Jadidah investigation (May 25, 2017). Source
  5. Airwars, 2017 annual assessment. Source
  6. Amnesty International, civilian catastrophe in western Mosul. Source
  7. DoD, decision to equip Kurdish elements of the SDF. Source
  8. Amnesty International/Airwars, Raqqa investigation (April 25, 2019). Source
  9. DoD, MOAB strike in Achin. Source
  10. Military Times/AP, General Nicholson’s authority to use the MOAB. Source
  11. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Afghan officials’ reported MOAB death tolls (April 15, 2017). Source
  12. UNAMA, midyear report for the first half of 2017. Source
  13. White House, South Asia Strategy (August 21, 2017). Source
  14. DoD, revised accounting of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (August 30, 2017). Source
  15. AFCENT, Airpower Summary, December 2020. Source
  16. UNAMA, Afghanistan 2019 civilian casualties. Source
  17. U.S.–Taliban Agreement, UN Peacemaker. Source
  18. DoD, Trump-directed reduction to 2,500 troops. Source
  19. White House, War Powers notification concerning Shayrat. Source
  20. CENTCOM, 59 missiles fired at Shayrat. Source
  21. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Syria and the strike: overview. Source
  22. OPCW, Fact-Finding Mission report on Douma (March 1, 2019). Source
  23. OPCW Investigation and Identification Team report on Douma (January 27, 2023). Source
  24. White House, War Powers report on Syria (April 2018). Source
  25. DoD, April 2018 strike on Syrian chemical weapons facilities. Source
  26. Obama White House, beginning of support for the Saudi-led coalition (March 25, 2015). Source
  27. White House, authorization of the Yakla raid (February 2, 2017 briefing). Source
  28. DoD, Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in 2020 — retrospective Yakla assessment. Source
  29. Human Rights Watch, Yakla (February 24, 2017). Source
  30. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), field investigation in Yakla. Source
  31. CENTCOM, Yemen 2017 counterterrorism campaign and more than 120 strikes (December 20, 2017). Source
  32. Human Rights Watch, Dhahyan school bus strike (September 2, 2018). Source
  33. DoD, discontinuation of coalition aerial refueling (November 9, 2018). Source
  34. DoD, expansion of U.S. operational authorities in Somalia (March 30, 2017). Source
  35. Amnesty International, Somalia investigation (2019). Source
  36. AFRICOM, Civilian Casualty Assessment Report, Q2 FY2025. Source
  37. Airwars, civilian deaths in Somalia by U.S. president. Source
  38. Airwars, Annual Report 2020, Somalia, pp. 22–23. Source
  39. DoD, Somalia force posture announcement (December 4, 2020). Source
  40. DoD/CENTCOM, press briefing on Baghdadi (October 30, 2019). Source
  41. Airwars, allegations surrounding the Baghdadi operation. Source
  42. DoD, statement on the Kata’ib Hezbollah response (December 29, 2019). Source
  43. Associated Press, reported casualties of strikes on Kata’ib Hezbollah (December 30, 2019). Source
  44. DoD, statement on the Soleimani strike (January 2, 2020, U.S. time). Source
  45. Trump White House, remarks on the killing of Qasem Soleimani (January 3, 2020). Source
  46. White House, Presidential Veto Message concerning S.J. Res. 68 (May 6, 2020). Source
  47. United States, letter to the UN Security Council, S/2020/20 — Article 51. Source
  48. UN Special Rapporteur, report A/HRC/44/38. Source
  49. Transportation Safety Board of Canada, release on Iran’s final investigation of the downing of PS752 (March 18, 2021). Source
  50. CENTCOM, General McKenzie testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Source