SeriesWestern Hypocrisy Part 3 / 12

Justice Without Borders? — The ICC, War Crimes and the Power of States

When can international criminal law reach powerful states? We examine ICC jurisdiction, state cooperation, and political responses to war crimes investigations.

AI-generated symbolic editorial illustration, not a documentary image.

International criminal justice speaks the language of universality. A war crime is supposed to remain a war crime regardless of the perpetrator’s uniform. A crime against humanity is not supposed to become less serious because the alleged perpetrator is a citizen of a militarily powerful state. And the legitimacy of an international court’s arrest warrant is not supposed to change depending on whether the name on it belongs to an adversary or an ally.

Yet this is precisely where the gap between declared universality and political practice becomes visible.

When the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, the United States emphasized the importance of the ICC, welcomed its work and supported accountability efforts in Ukraine. When the same court moved against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, Washington rejected its jurisdiction; in 2025 the US administration again imposed a sanctions regime on the ICC and described the Court’s actions against the United States and Israel as illegitimate and unfounded. When the ICC sought to investigate possible crimes by US personnel in Afghanistan, the United States had already sanctioned its Prosecutor in 2020. [5][20][8][9][13]

The cases are not identical. But that is precisely why the more exact question matters: which legal differences genuinely justify a different approach to the same institution — and which explanations appear only once the Court reaches one’s own personnel or a key ally?

Putin: jurisdiction over a citizen of a state that was not an ICC member

On 17 March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova. The Court found reasonable grounds to suspect their responsibility for the alleged war crimes of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of children from occupied Ukrainian territory to the Russian Federation. An arrest warrant is not a conviction, and the warrants did not concern the crime of aggression but specific alleged war crimes. [3][1]

For the comparison here, another point is more important. Russia was not a State Party to the Rome Statute. Ukraine, at the time the warrants were issued, was also not yet a State Party, but through declarations under Article 12(3) it had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory. On that territorial basis, the ICC may investigate conduct by nationals of states that are themselves not parties to the Statute. [2][1]

Washington did not treat that principle as inherently illegitimate. In 2023, US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack said the United States valued the significance of the Putin warrant, recalled that President Joe Biden had described it as justified, and presented the ICC as an important part of the wider system of international justice. In December of the same year, the United States delegation before the Assembly of States Parties praised the Court’s work and specifically highlighted the warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova. [5][31][4]

The principle was therefore clear: the fact that a suspect is a citizen of a non-State Party does not by itself eliminate ICC jurisdiction where a valid territorial basis exists. That principle becomes crucial once the name of the suspect changes. [1][2]

The modern International Criminal Court building in The Hague.
The International Criminal Court in The Hague. The ICC can issue warrants and conduct proceedings, but has no police force of its own and depends on states to enforce its decisions. Image: OSeveno / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

Netanyahu and Gallant: when territorial jurisdiction becomes a political problem

On 21 November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. The Court alleged responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including starvation as a method of warfare, murder, persecution and other inhumane acts. As of 16 November 2026, both remain listed by the ICC as at large with outstanding warrants. Again, an arrest warrant is not a conviction. [20][21][1]

But the US reaction was markedly different. When the Prosecutor requested the warrants in May 2024, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the United States fundamentally rejected the applications. Washington challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, the procedure and the application of complementarity, and emphasized that Israel is not a State Party to the ICC. [8]

Israel is entitled to challenge jurisdiction, and it has done so. In April 2025, the Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber had not adequately addressed part of Israel’s jurisdictional challenge and returned the matter for reconsideration. That is a serious procedural point and should not be concealed. But in July 2025, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected Israel’s request to withdraw, vacate or declare the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant to be without effect. The warrants remained in force. [22][23]

The central problem is that the argument about the nationality of a non-State Party is not a new issue that appeared only with Israel.

The ICC had already exercised jurisdiction over a Russian national even though Russia was not a member of the Court. In the Palestine situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled in 2021 that, for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the Court’s territorial jurisdiction extended to Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2024, the Prosecutor explicitly maintained that the Court’s jurisdiction can extend to nationals of non-States Parties when the relevant conduct occurs on the territory of a State Party. [2][6][7]

The fact that Israel is not a State Party therefore cannot, by itself, adequately explain the opposite US attitude toward Russian and Israeli nationals.

If territorial jurisdiction is sufficient to support proceedings against a Russian national, then any argument for a different result in the Israeli case must rest on additional legal grounds stronger than political alignment. This is one of the clearest consistency tests in the entire series.

Washington did not stop at a legal objection

The controversy would be less revealing if the US response had ended with a legal challenge over jurisdiction. It did not.

On 6 February 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC. The order accused the Court of illegitimate and baseless actions against the United States and its close ally Israel and described the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant as unfounded. That changes the nature of the case. [9][10]

A state may argue that an international court has interpreted its jurisdiction incorrectly. But political and economic pressure against the institution because it is investigating one’s own personnel or an ally is not the same thing as making a legal argument before a judicial chamber.

The contrast with Ukraine is direct. In 2023, the United States described the ICC as an important part of international justice and supported its work. Once the Court’s jurisdiction reached the Israeli political leadership, the US executive branch placed the Court under a sanctions regime in 2025. [5][9]

There is no need to claim that the Putin and Netanyahu cases are materially identical. They are not.

But the principle of judicial independence cannot coherently depend on whether a particular case is politically acceptable to Washington.

Fatou Bensouda at a public event in 2014.
Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor from 2012 to 2021. The United States designated her under its sanctions regime in September 2020 amid the dispute over the Afghanistan investigation; the sanctions were lifted in April 2021. Photograph taken in 2014. Image: Foreign and Commonwealth Office / Wikimedia Commons OGL v1.0 / CC BY 2.0

Afghanistan: when the investigation could reach US personnel

Afghanistan shows that this conflict did not begin with Israel. In 2017, the ICC Prosecutor sought authorization to investigate alleged crimes by the Taliban and Afghan security forces, as well as possible war crimes by members of the US armed forces and personnel of the CIA. In March 2020, the Appeals Chamber authorized the investigation into alleged crimes committed on Afghan territory and certain related acts committed on the territories of other States Parties. [24][32][11]

The Trump administration then imposed sanctions on Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko, a senior official in the Office of the Prosecutor. President Biden lifted those sanctions in April 2021 and called them inappropriate and ineffective, but Washington simultaneously stressed that it continued to strongly oppose the ICC’s actions in the Afghanistan and Palestine situations. [13]

In September 2021, the new Prosecutor, Karim Khan, announced that because of limited resources the investigation would focus primarily on the Taliban and Islamic State – Khorasan Province, while other aspects would be deprioritized. Those other aspects included previously identified possible violations by US personnel. Khan justified the decision by reference to the gravity, scale and continuing nature of alleged crimes by the Taliban and IS-K, as well as the Office’s limited resources. That explanation should be reported. It should not be turned into an excuse. [12]

There is no evidentiary basis for claiming that US sanctions caused the later deprioritization, and this article does not make that causal claim.

The documented fact is narrower: the part of the investigation that could have reached US personnel was deprioritized after the United States had previously used sanctions against senior officials of the Court. [12][13]

That institutional context cannot simply be ignored when assessing the practical reach of international criminal justice.

Afghanistan today also shows the other side

GovInfo — Executive Order 14203 primary document

The Afghanistan investigation led to concrete proceedings against the Taliban leadership. In July and September 2025, the ICC issued four arrest warrants for the alleged crime against humanity of persecution on gender and political grounds. The Court unsealed all four warrants on 5 October 2026. [14]

Subsequent developments also revealed the limits of the original investigation. On 12 November 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber II ordered the closure of the original Afghanistan situation record (ICC-02/17). Among the reasons it cited were difficulties investigating and obtaining evidence, compounded by the time elapsed since the alleged crimes. The investigation into alleged Taliban crimes following the takeover in August 2021 continues in the separate Afghanistan II situation, to which the four warrants also belong. The Chamber found that the Prosecution had not demonstrated its ability to pursue effective further investigative or prosecutorial activities in the original situation, which also encompassed potential responsibility of US personnel. On 13 November the Prosecution filed an appeal and requested suspensive effect. As of 16 November 2026, the outcome of the appeal had not been confirmed. Closure of the record is not an acquittal and does not in itself preclude reopening the investigation if the legal requirements are met. [33] [34]

The explanation concerning limited resources and difficulties gathering evidence is documented. It does not establish that the closure resulted from US sanctions. Yet the contrast between the advancement of proceedings against the Taliban leadership and the closure of the original situation record remains relevant to the question of the actual reach of universal criminal accountability. [12] [33]

British Iraq: the ICC found a basis to suspect war crimes

The British Iraq case is especially instructive because there is no need to speculate about whether the ICC saw possible criminal conduct. It did.

In December 2020, the Office of the Prosecutor stated that there was a reasonable basis to believe that members of the British armed forces had committed war crimes in Iraq, including wilful killing, torture, inhuman or cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape or other forms of sexual violence. It also found that the initial response of the British military to the allegations had been inadequate and had failed to provide genuinely independent and impartial investigations. Yet the ICC did not open a full investigation. [15]

The reason was complementarity. After reviewing domestic British proceedings, the Prosecutor did not find a sufficient basis to conclude that the United Kingdom had conducted them for the purpose of shielding persons from criminal responsibility. The potential cases were therefore considered inadmissible before the ICC at that time, while the possibility of reconsideration on the basis of new facts or evidence remained open. That is the legally accurate description of the decision. [15]

The outcome is nevertheless striking: an international prosecutor found a reasonable basis to suspect a range of war crimes and identified deficiencies in the initial British response, yet no ICC case followed. [15]

Complementarity is a foundational principle of the Rome Statute. But this case also exposes one of its politically significant consequences: a state with a strong legal and institutional apparatus can keep a case outside The Hague through domestic proceedings without those proceedings necessarily resulting in a substantial number of criminal prosecutions. Formal accountability and actual criminal accountability can therefore drift very far apart.

Abu Ghraib, Haditha and Kunduz: domestic accountability exists, but it has limits

It would be inaccurate to claim that Western states never investigate their own personnel. Abu Ghraib is a clear counterexample. After the abuses became public, multiple personnel were removed from duty, eleven soldiers were charged and convicted in military proceedings, and Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was disciplined and reduced in rank. [28]

Haditha produced a far weaker criminal outcome. After the deaths of Iraqi civilians in 2005, the initial military account differed substantially from the picture that later emerged; broader criminal and command investigations followed only after media scrutiny and questions about a possible cover-up. In the end, only one Marine was convicted in a court-martial proceeding. [29][30][35]

In Kunduz, a US AC-130 attacked a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in 2015. The US investigation found a combination of human, procedural and technical failures, as well as violations of the rules of engagement; sixteen service members received disciplinary or administrative action. At the same time, the US military concluded that the conduct did not meet the threshold of a war crime because investigators did not find that the personnel knowingly attacked a protected medical facility. [17]

These cases prevent the absolute claim that “the West never investigates its own.” But they do not resolve the central double-standard issue.

Administrative discipline is not the same as criminal prosecution. Punishing a direct perpetrator is not the same as examining responsibility at higher command or political levels. And a domestic investigation that itself concludes that conduct does not meet the threshold of a war crime is not the same thing as independent external judicial scrutiny.

The existence of some self-correction cannot therefore be used automatically to declare the system consistent.

Australia: proof that more serious domestic accountability is possible

The Australian case demonstrates that a stricter response within a Western system is not institutionally impossible.

The Brereton Inquiry found credible information concerning 23 incidents involving the alleged unlawful killing of 39 people by, or with the participation of, members of Australian special forces in Afghanistan. Australian defence authorities accepted the findings, and the Office of the Special Investigator was established to conduct criminal investigations. [18][25]

In March 2023, a former Australian special forces soldier was charged with the war crime of murder. In April 2026, a second former member of the Australian Defence Force was charged with five counts of the war crime of murder relating to the deaths of Afghans whom investigators alleged were unarmed, detained and not participating in hostilities. Both cases remain subject to judicial proceedings, and the presumption of innocence applies. The Australian case does not erase the problem of double standards. [25][26][27][36][37]

It demonstrates something concrete: a Western state can establish a mechanism that seriously investigates its own personnel and can result in criminal charges.

That makes the argument that strict accountability for one’s own military personnel is simply impracticable much less convincing.

The real boundary of universal justice is political cost

None of these cases proves that the ICC always gets the law right. Nor does it follow that Putin, Netanyahu, Gallant, US personnel in Afghanistan and British soldiers in Iraq are legally identical cases.

That is not necessary for the double-standard test. What matters more is the reaction to the very possibility of independent external scrutiny.

When the ICC moved against the leader of a US geopolitical adversary, Washington emphasized the importance of the institution, supported its work and welcomed the arrest warrant. When the Court investigated possible responsibility of US personnel, one US administration sanctioned senior ICC officials; another administration lifted those sanctions but continued to reject the Court’s jurisdiction. When the Court issued warrants for the leadership of a key US ally, the ICC was again subjected to US sanctions. That contrast is documented. [5][13][20][9]

The Western explanation differs from case to case: lack of jurisdiction, complementarity, procedural objections, national investigations, non-State Party status, limited resources.

Those arguments should be recorded and assessed on their substance. They should not be accepted merely because Washington or London advances them.

The test is the same as in the previous article: would the same rule, and the same breadth of exception, be accepted when invoked by an adversary?

Here the Russian case is especially uncomfortable for the US position. Washington was able to support ICC jurisdiction over a Russian national even though Russia was not a State Party, based on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Ukraine. The fact that Israel is not a State Party to the Rome Statute therefore cannot simultaneously function as a sufficient universal reason why the ICC should not be able to reach Israeli nationals for conduct occurring on territory over which the Court has found territorial jurisdiction. Other legal objections require separate legal assessment. But the standard has to be the same. [1][2][5][6][20]

If the independence of international criminal justice is treated as a civilizational value when the accused is an adversary, but becomes a reason to sanction the Court itself when the same principle reaches one’s own personnel or a strategic ally, then the universality of criminal law is being conditioned by power. And that is precisely where the charge of double standards begins.

Sources and further reading

  1. ICC — How the Court works / jurisdiction and cooperation Source
  2. ICC — Ukraine situation / Article 12(3) jurisdiction Source
  3. ICC — Prosecutor statement on Putin / Lvova-Belova warrants Source
  4. U.S. Department of State (archived) — US remarks supporting accountability / Putin warrant Source
  5. U.S. Department of State (archived) — US statement at Assembly of States Parties Source
  6. ICC — Palestine territorial jurisdiction decision Source
  7. ICC — Prosecutor statement on warrant applications in the Palestine situation Source
  8. U.S. Department of State (archived) — Warrant applications by the ICC Source
  9. White House — Executive Order 14203 / ICC sanctions Source
  10. GovInfo — Executive Order 14203 primary document Source
  11. ICC — Afghanistan investigation authorization Source
  12. ICC — Afghanistan prioritization statement by Prosecutor Karim Khan Source
  13. U.S. Department of State (archived) — Ending sanctions against ICC personnel Source
  14. ICC — Four Afghanistan warrants unsealed 5 Oct 2026 Source
  15. ICC — Iraq/UK preliminary examination conclusion Source
  16. ICC — Iraq situation page Source
  17. U.S. Department of Defense — Kunduz investigation summary Source
  18. Australian Department of Defence — Brereton inquiry press conference Source
  19. Office of the Special Investigator — Australian war-crimes investigation releases Source
  20. ICC — Decision on challenges and issue of Netanyahu / Gallant warrants, 21 November 2024 Source
  21. ICC — Register of defendants at large in the Palestine situation (consulted 16 November 2026) Source
  22. ICC Appeals Chamber — Judgment on Israel’s jurisdictional appeal, ICC-01/18-422, 24 April 2025 Source
  23. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber — Decision on Israel’s request to withdraw warrants, ICC-01/18-457, 16 July 2025 Source
  24. ICC Prosecutor — Afghanistan investigation and referral from six States Parties (statement) Source
  25. Office of the Special Investigator / AFP — Former Australian soldier charged with war crime, 20 March 2023 Source
  26. Office of the Special Investigator / AFP — Former Australian soldier charged over alleged war crimes, 7 April 2026 Source
  27. Office of the Special Investigator / AFP — Opening statements following arrest of former Australian soldier, 7 April 2026 Source
  28. TIME — The Abu Ghraib Cases: Not Yet Over (2007) Source
  29. U.S. Marine Corps / DVIDS — Guilty plea entered at General Court-Martial in Haditha investigation, 23 January 2012 Source
  30. Associated Press — Conn. town honors Marine convicted in Iraq deaths, 19 August 2012 Source
  31. GovInfo — President Biden, remarks to reporters, 17 March 2023, DCPD-202300206 Source
  32. ICC — Afghanistan: information for victims, procedural history Source
  33. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II — Public redacted version of Decision closing the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-253-Red, 12 November 2026, paras. 12–13, 16, 19–25 Source
  34. ICC Office of the Prosecutor — Notice of appeal and urgent request for suspensive effect, ICC-02/26-37, 13 November 2026 Source
  35. Tim McGirk / TIME — Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?, 19 March 2006 Source
  36. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions — Attorney-General (Cth) v Benjamin Roberts-Smith (consulted 16 November 2026) Source
  37. Associated Press — Australian accused of Afghanistan war crime pleads not guilty but trial held until at least 2027, 3 October 2025 Source