The Nature of Evil
When the Nazi authorities organized the persecution and murder of millions of people, they needed more than orders and those who killed directly.
Interpretative editorial illustration.
When the Nazi authorities organized the persecution and murder of millions of people, they needed more than orders and those who killed directly. They also needed offices, paperwork, transport, confiscations, and people who carried out their part of the operation in their respective positions. Documentation from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum shows how government agencies, the police, the military, and economic actors were involved in carrying out these crimes. The crime was no less real because it was divided among numerous everyday procedures. [11]
This history confronts us with a question that identifying secret hierarchies cannot resolve on its own. Where does evil begin? With the person who gives the order? With the one who carries it out? With an idea that declares the victim inferior? With indifference that allows harm to continue? Or is there something deeper that religions describe as spiritual evil? If we want to recognize abuses of power, we must take this question seriously rather than settle it by applying a single label to our opponents.
When Is the Word “Evil” More Than an Insult?
We readily use the word “evil” for an event that hurts us, a person we oppose, or a system we distrust. Yet loss, pain, and wrongdoing are not the same thing. An earthquake can cause terrible suffering without having any intention. A person may commit an injustice through ignorance, negligence, greed, or a deliberate desire to humiliate. Deliberate torture or systematic extermination raises the question of an especially grave moral violation. Philosophical debate distinguishes the broader category of what is bad from the narrower concept of moral evil, in which the agent, the act, the harm, and responsibility all matter. [1] [2]
This distinction is not an academic way of evading judgment. On the contrary, it allows judgment to be more precise. If we call every unpleasant act evil, the term loses its ability to distinguish; but if we forget the victim, even the most exact definition becomes empty. If we refuse to use the word for the gravest violations, we may obscure the severity of the victims' suffering. The moral conviction that deliberately humiliating a human being is unacceptable can be stated clearly without claiming to have discovered a complete, timeless metaphysical definition of evil.
Responsibility, too, must therefore be assessed in light of what a person knew, what they did, what harm they caused, and how they acted when they had an opportunity to choose differently. Moral condemnation of an act can be firm even when we know less about the perpetrator's inner experience than we would like.
There is another danger: a word used to judge an act becomes the definitive identity of a person, or even of an entire community. Once someone is declared to be evil itself, evidence, circumstances, and equal standards of accountability may begin to seem unnecessary. Yet that is precisely the kind of logic propagandists have used in different periods to justify exclusion and persecution. Describing a proven crime is not the same as declaring, without grounds, that a nation, a religion, a family, or an adversary is evil personified.
Is Evil a Thing in Itself, or the Absence of Good?
One influential Christian account comes from Augustine's thinking. In his mature teaching, he did not understand evil as an independent substance equivalent to good, but as a corruption or privation of good (privatio boni). If created beings are good by their nature, evil involves a deviation from and corruption of that good. His account of moral evil thus leads to a question about the will: how can a being capable of good turn its freedom against it? [3]
This idea is philosophically important because it does not require two equally powerful cosmic principles dividing the world between them. Yet it also raises a difficult question. Telling a person who is suffering from violence that evil is merely a privation is not enough. Injury, loss, and injustice are entirely real. An explanation of the origin of evil does not remove the question of why suffering was permitted or how we should answer for it. The so-called problem of evil therefore also asks how the existence of severe suffering can be reconciled with belief in a good and omnipotent God; no brief formula settles the issue. [13]
Immanuel Kant approached the question differently. In his 1793 work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, he considered the human propensity to subordinate the moral law to other incentives. His notion of “radical evil” is not the same as the modern habit of using that expression simply for the most horrific crimes. It concerns the fundamental possibility that someone understands a moral demand but, when deciding what to do, gives priority to personal advantage, self-love, or some other motive. Kant also drew attention to the social dimension: people can corrupt one another's moral judgment. [4]
Augustine and Kant do not offer the same answer. One begins with a theological account of creation and the will; the other with the problem of moral autonomy and reason. Both, however, raise a question that remains relevant beyond religion: is evil always something done by an entirely different, alien kind of person, or must we recognize our own capacity for moral failure when we place our desires above the dignity of others?
Spiritual Language and the Limits of Historical Evidence
Evil carries different meanings in different religions. Christian traditions interweave the language of sin, free will, temptation, evil as a spiritual reality, and accountability before God. There are substantial differences even within a single tradition. Buddhist teachings often place the emphasis elsewhere, speaking of ignorance, greed, and aversion as roots of unwholesome, harmful action. The text known as the Mūla Sutta (AN 3.69) names these three roots as causes of unskillful conduct. This is not to say that Buddhism has precisely the same understanding of sin or demons as Christian theology. [9]
Spiritual reflection can also be valuable to someone who does not identify as religious. Speaking of a lost conscience, blindness, temptation, or inner disintegration may describe experiences that legal language alone does not capture. But we must make an essential distinction between meaning and evidence. Someone who believes that the world is the scene of a struggle between good and evil may thereby express a view of life. It does not follow that a particular political group is controlled by a demonic force, or that a certain family is a bearer of metaphysical evil because of its ancestry. Such factual accusations require their own verifiable evidence.
History gives us another reason for caution. When a religious or moral belief in a final struggle becomes permission to exclude supposedly impure people, the language of good can become a justification for injustice. What matters in making distinctions is therefore not only what a group says about holiness, justice, or salvation, but also how it treats people who disagree with it. It is difficult to defend dignity while simultaneously denying it to someone else because of their affiliation.
How Can Someone Justify an Act They Would Otherwise Condemn?
Psychologist Albert Bandura studied how individuals can temporarily disconnect their own moral standards from their conduct. Mechanisms of moral disengagement include, for example, presenting a harmful act as serving a higher purpose, euphemistic language, comparing it with an allegedly even worse alternative, shifting or diffusing responsibility, and devaluing the victim. These processes do not mean that every perpetrator lacks a conscience. They show how conscience can lose its influence at the very moment it should restrain an action. [7]
Consider a general example of an institution that harms vulnerable people while describing its actions as a necessary cost of order, progress, or security. An individual who performs only a small part of a procedure may never see all the consequences. A superior may insist that someone else decides the objective, while colleagues repeat that their work is perfectly ordinary. Each of these circumstances can make independent judgment more difficult, but none by itself proves innocence. This is an illustrative example, not a description of any particular unnamed organization.
From a different humanistic starting point, Erich Fromm developed a contrast between love of life (biophilia) and an orientation toward what is dead, mechanical, or destructive (necrophilia, in his particular sense of a character orientation). This distinction can be read as a reflection on values and social culture, not as a clinical test for pronouncing people evil from a distance. His 1964 book The Heart of Man explores these themes in the context of human aggression and destructiveness. [6]
One warning is particularly important in psychological explanations: a psychiatric diagnosis is not synonymous with moral evil, and understanding a person's personality is no substitute for proving what they have done. A person with a mental disorder is not automatically dangerous, just as cruel or corrupt conduct cannot be explained solely by a presumed disorder in its perpetrator. An article about ethics must not become an exercise in publicly diagnosing political opponents. We judge responsibility on the basis of actions, circumstances, and evidence, not on the impression that someone seems to lack empathy.
Arendt, Eichmann, and the Contested “Banality of Evil”
After observing Adolf Eichmann's trial in 1961, Hannah Arendt produced one of the twentieth century's most influential and contested reflections on evil. Eichmann played an important role in organizing the deportation of Jews within the Nazi system of mass murder. In his public demeanor, Arendt saw a man who resorted to clichés and could not genuinely think from the perspective of others. Her idea of the “banality of evil” did not mean that the crimes were banal, unimportant, or excusable. It meant that a person who commits terrible acts may lack the grand demonic stature we tend to give such perpetrators in our imagination. [5]
But there is also a substantial objection concerning the historical picture of Eichmann. Researchers have pointed to evidence of his conscious Nazi and antisemitic commitment, and to the possibility that his courtroom performance concealed different motives. Arendt's account must therefore not be reduced to the claim that Eichmann was merely following orders. Nor did she regard him as an innocent cog in the machine. Her philosophical insight into a failure of judgment remains important, but it cannot replace a careful study of the perpetrator's ideology, actions, and responsibility. [5]
Perhaps this is the most powerful warning in Arendt's work: a moral catastrophe needs no supernatural mask to be horrifying. Yet it does not necessarily arise merely from the empty completion of forms. Sometimes it is driven by a considered ideology, sometimes by advantage, sometimes by fear, and often by several factors at once. An adequate explanation must be able to withstand facts that challenge our favorite theory.
Obedience and Engaged Followership
In 1963, Stanley Milgram published a study of obedience to authority that became important for understanding pressure on an individual's judgment. The experiment was a laboratory situation conducted under particular conditions, not a direct model of every war crime or every institution. Its findings therefore require attention to how the experiment was carried out and what can actually be inferred from the laboratory. [10]
A later interpretation by Stephen Reicher, Alexander Haslam, and Joanne Smith suggests that participants did not necessarily just passively transfer responsibility to an authority figure. They may also have actively identified with a purpose presented to them as beneficial and worthy of trust. This account of “engaged followership” matters for moral judgment: a person may participate in harmful conduct not because they have abandoned all values, but because they have accepted a dangerous conception of which objective is good and which means supposedly justify it. This is a scholarly interpretation of the experiments, not a final explanation of all historical atrocities. [8]
If moral disengagement, obedience, and engaged followership have a common thread, it is not the conclusion that people are inevitably evil. It is a warning that an apparently good goal, group pressure, and a narrow view of consequences can seriously distort moral judgment. What matters, therefore, is whether a person has the opportunity to say no, question instructions, listen to victims, and recognize the difference between loyalty and responsibility.
When Evil Acquires an Office, a Stamp, and a Schedule
Research into Nazi persecution is not a metaphor for an abstract system: it is a history of demonstrable actions. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum documents how specific Nazi organizations, state institutions, and parts of civil society participated in mass deportations and killings. Different agencies performed different tasks: some planned, others organized transport, implemented measures, administered confiscations, or exploited forced labor. We must distinguish leading perpetrators from other degrees of involvement without allowing the division of labor to erase actual responsibility. [11]
The word “bystander” is more complicated than it appears, too. The Museum notes that some people remained passive out of fear, others out of indifference, prejudice, or concern for their own position, while still others participated in persecution to varying degrees. Individual situations differed, and we must not assign everyone equal guilt. On the other hand, calling someone “merely a bystander” can sometimes conceal actual assistance to a harmful system. [12]
Historical accountability, then, is not a question of whether one secret master stood behind every decision. We need identifiable decisions, powers, orders, actions, and consequences. That is also why declaring that “the whole system is evil” is insufficient: such a judgment may express outrage, but it does not yet tell us who did what, what could have been prevented, or where decisions were actually made. Likewise, it is not enough to say that a single leader was responsible for everything when many others took part.
The Danger of Seeing Evil Only on the Other Side
It is easier to recognize deception when an opponent uses it than when it helps achieve a goal we support. This is not evidence that all interests are equally harmful or that all political camps bear equal responsibility. It means only that a moral standard is inconsistent if we use it solely to judge those we already reject. Grave acts call for clear condemnation, but that condemnation must rest on the acts and the evidence, not on kinship, religion, nationality, or membership in itself.
For an investigation of hidden power, the crucial shift is therefore away from demonizing people and toward identifying mechanisms, decisions, and responsibility precisely. If an organization has secret membership, that may be an important finding for researchers. If it commits or conceals abuses, that is an even more important finding—but it must be demonstrated separately. Neither an occult symbol nor membership in a fraternity is in itself proof of a crime, just as a respected public position does not exempt anyone from responsibility for proven harm.
This does not rule out spiritual language. A believer may understand the destruction of human dignity as an offense against the sacred; a nonbeliever may see it as a violation of human rights and moral duties. They may disagree about the ultimate origin of evil, yet agree on the need to protect victims, verify facts, and hold perpetrators accountable. Such common ground does not deny differences of belief. It makes cooperation possible without requiring everyone to adopt the same metaphysics.
What Can We Really Conclude About the Nature of Evil?
If “what is evil?” means searching for a single formula that explains every injustice, the answer is limited. Philosophy offers different concepts, religions offer different spiritual accounts, psychology investigates some mechanisms of behavior, and history documents particular crimes and the roles of their perpetrators. Without further evidence, none of these levels can take over the work of all the others. The evidence does not justify concluding that a single supernatural force or secret organization lies behind every grave act.
We can, however, draw an important conclusion. Moral evil does not lose its gravity when we explain it through human choices and social circumstances. On the contrary, this makes visible the points at which it was possible to choose differently, raise an alarm, refuse participation, protect a neighbor, or demand oversight. We can understand evil as a grave assault on goodness and dignity without always knowing whether its deepest nature admits of a theological, philosophical, or psychological explanation.
One question remains, and it leads us forward: does genuine power lie in the ability to compel others, or in the capacity to remain faithful to truth, conscience, and responsibility even under pressure? This is not yet a complete answer to what resistance means. But it is an essential starting point for the next article, Power Versus Force.
Sources and further reading
- The Concept of Evil, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; a philosophical overview of moral evil, acts, character, and responsibility. Source
- Kinds and Origins of Evil, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; philosophical distinctions among different kinds and origins of evil. Source
- Saint Augustine, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2023 edition, § 7.5, “Will and Evil”; an overview of privatio boni, freedom, and the will. Source
- Kant’s Philosophy of Religion, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; discussion of Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793). Source
- Hannah Arendt, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, § 6.1; Arendt's interpretation of Eichmann and the principal objections. Source
- International Erich Fromm Society, “The Psychological Roots of War and Destruction, Part 2: Necrophilous Destructiveness”; an account of lectures from April 1963 and ideas discussed in The Heart of Man (1964). Source
- Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 3, no. 3 (1999), pp. 193–209; DOI: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0303_3. Source
- Stephen D. Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, and Joanne R. Smith, “Working Toward the Experimenter: Reconceptualizing Obedience Within the Milgram Paradigm as Identification-Based Followership,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 7, no. 4 (2012), pp. 315–324; DOI: 10.1177/1745691612448482. Source
- Mūla Sutta: Roots (AN 3.69), translated from Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Access to Insight; the three roots of unskillful conduct. Source
- Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963), pp. 371–378; DOI: 10.1037/h0040525. Source
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, “Perpetrators”; overview of institutions, perpetrators, and responsibility. Source
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, “Bystanders”; degrees of involvement, fear, indifference, and participation. Source
- The Problem of Evil, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; analytical overview of philosophical arguments and theodicies. Source