One Law, Different Exceptions? — Sovereignty and the Politics of Power
How do powerful states apply the principle of sovereignty? Nicaragua, Iraq, the Golan Heights, and other disputes reveal gaps between rules and practice.
AI-generated symbolic editorial illustration, not a documentary image.
Sovereignty, territorial integrity and the prohibition on the use of force are among the principles Western states invoke most often when judging the conduct of their geopolitical rivals.
They demand respect for borders. They demand non-interference. They demand respect for international law. They insist that one state’s security interests cannot simply become a licence to use force against another.
These principles have a clear legal basis. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Among the clearest recognised exceptions are self-defence under Article 51 and the use of force authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII.[1] The question, then, is not whether the rule exists. The question is:
Do the states that most forcefully prescribe this rule to others allow it to constrain themselves and their strategic allies with equal strictness?
The cases of Nicaragua, Iraq and the Golan Heights suggest that the answer is far from straightforward.
Nicaragua: when US conduct was judged by the rules Washington applies to others
In 1984, Nicaragua brought proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice.
The case concerned, among other things, US support for the armed Contra groups, military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, and the mining of Nicaraguan ports.
In 1986, the International Court of Justice found that the United States had violated obligations under customary international law relating to non-intervention, the prohibition on the use of force and Nicaraguan sovereignty. It also rejected the US justification based on collective self-defence.[2]
In discussing non-intervention, the Court stressed a principle that is especially relevant to the question of double standards.
A sovereign state has the right to decide freely on its political, economic and social system and on its foreign policy. When another state uses coercion to interfere with such choices, or supports armed groups seeking to overthrow the government, that may constitute unlawful intervention.
This is very close to the language the United States itself uses when condemning external interference by other states.
But in Nicaragua, this was not a hypothetical accusation. The International Court of Justice found that the United States itself had violated the rule.
Washington challenged the Court’s jurisdiction and, after the jurisdiction ruling, announced in January 1985 that it would no longer participate in the proceedings. The Court nevertheless continued and delivered its judgment on the merits. The gap between the rule demanded of others and US conduct is therefore documented.
When Washington tells other states that they have no right to determine the political future of a weaker country through armed groups, military pressure or other forms of coercion, it is invoking a principle whose violation has also been judicially established in a case involving the United States itself.
Iraq: when there was no new Security Council authorisation
In March 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom launched the war against Iraq. Before the war began, the Security Council did not adopt a new resolution explicitly authorising the use of force.
Washington and London sought a legal basis in earlier resolutions connected to the Gulf War, the ceasefire and Iraq’s disarmament obligations. But the central fact remains:
there was no new explicit Security Council authorisation for the 2003 war.
Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later stated that, in his view, the war was not in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and was therefore illegal in that sense.[3] This was not a judgment by an international court.
It was, however, the position of the Secretary-General of the organisation whose founding document establishes the central rules governing the use of force.
The British Iraq Inquiry, or Chilcot Inquiry, likewise did not issue its own judicial ruling on the legality of the war.
It did, however, conclude that peaceful options had not been exhausted before military action began and that war was therefore not a last resort. It also described the process by which the British government concluded that a legal basis existed as “far from satisfactory”.[4]
The important question is therefore not whether Washington and London produced a legal justification. They did.
The question is how much interpretative latitude they allowed themselves, and how much they would allow an adversary.
Western governments insist that security interests and political assessments cannot by themselves create a right to use force.
In Iraq, however, Washington and London relied on an interpretation under which authority connected to an earlier conflict could be treated as revived more than a decade later without a new explicit Security Council mandate. At that point, the universality of the rule begins to depend on who is interpreting the exception.
The problem is not that the West rejects international law
Quite the opposite. The United States and the United Kingdom do not generally claim that international law does not apply to them.
They almost always attempt to place their conduct within a legal framework. That matters because a double standard rarely operates through an explicit statement such as:
the rule does not apply to us.
More often, the argument is:
our case is an exception because the circumstances are special.
The general rule therefore remains intact for others. The state applying it to itself receives greater interpretative flexibility. The same mechanism is visible in the Golan Heights.
The Golan Heights: when territorial integrity depends on the ally
Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967. In 1981, it extended its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the territory. The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 497.
The resolution reaffirmed the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force and decided that Israel’s imposition of its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without international legal effect. The resolution was adopted unanimously, including with the vote of the United States.[5]
In March 2019, the United States changed its policy and recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.
President Donald Trump’s proclamation referred to security threats facing Israel from Syria, Iran and Hezbollah and justified the decision by invoking “unique circumstances”.[6] The distinction between the rule and the exception is clear. The Security Council:
the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible.
The United States:
in this case, special security circumstances justify recognition of sovereignty.
Israel’s security concerns are a real political factor. But that is precisely why the case directly tests the universality of the rule. Almost any powerful state seeking to retain strategically important territory can cite security reasons.
If an ally’s security concerns are sufficient to justify recognition of a change in territorial status, then there must be criteria by which the same kind of argument could also be assessed when invoked by other states.
If the argument becomes acceptable only when it benefits a Western ally, two different standards are being applied.
When Washington tells others that borders are inviolable
US policy after 2014, and even more strongly after 2022, has emphasised Ukraine’s territorial integrity. That principle has broad international support.
In March 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262, affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and stating that the referendum held in Crimea had no validity and could not form the basis for altering the peninsula’s status.[7] But precisely because of the Golan Heights, a question of consistency arises.
In Crimea, the United States insists that a local referendum, security concerns and historical arguments cannot override Ukraine’s internationally recognised territorial integrity.
In the Golan Heights, the United States itself recognised Israeli sovereignty over territory despite a prior unanimous Security Council resolution stating that the change in its legal status had no international legal effect.
Crimea and the Golan Heights are not identical legal cases. But that difference does not remove the question:
why can security concerns not alter territorial integrity in one case, while in another they become the basis for US recognition of sovereignty?
Political alignment alone cannot be the legal answer.
Crimea: what the referendum changes — and what it does not
A referendum was held in Crimea in March 2014. According to the official results, a large majority of participants supported joining the Russian Federation. Russia presented the referendum as an expression of the Crimean population’s right to self-determination. That is a real component of the Russian argument and should not be omitted.
At the same time, the referendum was not internationally accepted as a valid basis for changing Ukraine’s borders.
In Resolution 68/262, the UN General Assembly stated that the referendum had no validity and could not form the basis for altering Crimea’s status.[7]
The Venice Commission concluded that the Ukrainian Constitution did not permit a local referendum on secession and that the circumstances in Crimea did not allow the referendum to be held in accordance with European democratic standards.[8]
The existence of the referendum and its legal validity are therefore separate questions. The referendum is an important part of Russia’s justification.
But under the prevailing international response, it did not by itself create a recognised legal basis for changing the border. In the context of Western double standards, however, another question follows:
how does the West assess self-determination when it advances a Western-backed political outcome, and how does it assess it when it advances the interests of an adversary?
That is where Kosovo becomes important.
Kosovo: a Western exception to its own rule
In 1999, NATO used military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without a new explicit Security Council authorisation.
After the war, Kosovo came under international administration. In 2008, it declared independence, and many Western states recognised it.
In 2010, the International Court of Justice concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence itself did not violate international law.[9]
But the Court’s opinion was narrow. It did not establish a general right of all regions to unilateral secession. It did not rule that Kosovo possessed a general international-law right to secede. And it did not decide on the legality of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Western states generally presented Kosovo as a special, almost unique case.
That formulation allows them to support a change in territorial status in one case without accepting a general rule that other states might later invoke.
Russia subsequently used Kosovo as an argument in the debate over Crimea for precisely that reason. This does not mean that Kosovo and Crimea are the same. But the Western claim that Kosovo cannot serve as any kind of precedent requires more than the word “unique”. It requires a criterion that can be applied independently of the identity of the state involved.
Rules set by the same actor should not change meaning with the flag
If Western states accept in Kosovo a combination of:
- special historical circumstances,
- humanitarian catastrophe,
- self-determination,
- years of international administration,
- political recognition of a new state,
then they can argue that Crimea does not meet the same conditions. But the criteria must be clearly stated. It cannot be enough to say:
Kosovo is our accepted exception; Crimea is Russia’s.
Nor can it be enough to say:
the security concerns of our ally in the Golan Heights are a legitimate special circumstance, while the security argument of an adversary carries no comparable weight.
A universal rule means that an argument must be judged by its substance, not by the flag attached to it.
Western Sahara: when a referendum can disappear from the process
Western Sahara offers another example of how flexibly the principle of self-determination can operate in international politics.
MINURSO was established in 1991 as part of a process connected to a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara. The referendum was never held. Decades later, the Security Council framework changed.
Resolution 2797 of October 2025 still calls for a political solution providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, but negotiations are now explicitly to proceed on the basis of Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal, and the resolution states that genuine autonomy could represent the most feasible outcome.[10]
Both the United States and the United Kingdom voted in favour of the resolution.[10] This does not mean that Western Sahara is the same as Crimea or Kosovo. It does show that “self-determination” does not by itself determine the outcome. It can mean a referendum. It can mean autonomy. It can mean independence. Or it can remain an unresolved political process for decades.
Which form it takes depends heavily on political power and the institutional framework in which the dispute is handled.
Palestine: self-determination until it meets the veto
US policy towards Palestine offers another example of the gap between a declared principle and institutional conduct. The United States has long supported a two-state solution.
But in April 2024, it used its veto in the Security Council to block a recommendation that Palestine be admitted to the United Nations as a full member.
The proposal received 12 votes in favour. The United Kingdom and Switzerland abstained, while the United States voted against it.[11]
In May 2024, the General Assembly voted 143 to 9, with 25 abstentions, that Palestine was qualified for membership under Article 4 of the Charter and should be admitted.[12] But without a Security Council recommendation, the General Assembly cannot grant full membership.
A single permanent member can therefore block full UN membership for a state whose eventual existence it supports in principle as part of a two-state solution.
The US position was that Palestinian statehood should emerge through negotiations. But this is exactly where the question of power becomes unavoidable.
If the weaker party’s route to full international membership is tied to a process in which the much stronger party has substantial influence over the terms, while a third great power can block UN membership through a veto, the gap between declared support for self-determination and its practical realisation becomes clear.
A great power does not need a different law — a broader interpretation is enough
This is the central pattern. The United States does not need to pass a law saying:
different rules apply to us.
It is enough for universal rules to be interpreted differently in cases where strategic interests differ. In Nicaragua: collective self-defence. In Iraq: a broad interpretation of earlier Security Council resolutions. In Kosovo: exceptional humanitarian and historical circumstances. In the Golan Heights: unique security circumstances. In Palestine: self-determination, but only after a negotiated process. The general rule remains. The exception changes.
A double standard does not require identical cases
A common response to the charge of double standards is:
the cases are not the same.
That is almost always true. No war is identical to another. No secession has exactly the same history. No occupation arises from precisely the same circumstances. But a double standard does not require identical cases.
It requires sufficiently comparable cases and different criteria that the material differences do not adequately explain. So it is not enough to say:
Kosovo is not Crimea.
One must show which legally relevant difference produces a different standard. It is not enough to say:
the Golan Heights are not Crimea.
One must explain why security arguments can support recognition of sovereignty in one case but cannot carry comparable weight in the other. And it is not enough to say:
Iraq is not a Russian use of force.
One must explain why a broader Western interpretation of legal authority is acceptable while much stricter limits are expected of others.
Change the flag
The test is simple. Imagine that a geopolitical adversary of the United States:
- funded and supported armed groups seeking to overthrow the government of another state;
- used military force without a new explicit Security Council authorisation on the basis of a broad reading of older resolutions;
- recognised an ally’s sovereignty over occupied territory because of “unique security circumstances”;
- supported self-determination in one secessionist case while emphasising territorial integrity in another.
Would Washington accept the same explanations? If not, it must identify the legal and material distinction. If the difference lies mainly in who the actor is, then two different standards are being applied.
Why these double standards carry particular weight in the Western case
Double standards are not a Western invention. Great powers throughout history have adjusted universal principles to their interests.
But the Western case carries particular weight because the United States and European states so often ground their international legitimacy precisely in the universality of rules. They do not merely say:
we are stronger, and this is in our interest.
They say:
this is international law;
this is the rules-based international order;
this is a principle everyone must respect.
By doing so, they themselves establish a higher standard. If the same rule then becomes more flexible when applied to themselves or their allies, the contradiction becomes part of the legitimacy problem of their foreign policy.
Sovereignty must constrain those who prescribe the rules as well
The prohibition on the use of force was not created because states stopped having security interests. They will always have them. Its purpose is precisely to prevent a powerful state from deciding on its own:
my interest is important enough, so the general restriction does not apply to me today.
Law matters only insofar as it constrains the powerful as well. If it is exceptionally strict when applied to an adversary but highly flexible when it constrains the United States or its key allies, then we are no longer dealing only with differences between cases.
We are dealing with a hierarchy in the application of the rule. Nicaragua, Iraq and the Golan Heights show three different forms of this problem. Kosovo shows how a Western-backed exception can later become an argument in the hands of another great power.
Crimea shows that a referendum and self-determination do not automatically provide a legal basis for changing a border, while still requiring Western governments to explain their own earlier exceptions.
Western Sahara and Palestine show how flexible the principle of self-determination can become when it collides with the interests of strategic partners and the institutional structure of the Security Council. In the end, the question is not:
do the United States always have some legal explanation?
They almost always do. The question is:
would they accept the same explanation, under comparable circumstances, from a state they oppose?
If not, the rule is no longer fully universal. It becomes a rule whose strictness depends on who violates it.
Sources and further reading
- United Nations — Charter of the United Nations, especially Article 2(4), Article 51 and Chapter VII. Source
- International Court of Justice — Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment on the Merits, 27 June 1986. Source
- United Nations Secretary-General — Kofi Annan remarks/briefing on Iraq and conformity with the UN Charter, 16 September 2004. Source
- Iraq Inquiry / Chilcot Report, 6 July 2016. Source
- UN Security Council Resolution 497 (1981) — Golan Heights. Source
- White House archive — Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State of Israel, 25 March 2019. Source
- UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262 — Territorial integrity of Ukraine, 27 March 2014. Source
- Venice Commission — Opinion CDL-AD(2014)002 concerning the Crimean referendum, 21 March 2014. Source
- International Court of Justice — Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010. Source
- UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2797 (2025) — Western Sahara / MINURSO. Source
- UN Security Council — Palestine full-membership vote, 18 April 2024. Source
- UN General Assembly — A/RES/ES-10/23 / Palestine membership, 10 May 2024. Source