SeriesIsrael and Palestine: Is the Israeli Occupation of Palestine Justified? Part 3 / 12

The Occupation of Palestine: What Is Permitted and What Is Prohibited?

What does international humanitarian law permit an occupying power to do? We examine effective control, civilian protection, settlements and legal limits.

Symbolic artistic illustration of control and restrictions on movement. It does not depict a specific historical event.

When temporary authority begins to determine a land’s future

Does a state that takes control of another territory during a war have the right to build settlements there for its own population, alter property relations and decide to which state that territory will eventually belong? International law gives a much narrower answer than military power or historical narratives sometimes suggest. Occupation may place responsibility for security and temporary administration on the occupying power, but it does not in itself confer sovereignty.

This does not make the relevant questions of international law simple. There is a difference between whether a territory is occupied as a matter of fact, which acts are permitted during occupation, and whether the occupying power’s continued presence is itself lawful. A fourth question concerns the consequences of violations for states and individuals. Confusing these levels can lead to two equally mistaken conclusions: that every security measure taken by an occupying power is necessarily unlawful, or that invoking security justifies unrestricted and permanent rule.

The distinction matters when assessing Israel’s control over the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the powers of control it has retained in relation to Gaza. Military operations after 7 October 2023 are examined in the separate article PL-04; the focus here is the law of occupation. [1] [2] [3]

Documentary photograph of the Kalandia checkpoint in the West Bank, August 2004.
Kalandia checkpoint, August 2004. Photograph: Justin McIntosh, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0. Image: Justin McIntosh / Wikimedia Commons CC BY 2.0

What is occupation? Actual exercise of authority, not historical origins

Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations defines occupation by whether territory is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The meaning of the original provision has also been checked against an explicit explanation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the separate article page in the ICRC database required JavaScript during this review. Occupation extends only to areas where such authority has been established and can be exercised. The test is therefore not what the state itself calls the territory, or what historical, cultural or religious ties it claims, but effective control. [1] [2]

Under international humanitarian law, occupation is primarily a factual situation that activates legal duties. The rules apply even when a state considers its military intervention lawful or an act of self-defence. The law governing recourse to force and the law governing conduct during armed conflict perform different functions: the former addresses the legal basis for the use of force or continued presence, while the latter restricts conduct once control has actually been established. [2]

In 1967, Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The predominant international legal treatment of these areas identifies them as occupied Palestinian territory. Gaza’s precise position after Israel withdrew its permanent ground forces and settlers in 2005 requires further explanation: under the contemporary legal assessment, it is not only a question of whether troops remain continuously present on the ground, but also of which essential governmental functions the state can still effectively exercise. [3]

In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the 2005 withdrawal had not entirely relieved Israel of its obligations under the law of occupation. The Court stressed that the remaining obligations depend on the degree of effective control retained, including over land, maritime and air borders, the movement of persons and goods, and other essential governmental functions. That is not the same as asserting that every obligation applied identically in every period: the obligations must be assessed in relation to actual control. [3]

In its later advisory opinion of 22 October 2025 (ICJ Case No. 196), the Court applied this principle again. It explained that Israel’s obligations in relation to Gaza had increased accordingly after 7 October 2023 because of the increased degree of effective control it had found. The Court added that occupation law can apply alongside the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. This does not mean that the Court assessed the legality of each individual attack in that advisory proceeding. [20]

What may an occupying authority do?

An occupying authority does not enjoy unlimited discretion, but neither is it without powers. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires it, as far as possible, to restore and ensure public order and civil life, while generally respecting the laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented from doing so. This is the essence of temporary administration: authority is supposed to protect people, not reshape the territory at will to serve the occupier’s permanent interests. [4]

Such responsibilities may include policing, protecting public services, preventing violence and organizing urgent administrative activities. But each measure must have a legal basis and satisfy other applicable limits, including necessity, non-discrimination and the protection of fundamental rights. In particular, it is incorrect to claim that the authority may justify every change merely by labelling it a “security” measure. [2] [4] [5]

Control of a territory is not ownership of that territory. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations requires respect for private property and prohibits its confiscation. Article 55 treats the occupying power, in relation to certain public property, as an administrator and usufructuary required to safeguard the property's capital value, not as a new owner with unrestricted rights. This is particularly important for land, forests, public buildings, resources and infrastructure, where the line between temporary administration and permanent transfer of property can easily become blurred. [6] [7]

A further qualification is necessary: Article 55 specifically concerns certain public property belonging to the state whose territory is occupied, so the applicable legal regime for a particular parcel requires closer examination. Residents’ rights, local authorities’ rights, public land and actual administrative powers are not a single category. The history of ownership before 1948 belongs to PL-02; any specific present-day interference must be established through evidence concerning the particular land and its legal status.

Civilians are not at the discretion of military authorities

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides special protection for civilians who fall within its personal and material scope in international armed conflict or occupation. Article 27 requires humane treatment and respect for protected persons, their families, religious convictions and customs. Article 33 prohibits punishing people for acts they did not personally commit, collective penalties, intimidation, pillage and reprisals against protected persons and their property. [5] [8]

Collective punishment is not identical to every restriction that affects a group of people. The legal assessment must examine a measure’s purpose, nature, actual effects and legal basis. But Article 33 rules out the idea that an entire community may be punished for acts committed by individuals or an armed group. A security measure genuinely directed at a specific security problem is not legally equivalent to a measure designed to punish a population for the acts of others. [8]

Article 47 also prevents protected persons from losing the Convention’s protections merely because the occupying authority changes institutions, enters into an agreement with local authorities or declares the territory part of its own state. International humanitarian law thereby protects people against the consequences of unilateral political or administrative decisions as well. [9]

An occupying authority must also address the population’s basic needs. Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires it, to the fullest extent of the means available to it, to ensure food and medical supplies; related provisions concern public health and relief. In practice, these obligations can be decisive for access to medicines, necessities and basic services. Their application to particular events in Gaza or the West Bank requires a fact-specific evidentiary analysis. [10]

On 22 October 2025, the ICJ further clarified humanitarian obligations: in the context of a specific legal question involving the United Nations and other organizations, it referred to the obligation to provide essential supplies, protect humanitarian and medical personnel, and facilitate impartial relief programmes when the population is inadequately supplied. It distinguished duties under Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, concerning essential supplies and health services, from the additional relief regime under Article 59. In this proceeding, the Court was addressing legal obligations, not the criminal responsibility of particular individuals. [20]

Forcible transfers and the transfer of an occupying power’s own population: two distinct prohibitions

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contains two related but distinct sets of rules. The first prohibits unlawful forcible transfers and deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. The second prohibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring parts of its own civilian population into that territory. [11]

The first paragraph does contain an exception concerning temporary evacuations: the second paragraph permits evacuation of a particular area where the safety of the population or imperative military reasons so demand, subject to additional strict conditions. Evacuations should generally not take people outside occupied territory unless this cannot be avoided for material reasons. Temporarily evacuated persons must be able to return home as soon as hostilities in the area have ceased; proper accommodation, health and safety, and keeping families together are also required. According to the ICRC’s 2025 commentary, implementing return may require additional measures for safety, dignity and appropriate alternative accommodation where homes have been destroyed. Evacuation must therefore not become a pretext for permanent demographic change. [11]

The sixth paragraph addresses a different problem: an occupying power must not transfer parts of its own civilian population into occupied territory. In its 2004 advisory opinion on the wall, the ICJ explained that the prohibition also covers measures by which an authority organizes or encourages the transfer of its population, not merely direct compulsory transfer. The updated 2025 ICRC commentary (especially paragraphs 3236–3240) explains that indirect forms of state support or encouragement may also matter—for example, roads serving settlements, military protection, electricity supply and tax benefits. The commentary also distinguishes active state support from mere inaction: the latter does not necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article 49(6) by itself, although it may call for an assessment under other rules. This does not mean automatic criminal liability for every individual settlement resident; the particular conduct of a state cannot establish a person's individual criminal guilt without evidence. [11] [12] [13]

Calling a house demolition “military” or “administrative” does not, by itself, make it lawful

Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from destroying movable or immovable property belonging to private persons, communities, public authorities or other listed entities, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. The exception is narrower than a general claim that the measure would be “useful” or “convenient.” [14]

This does not mean every instance of physical damage to a building can be assessed under the same article alone. Destruction during hostilities also engages the rules on the selection of military objectives, distinction, proportionality and precautions. Administrative demolitions, demolitions based on allegedly missing permits, and punitive demolitions require close examination of different legal grounds and applicable restrictions. A legal judgment about a demolition should not therefore be drawn solely from a photograph of ruins or a statement by one side. [14]

For an individual house, the questions include: who owns it, who ordered the measure, for what reason, under what procedure, whether an alternative existed, what the actual security justification was and how the measure affected people. Particular Palestinian homes, evictions and confiscations are examined in PL-05. The legal standards, however, come from the framework described here.

Documentary photograph of a section of the separation barrier near Bethlehem, April 2009.
Separation barrier near Bethlehem, 15 April 2009. Photograph: Daniel Case, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0. Image: Daniel Case / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0

Settlements and annexation: where does temporary administration end?

A security checkpoint, a temporary military position, a residential neighbourhood for the occupying power’s civilians and the formal incorporation of territory are not the same thing. Keeping those measures distinct is essential if the transition from security provision to permanent rule is not to pass unnoticed.

In Resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of international law. It called on Israel to cease settlement activities and on states to distinguish in their dealings between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. The same resolution also calls for the prevention of attacks against civilians and acts of terrorism. [15]

In its 2004 opinion on the construction of the wall, the ICJ assessed the route of the wall and its associated regime in occupied territory; it was not ruling on every possible kind of border barrier regardless of location. It found the wall and associated regime under consideration unlawful and stressed the importance of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In 2024, the Court went further, examining a broader pattern of policies and practices, including settlements, interference with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, and the assertion of permanent control or annexation. [12] [3]

There is an important difference between de jure annexation (formal legal incorporation) and de facto annexation (administering territory as though the occupying power intended to incorporate it permanently, even without a single formal act). In particular cases, public descriptions alone are not decisive; the actual legislative, administrative and spatial consequences matter. The ICJ’s 2024 opinion found that Israel’s assertion of sovereignty over parts of the occupied territory, and its obstruction of the right to self-determination, affected the legality of its continued presence. [3]

What about Israel’s security argument?

No serious account of the conflict can ignore attacks against Israelis, including attacks on civilians, rocket fire and hostage-taking. A state has legitimate security needs, and international law recognizes certain security powers and, in particular circumstances, the use of force. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also recognizes the possibility of necessary measures of control and security. [5]

But the right to protect a population against attacks does not authorize the permanent acquisition of territory through force, nor does it override the specific limits of occupation law. Military necessity is not a blanket exception to the prohibition of collective penalties, the permanent transfer of the occupying power’s own civilian population, or unlawful annexation. [8] [11] [3]

In an official legal explanation published on 17 February 2004, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes that military occupation is not necessarily unlawful in itself; that security and the boundary issues surrounding Resolution 242 (1967) matter; and that the territories’ final status should be determined through negotiations. This is important for understanding the Israeli state's argument, but it is not a judicial finding. Because the statement predates the ICJ’s 2024 advisory opinion, it must not be presented as the official response to that opinion. [16]

Following the opinion of 19 July 2024, the Israeli Foreign Ministry reportedly rejected the decision as “fundamentally wrong” and “blatantly one-sided,” stressing that a political solution could be reached through direct negotiations, according to a United Nations account of a statement reported in the media. Because an independently archived original Ministry statement has not yet been retrieved, this is identified as a report of the Ministry’s position, rather than as a directly verified government document. [17]

The answer to the security objection is not that Israeli civilians’ security is unimportant. It is that security, too, must be pursued within the law. Equally, the Palestinians’ right to self-determination does not entitle any Palestinian armed group to attack civilians or take hostages. Legal protection does not depend on the ethnic or religious identity of a victim or perpetrator.

What did the International Court of Justice actually decide in 2024?

On 19 July 2024, the ICJ delivered its advisory opinion in Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Court considered the consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in occupied territory, including East Jerusalem. In assessing its continued presence, it stressed the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. An important temporal limitation: in paragraph 81, the Court explained that the United Nations General Assembly’s request did not encompass an assessment of Israel’s military operations in Gaza in response to the attacks by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023. The legality of those later operations must be assessed separately (PL-04), rather than attributed to this opinion. [3]

Importantly, the opinion does not claim that every occupation of territory automatically constitutes the same violation of international law regardless of the circumstances or the occupying authority’s conduct. The Court assessed a specific set of long-standing policies that, in its view, rendered Israel’s continued presence unlawful. [3]

Paragraph 285 of the operative part contains several separate conclusions. The table below sets out key findings and their actual voting margins:

Finding in § 285 Votes
Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful (§ 285(3)). 11–4
Israel must bring its unlawful presence to an end as rapidly as possible (§ 285(4)). 11–4
Immediately cease all new settlement activities and evacuate settlers from the occupied territory (§ 285(5)). 14–1
Israel must provide reparation for damage caused to affected natural and legal persons (§ 285(6)). 14–1
States must not recognize the unlawful situation as legal or render aid or assistance in maintaining it (§ 285(7)). 12–3

The Court also addressed the obligations of international organizations and the need for further consideration by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. These conclusions were not all adopted by identical voting margins, so it would be incorrect to describe them as a single unanimous decision. [3]

What does the ICJ’s advisory opinion of 22 October 2025 add?

In the separate Case No. 196, the Court examined Israel’s obligations concerning the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third states in the occupied Palestinian territory. In the operative part (§ 223), it referred, among other things, to the duty to ensure essential supplies, respect the prohibition of forcible transfers and allow humanitarian relief for an inadequately supplied population. Some findings were unanimous; others were adopted by ten votes to one. [20]

The two opinions address different questions: the 2024 opinion concerns the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and continued presence, while the 2025 opinion focuses primarily on duties towards humanitarian activities, organizations and the population. The latter is not a general judgment on every act committed during the war or on criminal guilt. Substantive assessments of military operations, the blockade and events after 7 October 2023 will be examined in more detail in PL-04. [3] [20]

Why did not all judges agree?

Separate and dissenting opinions do not invalidate the majority’s operative conclusions, but they help clarify the actual legal disagreements. Judges Peter Tomka, Ronny Abraham and Bogdan Aurescu, in their joint opinion (§§ 1–6), opposed the conclusion that the violations found made Israel’s continued presence unlawful as such. They stressed Israel’s security needs, the Oslo agreements and the framework for negotiations. At the same time, in § 3 they explicitly acknowledged that many Israeli policies violate international law and agreed that systematic expansion of settlements in the West Bank is contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In their introduction, they also objected to including Gaza in the full operative conclusion because, in their view, there was insufficient evidence concerning some earlier situations. This is a legal disagreement about the scope and implications of the majority’s conclusion, not a blanket endorsement of settlements or annexation. [18]

The procedural objections also deserve attention: Israel did not participate in the oral hearings but submitted a written statement. A state's absence from oral proceedings in such an advisory case does not prevent the Court from answering the legal question. The original official PDF of the joint opinion was reviewed during C2, with reference to paragraphs 1–6 and particularly paragraph 3. The original forms part of the official record of Case No. 186. Individual judges’ opinions do not represent the opinion of the Court as a whole. [19]

Is an advisory opinion “just an opinion”?

An ICJ advisory opinion is not the same as a judgment between two states in a contentious case, a final criminal conviction or an order directly enforceable against a named person. It would therefore be misleading to write that the Court “convicted Israeli officials” in 2024 or that the advisory opinion was itself an arrest warrant. It did neither.

It would be equally misleading to conclude that the opinion has no legal significance. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and its advisory opinions carry considerable legal authority in interpreting international law. In particular, in identifying legal consequences, the Court was not arbitrarily inventing new rules; it was interpreting obligations it found to arise under existing international law. Some are obligations of Israel; others concern states and international organizations. [3]

State responsibility for a violation of international law is not identical to individual criminal responsibility. The latter requires proof of the elements of a particular crime, jurisdiction and the individual’s responsibility. The International Criminal Court (ICC), which operates separately, is not the ICJ. An arrest warrant in an ICC proceeding is not a criminal conviction. These distinctions will matter when PL-04 examines proceedings relating to Gaza.

What should protecting the rights of both communities mean?

The law of occupation protects people living under an authority not of their choosing. It does not grant privileges based on religion or national origin. The prohibition of violence against civilians and hostage-taking applies whoever the victims are. Nor can an occupying power escape its obligation to protect protected persons by describing an entire population as a threat.

Legal assessment must not be reduced to a competition between historical suffering. A Palestinian civilian is not responsible for an act by a Palestinian armed group. An Israeli civilian is not automatically responsible for a decision by the Israeli government. Criticism of particular practices of the State of Israel is not criticism of Jewish people or Judaism as a religion; criticism of Hamas does not amount to condemning all Palestinians.

From a political standpoint, it is possible to debate security arrangements, negotiations, borders, transitional governance and mutual guarantees. Legally, however, the central question remains whether proposed arrangements are compatible with the prohibition on acquiring territory by force, the right to self-determination and the rights of the population. According to the ICJ’s 2024 opinion, the imposed permanence of control cannot become a legal title merely because it persists over time. [3]

Conclusion: occupation is not a licence for permanent rule

International law gives an occupying power limited authority to maintain order, security and basic necessities in the factual situation of foreign military control. It also places limits on that authority: private property must not be arbitrarily confiscated; civilians must be protected; communities must not be collectively punished; unlawful population transfers, transferring parts of the occupier’s own civilian population and destruction of property outside narrowly prescribed conditions are prohibited.

There is an additional step in assessing Israel’s occupation. On the basis of specific policies and practices it examined, the ICJ concluded in 2024 that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful and set out the obligations flowing from that conclusion. Israel disputes this and points to security and negotiations; several judges disagreed with steps in the legal reasoning. That disagreement should be presented fairly, but it does not alter the findings adopted by the majority of the Court.

The central conclusion is therefore twofold: the law of occupation does not depend on which side tells the more persuasive historical story; and a temporary military authority cannot create a right to permanent rule simply by gradually transforming the territory, its population and its institutions. The next article will examine these principles in Gaza, from the blockade and the status of control to the attacks of 7 October 2023, the war and responsibility for protecting civilians.

Sources and further reading

  1. Hague Regulations (1907), Article 42 — test of effective control: source Source
  2. ICRC, Occupation and IHL: Q&A — distinction between legal regimes: source Source
  3. ICJ, advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, Case No. 186, especially paragraphs 81, 87–94, 230–264, 267–285; full official document: source ; text and operative part (285): source ; official summary: source Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
  4. Hague Regulations (1907), Article 43: source Source
  5. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 27: source Source
  6. Hague Regulations, Article 46: source Source
  7. Hague Regulations, Article 55: source Source
  8. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 33: source Source
  9. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47: source Source
  10. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 55: source Source
  11. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49: source Source
  12. ICJ, advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 concerning the wall, especially paragraphs 120–135, 163: source Source
  13. ICRC, 2025 Commentary on Article 49, especially §§ 3190–3208, 3230–3240: source Source
  14. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 53: source Source
  15. UN Security Council, S/RES/2334 (2016), especially operative paragraphs 1–6: source Source
  16. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Aspects: Legal Status of the Land, earlier government account predating the ICJ’s 2024 opinion: source Source
  17. UN News, 19 July 2024, reporting the Israeli response rather than reproducing an original MFA statement: source ; a reported verbatim response by an MFA representative: source Source 1 Source 2
  18. Joint opinion of Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu (19 July 2024), §§ 1–6 (especially § 3); original official PDF: source ; ICJ case-register alternative: source Source 1 Source 2
  19. ICJ press release 2024/57 (19 July 2024), procedural background and list of separate opinions: source Source
  20. ICJ, advisory opinion of 22 October 2025, Case No. 196, Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially §§ 85–87, 91–133, 223. Official text: source ; official summary: source Source 1 Source 2

Accessed and compared: 12 November 2026. The core operative conclusions of the ICJ’s 2024 opinion in § 285 and the temporal limitation in § 81 were checked against the official document, including a visual inspection of the operative paragraphs on printed pages 78–79. The joint separate opinion of three judges was also visually inspected, particularly § 3. The updated ICRC commentary on Article 49 (§§ 3230–3240) and the 2025 ICJ opinion (§§ 85–87, 91–133, 223) were checked through official publications or summaries. An independently archived original of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s statement of 19 July 2024 remains an outstanding bibliographic check; accordingly, the response is identified as a statement reported via a UN account.