SeriesWestern Hypocrisy Part 5 / 12

Which Lives Do We See? — Media, Empathy and the “International Community”

Why do some humanitarian crises receive more attention than others? We compare refugee coverage, war reporting, and selective political empathy.

AI-generated symbolic editorial illustration, not a documentary image.

When a person dies in war, death is biologically the same. In public life, however, not all deaths carry the same weight.

Some are given a name, a photograph, a family story, an occupation, an age and a final message to loved ones. Others become a number. Some refugees are presented as mothers, children, teachers and neighbours who could be us. Others as a “flow”, “pressure”, a “crisis”, a “security issue” or a problem at the external border. That difference matters.

The media do not directly determine how much a human life is worth. But they can influence which lives audiences perceive as individual human lives and which remain part of an abstract mass. This is where media, politics and foreign policy meet.

If a victim is individualised, empathy is easier to establish. If people are presented primarily as a mass, it becomes easier to discuss borders, capacity and security. If the actor responsible is clearly named, responsibility is more visible in the story. If death is described without a clearly identified actor, the connection between action and consequence becomes weaker.

No central plan has to be assumed for such differences to exist. It is enough to examine the result.

Ukraine: Europe showed what open doors can look like

After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union did something unprecedented in the history of its Temporary Protection Directive.

On 4 March 2022, the Council of the EU unanimously activated temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine. The mechanism allowed immediate collective protection without requiring the usual individual procedure for every person and provided rights to residence, work, accommodation, medical care and education for children. UNHCR described the decision as “unprecedented”. [1] [2]

This was an important humanitarian response. The question in this article is not why Europe helped Ukrainians.

The question is what that response tells us about the political language that accompanied earlier refugee crises.

In 2015 and 2016, Europe’s response to people arriving mainly from Syria and other crisis zones was much more focused on controlling external borders, asylum procedures and reducing irregular arrivals. In March 2016, the EU and Türkiye agreed on an arrangement under which new irregular migrants arriving from Türkiye on the Greek islands after 20 March and not qualifying for protection would be returned to Türkiye; for every Syrian returned, another Syrian from Türkiye would be resettled in the EU. The arrangement was also tied to several billion euros in support for refugees in Türkiye. [3]

The comparison needs a corrective. The Ukrainian and Syrian refugee situations were not legally or geographically identical. Ukrainians fled in large numbers directly into neighbouring EU states. The Temporary Protection Directive was already part of European law. Mediterranean routes involved different legal statuses, transit through several countries and mixed migration flows. Those differences can explain part of the different institutional response.

They do not erase an important fact: in 2022, Europe showed that displacement on a scale of millions could be treated primarily as a task of rapid collective protection and broad social inclusion.

That means a strictly security- and border-centred framing of mass arrivals is not the only possible European response.

People at a reception point for refugees from Ukraine in Przemyśl, Poland.
Refugees from Ukraine at the reception centre at Przemyśl Główny railway station in Poland, 12 March 2022. Image: © European Union, 2022 / Bartosz Siedlik / European Commission Audiovisual Service / FACTSTORY / Wikimedia Commons CC BY 4.0

The media saw refugees differently too

The differences are not visible only in policy. A comparative content analysis of five major U.S. newspapers comparing coverage of Syrian refugees in 2015 and Ukrainian refugees in 2022 found substantially greater humanisation of Ukrainians. About 85 percent of the analysed articles about Ukrainian refugees used a humanitarian frame, compared with about 59 percent for Syrian refugees. Ukrainian refugees were also, on average, quoted or paraphrased more often and were more frequently presented with personal details. [4]

Another large study analysed 84,623 newspaper articles from Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. It found that Ukrainian refugees were more often presented through individualised humanitarian and victimisation frames, while contextual and security frames were more pronounced for Syrian refugees. Differences in humanitarian, victimisation and security framing were statistically significant. [5]

A broader comparative study across seven European countries, published online in December 2025 and in the journal in 2026, used the GDELT database and found that Ukrainian refugees were generally portrayed more positively than Syrian and other refugee groups. The authors linked the result to cultural, racial and geopolitical proximity. Because the study relies on automated sentiment analysis and machine processing of multilingual content, its findings are not equivalent to manually reading every article, but they remain an important large-sample signal. [6]

A smaller British study of the BBC and the tabloid The Sun examined 30 articles about Ukrainian, Afghan and Syrian refugees. In that sample, humanitarian framing was also strong for Afghans, which is an important corrective to an overly simple thesis. Yet the frame of economic or social burden appeared in reporting on Afghans and Syrians, while it did not appear in the sampled Ukrainian coverage. [7]

The conclusion therefore cannot be that every Western outlet treated every Ukrainian better than every Syrian.

The data do support a narrower and stronger finding: across several different samples and countries, Ukrainian refugees were more often individualised and framed in humanitarian terms, while Syrian refugees were more often associated with security, collective movement and burdens on the host state.

Refugees resting on the platform at Keleti railway station in Budapest.
Syrian refugees sleeping on the platform at Budapest Keleti railway station during the European refugee crisis, 4 September 2015. Image: Mstyslav Chernov / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

“They could be us”

The difference in empathy was sometimes stated directly. In the first days of the war, CBS correspondent Charlie D’Agata reported from Kyiv that Ukraine was not a place like Iraq or Afghanistan where conflict had been raging for decades, and described the city as “relatively civilized, relatively European”. The remark triggered broad criticism. D’Agata apologised the following day and explained that he had meant to emphasise that Ukraine had not experienced a comparable scale of war in recent years. [8]

The apology matters too. A single controversial remark does not by itself prove a general media rule.

But such cases help clarify the question measured by broader research: whether cultural and geographic proximity affects how easily a victim can be presented to an audience as “someone like us”.

The problem is not empathy for Ukrainians. The problem would arise if similarity to Western audiences became a condition for full humanisation. A person in Aleppo is not less of an individual because the city feels less familiar to Western audiences.

An Afghan family does not become less civil because its country has been presented for decades mainly through war, the Taliban and terrorism.

If cultural proximity increases the likelihood of individualised humanitarian framing, then the media field does not merely reflect suffering. It also reflects a hierarchy of visibility.

Yemen and Ukraine: the same country supports a side in both wars, but the coverage is very different

A child holding a dove at a protest following an attack on the al-Nour Center for the Blind in Sana’a, January 2016. The image does not establish responsibility for the attack. — Almigdad Mojalli / VOA / Wikimedia Commons (additional documentary material; republication rights for the image remain unresolved).

Yemen offers a particularly useful case because a comparative study exists at the level of the same major U.S. newspaper.

Jeffrey S. Bachman and Esther Brito Ruiz analysed New York Times headlines on the war in Yemen and the war in Ukraine. The conflicts are not the same, but the authors identified four reasons for comparison: civilians suffered on a mass scale in both, both affected food security, the United States provided military support to one side in both conflicts, and their geopolitical position for Washington was fundamentally different.

The study found much less coverage of Yemen, more neutral language and less direct attribution of responsibility. Coverage of Ukraine was more extensive and more often used moral and responsibility-oriented framing. The authors interpret this result partly through the differing U.S. geopolitical position in each conflict. [9]

This is the authors’ analysis, not proof that every editorial decision at The New York Times was caused by U.S. foreign policy. But the difference in the resulting coverage is documented.

A later academic discussion of the same research highlights a particularly striking example: in coverage of starvation in Yemen, The New York Times reportedly published only two related front-page stories, the first more than three years after the start of the Saudi-led intervention. [10]

The geopolitical difference is relevant here as well. In Ukraine, Washington supported a state attacked by Russia. In Yemen, the United States for years materially supported the Saudi-led coalition.

The article therefore does not claim that every media difference was directly instructed by a foreign-policy centre.

It makes a narrower claim: when the U.S. geopolitical position in two conflicts is opposite, the volume of coverage, moral language and attribution of responsibility can differ sharply as well — and that difference is worth measuring.

A destroyed residential house and rubble in southern Sana'a, with people in the foreground.
A destroyed house in southern Sana'a, Yemen, photographed on 13 June 2015. The image shows the impact of war on civilian surroundings; it does not by itself establish responsibility for the attack or the extent of media coverage. The web version may be optimised (WebP, resized without altering the content). Image: Ibrahem Qasim / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

Forgotten crises are not just a metaphor

Humanitarian organisations also measure unequal attention on a broader scale. In an analysis of 5.8 million online articles about 47 humanitarian crises in 2022, CARE found that Ukraine received approximately 2.2 million articles. The ten least-covered crises combined received 66,723. The analysis covered five language areas and used Meltwater media monitoring. [11]

This does not mean every crisis should receive the same number of articles. Ukraine directly affected European security, energy, the economy, refugee flows and relations among nuclear powers. There were objective news-value reasons for exceptionally intensive coverage. But the scale of the difference is so large that it points to more than minor editorial variation.

The Norwegian Refugee Council similarly found that in 2022 English-language media published approximately 1.98 million articles about Ukraine’s displacement crisis, compared with approximately 375,000 about the ten most neglected displacement crises combined. NRC also calculated that $212 per person in need was raised for Ukraine, compared with an average of $52 across the ten most neglected crises. [12]

NRC builds its neglect index from three elements: lack of political will, lack of media attention and lack of humanitarian funding.

Its conclusion is normative, but the methodology is publicly described. Here too, the comparison does not prove that media attention is the sole cause of funding differences. It does show that political attention, media visibility and money often move together.

Gaza: there is no simple answer here

Gaza is the part of this article where the thesis of a single “Western media narrative” is most vulnerable. The research partly conflicts.

The Centre for Media Monitoring analysed 3,873 BBC online articles and 32,092 television or radio segments between 7 October 2023 and 6 October 2024. Among other findings, it counted 2,350 interviews with Israelis and 1,085 with Palestinians, and found Israeli perspectives were relayed much more often by presenters and journalists. CfMM interprets the results as a systematic marginalisation of Palestinian perspectives. [13]

This is a large data project, but it is important to state clearly what it is and what it is not. CfMM is a media-monitoring project, not the British regulator. Its conclusions are those of the authors of the analysis and should not be presented as an official ruling on the BBC.

At CNN, The Guardian reported in February 2024 on criticism from six staff members and internal editorial procedures that interviewees believed favoured the Israeli perspective and subjected Palestinian sources to stricter treatment. CNN rejected that characterisation and stressed that it had reported critically on all sides. [14]

This establishes the existence of a serious internal editorial dispute. It does not establish a centrally directed media conspiracy.

Another important limitation also affects the picture: for much of the war, foreign journalists did not have independent access to Gaza and could enter mainly through tightly controlled military embeds. As a result, Palestinian journalists in Gaza carried much of the direct field reporting, while international newsrooms faced greater difficulty conducting their own on-the-ground verification. [15] [16]

This does not remove the question of bias. But it is an important part of the explanation for why reporting depended on different kinds of sources and verification procedures.

The New York Times: the same institution, opposing academic allegations

The case of The New York Times is particularly useful because it shows how risky it is to turn one study into a universal judgement about “Western media”.

Holly M. Jackson analysed more than 33,000 articles about the first and second Palestinian intifadas, examining active and passive voice, tone and violent language. She found that Palestinians were more often described with violent language and more often placed in passive linguistic positions, and interpreted the findings as systematic anti-Palestinian bias. [17]

A newer study published in 2026 analysed 1,559 news articles from The New York Times between 7 October 2023 and 7 June 2024 and reached a different conclusion. The author reports much more frequent mention of Palestinian suffering than Israeli suffering after 7 October, extensive mention of Israeli violence and relatively little mention of Palestinian violence after the initial attack. The author interprets this as a frame that disproportionately emphasised Israeli responsibility for the continuation of the war. [18]

These two studies are not direct replications of one another. They examine different periods, use different methods and ask different research questions. That is precisely why they are useful together.

They show that even within the same newspaper it is not fair to speak of one fixed direction of bias across decades.

A better approach is to analyse the specific period, sample, source selection, language and metrics.

“International community”: the phrase needs a referent

A similar problem exists in political language. In October 2022, after Russian strikes on Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the “international community” had a responsibility to make clear that Russia’s conduct was unacceptable. [19]

In Ukraine’s case, talk of broad international opposition had strong numerical support. On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution Aggression against Ukraine by 141 votes in favour, five against and 35 abstentions. [20]

But the term “international community” has no formally defined membership of its own. It is therefore useful to examine concrete votes when Washington’s position differs from that of a large majority of UN member states.

On 12 December 2023, the General Assembly backed a demand for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza by 153 votes to 10, with 23 abstentions. The United States voted against. [21]

On 11 December 2024, 158 states supported a demand for an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire; nine voted against, including the United States. [22]

On 12 June 2025, a resolution that, among other things, demanded an end to the blockade, immediate access for humanitarian aid, an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire, and the release of hostages was supported by 149 states, with 12 voting against. [23]

The Security Council also shows why precision matters. On 8 December 2023, a proposal for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire received the support of 13 members; the United Kingdom abstained, and the United States vetoed it. [24]

On 20 February 2024, another ceasefire proposal again received 13 votes; the United States voted against, and the United Kingdom abstained. [25]

On 20 November 2024, a resolution calling for an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire was supported by 14 of 15 members, but a U.S. veto prevented adoption. [26]

The U.S. position also changed over this period. On 22 March 2024, the United States itself submitted a text that spoke of the imperative of an immediate and sustained ceasefire; Russia and China vetoed it. Three days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2728, which demanded an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan, while the United States abstained. [27] [28]

That corrective matters. It does not change the basic need for precise language.

“International community” should not be used as a self-evident synonym for the United States, G7, NATO, the EU or any other political grouping.

If we mean the UN General Assembly, we can cite the vote. If we mean NATO, say NATO. If we mean the G7, say the G7. If we mean a broad coalition of states, say which ones.

There is no need to manufacture a global consensus through an imprecise noun when concrete numbers are available.

The conflicts are different

The comparisons in this article have limits. Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen and Gaza are not the same conflicts. Refugee routes are not the same. States do not have identical legal obligations. Geographic proximity differs. The demographic composition of refugee flows differs. Some conflicts directly affect EU or NATO security; others do not. Media access differs.

In Gaza, independent work by foreign journalists was heavily restricted. In Yemen, security and logistical barriers to reporting are substantial. In Ukraine, many international news organisations were able to establish extensive teams on the ground and in neighbouring states.

These differences can explain part of the variation in the amount and form of coverage. So we are not looking for mathematical equality.

We are asking whether, after taking those differences into account, patterns still recur in the amount of attention, the individualisation of victims, the selection of voices and the language of responsibility.

What happens when the victim is closer to “us”?

Several recurring mechanisms emerge from the research. The first is individualisation. Across several comparative studies, Ukrainian refugees were more often portrayed through individual humanitarian stories, quotations and personal details; Syrian refugees were more often placed in security, collective-movement or burden frames. The second is volume of attention.

CARE and NRC show that the gap between highly visible and neglected humanitarian crises can be several-fold or even several dozen-fold. The third is the language of responsibility.

The Yemen–Ukraine comparison shows that one conflict can be described more often with direct moral and responsibility-oriented language while another is presented in more neutral terms. The fourth is the political language of representativeness.

UN votes show that it is possible to measure when a position really is supported by a large majority of states. The term “international community” therefore needs a concrete referent and should not create the impression of global consensus on its own.

None of these mechanisms by itself proves intentional discrimination. Together, however, they make selective visibility empirically testable.

Empathy should not require the right passport

The strongest criticism of Europe’s response to Ukraine is not that it was too humane. Quite the opposite. It demonstrated the level of institutional mobilisation that is possible when political will exists.

Europe’s response to Ukrainian refugees showed how quickly collective protection can be activated, labour markets opened, access to education and healthcare secured, and displacement on a scale of millions treated primarily as a question of protecting people.

Media coverage showed how effectively a mass tragedy can be broken down into individual faces and stories. That is not a reason for less empathy toward Ukrainians. It is a measure of capacity.

If this level of humanisation is possible for a European victim, it becomes legitimate to ask why, in some other crises, it is so much easier to switch to the language of masses, flows, borders, security and abstract numbers.

Different circumstances can justify different policies. They do not automatically justify different standards of humanity.

Visibility is a form of power

A journalist does not have to lie for a different moral picture of the world to emerge. It is enough for one death to receive a name and another a number. For one family to receive an interview and another a statistic. For one person to be primarily a refugee and another primarily part of a migration flow.

For the actor responsible in one conflict to appear regularly as the grammatical subject, while in another violence is more often described without a clearly identified perpetrator.

For one crisis to appear on the front page every day while another becomes “forgotten”. Any single editorial decision may have a perfectly legitimate explanation. But across thousands of decisions, patterns can be tested. Research on refugee coverage measures them. The Yemen–Ukraine comparison detects them. CARE and NRC measure enormous differences in the visibility of crises. Disputes inside the BBC and CNN show that journalists themselves argue over these questions.

Conflicting studies of The New York Times warn that the pattern is not one-directional and cannot be reduced to a theory of one Western propaganda machine. That is the boundary this article must preserve.

There is no single Western editor deciding whose life counts.

But there are measurable differences in how much space different crises receive, how their victims are individualised, which voices are heard more often and how directly responsibility is assigned.

When such differences recur alongside cultural proximity and geopolitical interest, it is legitimate to examine them as a problem of selective visibility.

The most dangerous inequality is not always the one in which we openly say one life is worth less. Sometimes it is enough that we see it less.

Sources and further reading

  1. Council of the EU — temporary protection for people fleeing the war in Ukraine (4 March 2022) Source
  2. UNHCR — response to the EU decision on temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees Source
  3. Council of the EU — EU–Turkey statement (18 March 2016) Source
  4. El-Nawawy and Elmasry — comparative study of US newspaper coverage of Syrian and Ukrainian refugees Source
  5. Hoffmann and Hameleers (2024) — comparative analysis of Syrian and Ukrainian refugee framing in four European countries Source
  6. Bassoli and Greppi (2026) — GDELT-based comparison of Syrian and Ukrainian refugee portrayals in seven countries Source
  7. Ajana, Connell and Liddle (2024) — media framing of Ukrainian, Afghan and Syrian refugee crises Source
  8. The Washington Post — offensive comparisons in media coverage of Ukraine (27 February 2022) Source
  9. Bachman and Brito Ruiz — comparative study of media coverage of the wars in Yemen and Ukraine Source
  10. Shmuel and Zohar Lederman — the overlooked war in Yemen and critical genocide studies Source
  11. CARE — ten humanitarian crises that did not make headlines in 2022 Source
  12. Norwegian Refugee Council — report on neglected displacement crises Source
  13. Centre for Media Monitoring — analysis of BBC coverage of Gaza and Israel Source
  14. The Guardian — CNN staff allegations of pro-Israel bias (4 February 2024) Source
  15. Reporters Without Borders and CPJ — call for foreign journalists’ access to Gaza Source
  16. Committee to Protect Journalists — six foreign journalists denied entry by Israel Source
  17. Holly M. Jackson — analysis of New York Times coverage of the first and second Palestinian intifadas Source
  18. Edieal Pinker (2026) — analysis of New York Times framing of the Israel–Hamas war Source
  19. US State Department — US support for Ukraine in the face of Russian strikes Source
  20. UN General Assembly — Aggression against Ukraine resolution and vote (2 March 2022) Source
  21. UN General Assembly — vote on a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza (12 December 2023) Source
  22. UN General Assembly — vote on an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza (11 December 2024) Source
  23. UN General Assembly — vote on ceasefire, aid access and release of hostages (12 June 2025) Source
  24. UN Security Council — US veto of Gaza ceasefire proposal (8 December 2023) Source
  25. UN Security Council — vote on ceasefire proposal (20 February 2024) Source
  26. UN Security Council — US veto of ceasefire proposal (20 November 2024) Source
  27. UN Security Council — Russian and Chinese veto of US proposal (22 March 2024) Source
  28. UN Security Council — adoption of ceasefire resolution 2728 (25 March 2024) Source