SeriesHidden Power: Dynasties, Secret Societies and the Invisible Mechanisms of Power Part 37 / 55

The World Economic Forum and Shaping the Future

Every year, people who rarely sit around the same table in everyday life gather in Davos, Switzerland: heads of state, ministers, executives of major companies, representatives of international institutions, researchers and members of civil society.

Symbolic editorial illustration of the difference between shaping visions of the future and decisions affecting real people. It does not depict an actual WEF event or venue.

Every year, people who rarely sit around the same table in everyday life gather in Davos, Switzerland: heads of state, ministers, executives of major companies, representatives of international institutions, researchers and members of civil society. Their conversations may be public, conducted in working sessions or closed to the wider public. No one at this gathering passes laws on behalf of the entire world. Nevertheless, what they discuss, who is invited and which ideas gain support afterward all matter. The question of the World Economic Forum lies precisely in the distance between having no formal governing authority and being able to exercise real influence.

The WEF is neither a world parliament nor merely a neutral lecture hall. It is an organization with its own goals, networks, sources of funding and capacity to help different actors align their visions of the future. Investigating its power means tracing specific initiatives, documents and relationships—without assuming in advance that every connection proves a secret directive, but also without naively believing that informal power does not count because it lacks the official seal of a state.

Davos as a Stage, Not a World Parliament

At the World Economic Forum's 56th Annual Meeting, held from 19 to 23 January 2026, the WEF says it hosted nearly 3,000 participants from politics, business and other fields. The theme, A Spirit of Dialogue, emphasized the need for conversation amid international tensions. But dialogue in such a setting is not simply a conversation among equals. Some guests wield political authority, others command vast capital, while still others have professional standing or access to influential media. [1]

This points to a first crucial distinction: influence does not necessarily mean issuing orders. If a minister supports a proposal after hearing about it in Davos, we need to establish whether the minister first encountered it there or had already advocated it, who developed it and how it subsequently entered the official decision-making process. A photograph of two participants, a handshake or a reference to membership does not, by itself, prove a secret agreement. Equally, the absence of legislative powers does not mean that alliances formed at the meeting have no consequences.

The power to convene people often looks less dramatic than the power of law. The organizer sets the framework of discussion, selects topics, schedules speakers and creates opportunities for contact that others do not enjoy on equal terms. A serious assessment must therefore consider not only the answers heard on stage, but also the questions left off it: who was excluded, who pays for participation, and how the public can determine whether an elected official at the forum defended the public interest or particular interests.

People taking part in a public event at the 2023 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting.
Scene from the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, 18 January 2023; photo: WEF/Jakob Polacsek. Image: World Economic Forum / Jakob Polacsek CC BY 2.0

From European Management to the World Economic Forum

The story begins in 1971, when Klaus Schwab organized a European management symposium in Davos. What began largely as a discussion about business management gradually expanded into a meeting place for business and international politics. In 1987, the organization adopted the name World Economic Forum. This development was not the sudden emergence of a hidden world government, but the gradual institutionalization of a space in which business concerns became intertwined with social development, international relations and public policy. [2]

In legal terms, the WEF is a Swiss non-profit foundation. In December 2014, the Swiss Federal Council recognized it as an “other international body” under the Host State Act, and on 23 January 2015 Switzerland and the Forum signed an agreement governing its status. The publicly available German translation of the agreement recognizes, among other things, the foundation's legal capacity, guarantees freedom of action and assembly, and regulates taxation, control over assets and cooperation with the Swiss authorities. It also provides for cooperation to prevent abuses, recognizes Swiss security responsibilities and allows the agreement to be terminated with six months' notice. These provisions do not grant the WEF general legislative authority over states. A comprehensive legal assessment would still require comparison with the authoritative French original in force and any subsequent amendments. [3] [4] [21]

This distinctive institutional position matters precisely because the WEF is not an insignificant private club. In January 2020, the Swiss foreign ministry publicly explained an additional agreement on enhanced cooperation with the Forum, already envisaged by the 2015 agreement. This is another verifiable channel of institutional access, not evidence of a transfer of state powers. [22] The Forum describes itself in terms of public-private cooperation, raising a political question: how can decision-makers and companies meet when their choices affect millions of people without blurring the distinction between public accountability and private initiative? That distinction becomes especially important when an organization invokes the common good, since both genuine collective efforts and conflicts of interest can be associated with it.

Who Gets to Propose the Future? Money, Invitations and Representation

Major international initiatives need resources, organization and access to people in a position to bring about change. It is therefore important to examine the WEF's finances and governance. In its annual report for the 2024–2025 financial year, the Forum reported CHF 287 million in revenue from membership fees and partnerships. That is not its total revenue, nor is it a figure for the following financial year. More recent consolidated statements exist for the period ending 30 June 2026, but their full financial breakdown has not yet been examined closely enough in this research to support conclusions about the distribution of power among individual funders. [5] [6]

Those who contribute money may gain access or prestige; whether they also gain the decisive say is another matter. It would be unfair to treat a membership fee automatically as the purchase of a political directive. Nor would it be sufficient to stop at the explanation that the foundation is non-profit. A non-profit organization can have strong interests, priorities, employees, influential partners and substantial financial flows. The question “who pays?” therefore leads to the need to examine member-selection rules, partnership terms, governing bodies and actual decisions.

A second issue is representation. Civil society, academic institutions and international organizations are also represented at annual meetings, but the presence of different groups does not by itself establish that they enjoy equal opportunities to influence outcomes. An invitation can enable contact; it can also create the symbolic appearance of broad agreement even when key decisions take shape in narrower circles. To test this in any particular project, we would need participant lists, the process by which the agenda was prepared, meeting records, funders' roles and responses from those excluded from the process. For many closed-door discussions, that evidentiary trail is not fully available to the public.

The decisive question, then, is not whether wealthy and influential people have a right to discuss the world. They do. It is whether everyone else can identify when their proposals become policy, who is accountable for that transition and who has an opportunity to object.

The Power of Ideas: Risks, Forecasts and the Language of Global Policy

Meetings are not the WEF's only means of exerting influence. It publishes reports, analyses, discussions and policy proposals capable of bringing particular problems to the forefront. The Global Risks Report 2026 is a useful example. The central Global Risks Perception Survey for that edition gathered responses from more than 1,300 experts in academia, business, public administration, international organizations and civil society; responses were collected between 12 August and 22 September 2025. These are expert assessments of potential risks, not measurements of a future that has already happened, and not a list of legally mandatory measures. [7]

Yet the way risks are ranked can have social consequences. When an important international forum repeatedly highlights certain issues, it gives them a vocabulary, visibility and often a route to decision-makers. Such reports can help identify genuine dangers; they can also narrow the terms of debate if they fail to distinguish clearly between measurable data, expert forecasts, politically preferred responses and the interests of participants. This is why methodology matters: who was surveyed, what questions were asked, what uncertainty remained and who interprets the findings?

In a 2023 academic article, political economist Desmond McNeill examined the Forum's influence on global health governance through three forms of power: the capacity to convene actors, the power to shape discourse, and entrepreneurial or institution-building initiative. He also raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of public-private partnerships. His analysis provides a useful research framework, not a final verdict on every WEF initiative; for each particular project, the chain of evidence must be established separately. [8]

Sometimes the most important political consequence of an idea is that, over time, it comes to be taken for granted. But the story of that transition must be demonstrable: first a document or speech, then its adoption by another institution, then a political choice, followed by any legal basis and implementation. Without those steps, we would be inferring a single command structure from similarities of language—and similarity alone does not prove that.

How do we trace an idea into a public policy measure?

Stage Evidence to examine
1. Public proposal The original document, its author, date and the proposal's precise content.
2. Institutional uptake A record showing that the competent public body actually considered or adopted the proposal.
3. Decision A decision by the competent authority, its legal responsibilities and any changes made to the proposal.
4. Legal basis Any law, regulation or other legal act adopted, including its actual scope and binding effect.
5. Implementation and consequences Implementation records, responsible agencies, observed effects and independent assessments.

Similar language or membership in the same network does not replace this chain of evidence. The research conducted for SM-37 has not established the full causal chain for a particular national law. This table is a research guide, not a finding that such a measure was implemented.

The Great Reset: A Public Initiative, Political Imagination and Its Limits

In June 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic caused a health and economic crisis, Klaus Schwab publicly called for a “great reset” of capitalism. The Great Reset initiative proposed rethinking the economy to make it more inclusive, sustainable and resilient. The then Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Kristalina Georgieva, also took part in its launch; her speech is a separate public document. This establishes that the initiative did not exist solely in the imaginations of its critics: it was publicly presented, attracted international attention and had influential advocates. [9] [10]

There is, however, an essential difference between a public policy initiative and a legislative command. The WEF had no authority to use that slogan to enact new laws for the inhabitants of sovereign states. To determine whether a particular idea from the initiative influenced housing, environmental or digital legislation, for example, we must identify the exact proposal, the official document, the competent authority, the legal act and its implementation. Such a direct chain has not yet been confirmed in the research assembled for SM-37. We will not replace it with deductions based on similar slogans.

Much confusion has surrounded a claim about a future in which people would own nothing in 2030. The text was written in 2016 by Danish politician Ida Auken as an imagined scene from a future city in which many things are accessed as services rather than purchased. The WEF published the piece, and the idea also circulated through its communications. In an explanation, Auken wrote that this was not her dream outcome, but a scenario intended to provoke discussion of the positive and negative consequences of technological development. Significantly, the narrative itself includes the loss of privacy and people who are left outside such a society. [11] [12]

None of this establishes a binding global plan to abolish private property by 2030. But neither does it mean that the problems raised by the scenario should be ignored. If a home, a vehicle, software or even everyday tasks depend on subscription services, the relationship between user and provider changes. Who sets the terms of access? Can individuals refuse a service, switch providers, use it without being tracked or retain it when they encounter financial hardship? These are reasonable political and ethical dilemmas; they do not have to be attributed to a secret conspiracy to be taken seriously.

The strongest criticism of the Great Reset therefore needs no invented worldwide decree. It can examine specific proposals, the balance between private benefits and public costs, and the actual consequences of policies that have been adopted. And if a similar measure cannot be traced back to the WEF, that must be stated just as clearly.

When a Network Gives Rise to an Institution: CEPI as a Verifiable Example

The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) illustrates how the WEF can be more than a venue for speeches. CEPI was publicly launched in Davos on 18 January 2017. Its official launch announcement identifies the governments of India and Norway, the Wellcome and Bill & Melinda Gates foundations, and the WEF among its founding partners. According to CEPI, the Forum played an important convening role, including through meetings in 2016. [13]

CEPI was created to support vaccine development against dangerous infectious diseases and improve preparedness for future outbreaks. At its launch, contributions from governments and foundations and plans for research investment were made public. Here, a much clearer chain can be traced than one built on group photographs alone: recognition of a public-health problem, meetings and coordination, development of a joint initiative, and establishment of an independent organization. The WEF was one of the founding partners, not the sole initiator or sole funder.

This is evidence of the real institutional power of networking: the Forum can help enable cooperation that results in an organization with actual resources and programmes. It does not, however, prove that the WEF secretly operates CEPI as one of its departments, or that CEPI can impose health measures on national parliaments at will. Its governance, allocation of funds, research priorities and unequal access to results must be assessed using documents from CEPI itself, its funders and the competent public institutions.

It is only fair to acknowledge the strongest case for such partnerships: epidemics do not respect national borders, and developing medicines and vaccines requires cooperation among researchers, public authorities and industry. Beneficial cooperation is possible. That is precisely why accountability matters so much. Society does not need to choose between unconditional trust and unconditional, suspicious rejection; it needs transparent goals, independent evaluation of results, publicly visible financial flows and opportunities for the people affected to have their say.

The WEF and the United Nations: Partnership and the Question of Democratic Accountability

Another concrete example is the strategic cooperation framework between the WEF and the United Nations, signed in New York on 13 June 2019. Both partners publicly confirmed the agreement. Their announcement listed six areas: financing the goals of the 2030 Agenda, climate change, health, digital cooperation, gender equality, and education and skills. The relationship is thus documented, real and public, not merely a theory about a clandestine meeting. [14] [15]

A publicly available copy of the full framework hosted by a third party describes exchanges of knowledge and networks, the inclusion of representatives in meetings and annual meetings of senior leaders to review the partnership. Its concluding section states that the framework is not intended to be legally binding. That is an important substantive limitation, but the copy has not yet been authenticated against an original signed by the UN or the WEF; we therefore do not present the statement as a definitive legal assessment. The official announcements by the signatories reliably confirm the agreement and its areas of cooperation. How far and in what ways the individual arrangements were subsequently implemented remains a separate research question. [14] [15] [16]

This limitation does not diminish the significance of the partnership. A non-binding agreement can facilitate repeated meetings, joint projects and the development of policy priorities. Its influence is measured not only by whether it provides a legal penalty for non-compliance, but also by who gained access through it, which projects acquired greater visibility and how decision-making changed within the participating institutions. Such effects must be investigated through actual project evidence rather than an assumption that signing the framework made the UN subordinate to a private forum.

Civil society also raised the alarm. In September 2019, more than 400 organizations and 40 international networks called for the agreement to be terminated, warning of the danger of greater corporate influence within the UN system. Their warning is genuine, documented criticism concerning democratic accountability, representation and potential conflicts of interest. The phrase “takeover of the UN” must therefore be understood as the protesters' characterization, not an independently established legal fact. [17]

To accept a claim of an actual takeover, we would have to demonstrate a transfer of powers, binding instructions, formal decision-making rights or a concrete dependency that prevented the competent authority from deciding independently. The sources presented do not establish this. There is nevertheless ample reason to ask a serious question: who oversees partnerships between international organizations and private initiatives when the people affected by them do not enjoy comparable access to the negotiating table?

Young Global Leaders, Leadership and the Difference Between Access and Orders

An institution's influence can also travel through people. The WEF operates or connects several programmes for emerging and established leaders. According to its own announcement, the Young Global Leaders Class of 2026 admitted 118 people under the age of 40 from 55 countries and from different areas of public and economic life. Organized meetings, education and access to international networks may contribute to professional relationships, values and a shared vocabulary among participants. [18]

That is a legitimate subject for research into influence, but it is not self-sufficient proof that participants follow a unified set of secret instructions. Such a claim would require actual directives, coordinated actions, links in time and verifiable consequences. A politician's biography listing participation in the programme shows that the person took part; it does not show how they voted, why they proposed a particular law or to whom they were accountable in doing so. But neither should we accept the claim that such programmes have no influence whatsoever without examining their content, participant selection and subsequent career paths.

It is also important that the WEF's leadership changes over time. Klaus Schwab stepped down as chair of the board in April 2025. Following changes in 2025, Larry Fink and André Hoffmann became co-chairs; in February 2026, Børge Brende stepped down as President and Chief Executive Officer, and Alois Zwinggi took over the leadership, initially in an interim capacity. On WEF pages checked for November 2026, Zwinggi is listed as President and CEO. These positions are relevant to governance, interests and accountability, but they do not, on their own, justify inferring that these individuals personally direct the decisions of particular states. [19] [20]

The next questions should therefore be very specific: who appoints the governing bodies, who decides on initiatives, how are conflicts of interest managed, who publishes meeting minutes, and do participants and the public have an effective way to object? A social network of influence is not necessarily a secret order. Yet it may become politically important precisely because it operates outside the everyday mechanisms of electoral accountability.

Shaping the Future Without the Right to Decide for Others

The documents examined so far support a clear but limited conclusion. The World Economic Forum does possess real informal power: it brings important actors together, reinforces the language of public debate, connects resources and, in some cases, helps establish new institutions. CEPI and the partnership with the UN are concrete examples that demonstrate more than the mere appearance of proximity. But the sources assembled do not establish that the WEF holds general legislative authority, exercises unified control over governments or has a binding worldwide plan to abolish private property.

This distinction is neither a defence of influential institutions nor an attack on them. It is a demand for precision. If we confuse influence with complete control, we may overlook the real processes by which ideas become decisions. If we dismiss influence as irrelevant simply because it is not written into a constitution, we overlook an important part of modern political life. Serious criticism must therefore follow documents, people, financial flows, opportunities to object and actual effects.

The future does not belong to those with access to the most expensive conference tables. Everyone has the right to propose what it should look like, but the right to propose is not the right to decide for others. Democratic accountability is not an obstacle to cooperation; it is what prevents cooperation from slipping into private management of public affairs. Personal freedom does not mean rejecting every collective initiative, either. It means having the opportunity to understand, evaluate, participate or object without covert coercion.

The most important question, then, is not whether a “world government” assembled in Davos. It is whether, for every specific proposal, we can establish who developed it, who won support for it, who implemented it, who benefited and whom people can hold to account for its consequences. Where that chain cannot be traced, the accountability gap remains a real problem—even if it does not prove a conspiracy.

Sources and further reading

  1. World Economic Forum (2026). A Spirit of Dialogue — Annual Meeting 2026, report on the meeting of 19–23 January 2026. source Source
  2. World Economic Forum. Davos: A history of the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting (historical timeline). source Source
  3. Swiss Federal Council / Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (23 January 2015). Agreement signed with the WEF (official Swiss announcement on the signing). source Source
  4. World Economic Forum. Statutes and Regulations (statutory and legal framework; individual documents still require detailed assessment). source Source
  5. World Economic Forum (2025). Annual Report 2024–2025 — Our Core Functions, reporting CHF 287 million in revenue from membership fees and partnerships. source Source
  6. World Economic Forum (2026). Annual Report 2025–2026 — Financial Statements; existence of the statements verified, but an item-by-item review of the tables remains outstanding. source Source
  7. World Economic Forum (2026). Global Risks Report 2026 — Overview of Methodology. source Source
  8. Desmond McNeill (2023). The World Economic Forum: An unaccountable force in global health governance?, Global Policy 14(5), 782–789, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.13254. The academic article was checked using accessible metadata and online text; a comprehensive critical assessment remains outstanding. source Source
  9. Klaus Schwab / World Economic Forum (3 June 2020). Now is the time for a 'great reset' of capitalism. source Source
  10. Kristalina Georgieva / International Monetary Fund (3 June 2020). The Great Reset, speech at the launch. source Source
  11. Ida Auken (11 November 2016). Welcome to 2030. I own nothing, have no privacy, and life has never been better, archived copy of the WEF website post, including the author's explanation. source Source
  12. PolitiFact (28 September 2023). The World Economic Forum is not planning to seize control of everything through 'the Great Reset', fact-check of an interpretation of the 2016 post. source Source
  13. Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (18 January 2017). CEPI officially launched, launch announcement identifying founders, roles and initial funding. source Source
  14. World Economic Forum (13 June 2019). World Economic Forum and UN Sign Strategic Partnership Framework. source Source
  15. United Nations, Office of the Secretary-General (13 June 2019). Noon briefing of 13 June 2019, official confirmation of the signing. source Source
  16. The United Nations – World Economic Forum Strategic Partnership Framework for the 2030 Agenda (13 June 2019), publicly available copy hosted by a third party. Limitation: neither the signatories' original nor the authenticity of this copy has been conclusively verified; reviewing the text does not substitute for a legal audit. source Source
  17. Transnational Institute (27 September 2019). Hundreds of Civil Society Organizations Worldwide Denounce World Economic Forum´s Takeover of the UN. A statement by organizations calling for the agreement to be terminated; “takeover” is their public criticism, not an independently established legal fact. source Source
  18. World Economic Forum (16 April 2026). Entrepreneurs, Public Leaders and Innovators Join the Young Global Leaders Class of 2026. source Source
  19. World Economic Forum (21 April 2025; 26 February 2026). World Economic Forum Announces Governance Transition and Press Statement from Co-Chairs André Hoffmann and Larry Fink on Behalf of the Board of Trustees. source ; source Source 1 Source 2
  20. World Economic Forum (checked 18 November 2026). Leadership and Governance. Time-sensitive source; a further check is required before publication. source Source
  21. Swiss Federal Council / Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2015). Abkommen zwischen dem Schweizerischen Bundesrat und der Stiftung World Economic Forum zur Festlegung des Status der Stiftung World Economic Forum in der Schweiz, publicly available German translation of the agreement (Articles 1–14). Limitation: the German document is identified as a translation; a definitive legal assessment requires the authoritative French original and the version in force to be checked. source Source
  22. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland (30 January 2020). Agreement between the FDFA and the World Economic Forum: the facts, official explanation of the additional cooperation agreement and its relationship to the 2015 agreement. source Source