SeriesGoyim: Texts, Law, and Controversies Part 2 / 4

Goyim in the Talmud: What Does It Actually Say?

What does the Talmud actually say about non-Jews? Key passages are examined in context, distinguishing legal debates from modern practice.

AI-generated editorial illustration, not a documentary photograph or historical evidence.

Authentic passages on the rights, prohibitions, penalties, and dignity of non-Jews

Online discussions often present two starkly opposing portrayals of the Talmud. According to the first, it is a handbook that permits Jews to harm everyone else. According to the second, every such accusation is fabricated or taken out of context. Neither portrayal withstands a careful reading of the sources. Rabbinic literature does contain provisions that distinguish between Jews and non-Jews in matters of property, legal sanctions, and religious obligations. At the same time, we find explicit prohibitions against deceiving non-Jews, as well as duties to help non-Jewish people who are ill or living in poverty. Presenting only one side would mislead the reader.

In the first article in this series, we explained the history of the term goj (goy). Here we turn to a more difficult question: What do selected passages of the Mishnah and Babylonian Talmud actually say, who is speaking, which legal question is being addressed, and where do the limits of our conclusions lie? We are not attempting to produce a single, unified “Jewish verdict on non-Jews.” We are examining specific texts.

What Is the Talmud—and Why Is a Single Quotation Not Enough?

Munich Manuscript of the Babylonian Talmud (Cod. hebr. 95), completed in 1342. Bavarian State Library digital collection; link to the original.

The Talmud is not a book written from beginning to end in a single voice. Its foundation consists of the Mishnah, a collection of early rabbinic traditions, and the Gemara, later discussions, interpretations, and objections. The two major Talmudic compilations are the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. On a single page, we may encounter a rule from the Mishnah, the opinion of an individual rabbi, another teacher's objection, a hypothetical example, and a narrative. None of these forms is automatically a final, universally accepted legal ruling.

Words such as prohibited, permitted, liable, and exempt must also be read in their legal context. “Exempt from a particular penalty” does not necessarily mean “the act is morally permitted.” Conversely, an unequivocally stated legal inequality cannot be explained away by claiming that everything is merely metaphorical.

This is particularly important with controversial quotations concerning non-Jews. We must first establish whether the sentence actually appears in the Talmud. We must then determine whether it is a speaker's own assertion, a cited earlier opinion, a question, or a rejected argument. The term goy is not always interchangeable with nokhri, oved avodah zarah (an idolater), or ger toshav (a non-Jew with a distinct legal status). We will therefore examine the texts by legal issue rather than as a random list of shocking quotations.

One further point matters: the authenticity of a passage does not prove that it was applied in the same way in every era. What was written in a late-antique discussion, what later legal codes prescribed, and what individuals or communities do today are three different questions. The last of these belongs mainly in the fourth article in the series. [1]

Photograph of the historic Hebrew title page of tractate Ta’anit from the Vilna Talmud edition.
Title page of tractate Ta’anit in the Vilna edition of the Talmud. Photograph: BRINKS / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. This illustrates a historical edition, not the passages examined in this article. Image: BRINKS / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

Does the Talmud Say That Non-Jews Are Not Human?

Yevamot 61a contains a saying attributed to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai:

אַתֶּם קְרוּיִין אָדָם, וְאֵין הַגּוֹיִם קְרוּיִין אָדָם

“You are called adam, but non-Jews are not called adam.”

The passage is authentic. Its immediate subject, however, is neither biology nor a general discussion of whether members of other peoples are human beings. It concerns ritual impurity arising from a corpse under the same roof or within a tent. The discussion connects Ezekiel 34:31 with the use of the term adam in Numbers 19:14. [2]

The statement draws a pronounced distinction between groups: within this particular legal interpretation, the designation adam is reserved for Israel. We therefore should not dismiss it as an innocuous grammatical footnote. Yet it does not follow that the rabbis were unaware that members of other peoples were human. On the very same page, the Gemara raises objections, citing biblical passages that also use adam for non-Israelites, including accounts concerning the Midianites and Nineveh.

The precise conclusion is therefore narrower than the popular online claim. The passage establishes a distinction in the law of ritual impurity, derived from the interpretation of a particular Hebrew term. By itself, it does not prove a universal assertion that “non-Jews are not human.” The question remains, however, why such a distinction was accepted in the first place and how later teachers interpreted it. That is a legitimate historical and ethical question.

Property and Compensation: The Case of Two Oxen

Among the clearest examples of inequality is Mishnah Bava Kamma 37b, subsequently discussed by the Gemara on 38a. The Mishnah says that when an ox belonging to a Jew injures an ox belonging to a non-Jew, the Jewish owner is exempt from compensation; when a non-Jew's ox injures a Jewish ox, its owner must pay full compensation. The usual distinction between an ox not previously considered dangerous (tam) and one already established as dangerous (mu'ad) does not apply here. [3]

The substance of the rule is stated directly: “Shor shel Yisrael ... shor shel goy—patur” (a Jewish ox that injures a non-Jewish ox—exemption); in the reverse situation, full compensation is required. This is not a general statement about every property dispute, but a specific rule concerning damage caused by an animal.

There is no need to search for a hidden meaning here. The text establishes unequal legal liability. The inequality rests on the owners' group membership, not merely on the amount of damage caused. Attempts to present the passage as providing completely equal protection for everyone's property are inconsistent with its wording.

The ensuing discussion is also important. The Talmud itself considers an objection to this rule and relates a story about Roman officials who, while studying Jewish law, raise precisely the issue of compensation. This shows that the question of fairness did not arise only in modern internet debates. The narrative, however, does not itself tell us how frequently the particular rule was actually enforced, under what political circumstances, or which courts had jurisdiction.

We must therefore separate three propositions: the existence of the unequal provision is confirmed; its general historical enforcement requires further evidence; and the inference that all Jews today consequently hold the same view of non-Jewish property is unjustified. Legal reinterpretations will be addressed separately in GOY-04.

Is Robbing a Non-Jew Permitted—and What Happens to Lost Property?

It would be wrong to select just one Talmudic page here. In its discussion of the obligations of the descendants of Noah, Sanhedrin 57a cites a baraita distinguishing between robbery committed by a non-Jew and robbery committed by a Jew against a non-Jew. For the latter, it uses permissive wording. The discussion even explains why it does not merely say “exempt from punishment” in this case. Later on the same page, withholding a worker's wages is mentioned separately: a permissive formulation appears there for a Jew in relation to a non-Jew. [4]

These are serious statements and, by today's standards, discriminatory ones. It would be dishonest to conceal them or replace their meaning with something milder. At the same time, they are specific statements within a Talmudic debate, not proof that Jewish law in every place and every era permitted robbery.

Bava Kamma 113b, however, explicitly gives a different rule:

גֶּזֶל גּוֹי אָסוּר, אֲבֵידָתוֹ מוּתֶּרֶת

“Robbing a non-Jew is prohibited, but one may keep property that the non-Jew has lost.” The statement is attributed to Rabbi Shimon Hasida through Rav Beivai bar Giddel. [5]

The tension with Sanhedrin 57a is real. This is not merely a distinction between robbery and found property: Sanhedrin 57a also contains statements directly permitting robbery. We therefore cannot, without further interpretation, turn these passages into one perfectly consistent rule.

The statement in Bava Kamma itself distinguishes the active taking of property from finding something that its owner has lost. When someone forcibly or unlawfully takes something from its owner, that is robbery. When someone finds an object, a separate question arises: to whom, under the rules of that time, must it be returned? An important qualification in the same discussion concerns chilul Hashem—desecration of God's name. That qualification does not erase the initial difference in the duty to return lost property.

Accordingly, the claims that “the Talmud never permits any exception concerning non-Jewish property” and that “the Talmud unconditionally allows Jews to steal from non-Jews” both distort the material. Different texts and different legal categories coexist; we must not force them into artificial agreement. Later codifications of the prohibition of theft, along with debates over errors in calculations, will be examined in GOY-04.

Homicide and Criminal Liability: The Danger of Drawing the Wrong Conclusion

Sanhedrin 57a raises an even more difficult question. In the baraita cited there, a non-Jew who kills another non-Jew or a Jew is described as liable under rules involving the death penalty; for a Jew who kills a non-Jew, however, the word “exempt” (patur) is used within the framework of the criminal liability under discussion. [4]

This exemption constitutes a genuine legal asymmetry. But in the same discussion the Gemara rejects the inference that deliberately killing a non-Jew is therefore permitted. It invokes another tradition under which certain people are not to be rescued from a pit, nor may they be deliberately thrown into one.

The Talmudic discussion thus distinguishes between punishment, the prohibition of an act, and the duty to rescue. These are three separate questions that must not be confused. The distinction does not remove the serious difference in criminal liability; it does, however, prevent the mistaken conclusion that an exemption from punishment is, in itself, unlimited permission to kill.

We therefore cannot infer from this passage that “killing a non-Jew is permitted” or that “the Talmud treats a non-Jew as equivalent to an animal.” Both claims go beyond the immediate wording. We can reliably conclude, however, that the criminal-law model under discussion envisaged unequal penalties, raising questions about the legal protection of life.

We must distinguish which act attracts a penalty in the discussion, whether the act itself is prohibited, and who would even have had jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Without these distinctions, even a literally quoted sentence can lead to an incorrect conclusion.

Torah Study and Sabbath Rest: Severe Statements and Internal Objections

In Sanhedrin 59a, Rabbi Yochanan declares:

גּוֹי שֶׁעוֹסֵק בַּתּוֹרָה חַיָּיב מִיתָה

“A non-Jew who studies the Torah is liable to the death penalty.” The same discussion then raises an objection based on a saying of Rabbi Meir that even a non-Jew who occupies himself with Torah study may be compared to a High Priest. The Gemara subsequently limits this positive statement to the study of the seven Noahide commandments. [6]

The phrase chayav mitah must be presented without softening it; nevertheless, whether it could be judicially enforced cannot be inferred from those two words alone. Questions of later codification and punishment belong in GOY-04.

The passage therefore contains neither an unrestricted permission nor an unchallenged prohibition. It brings together the idea of Israel's particular inheritance and an acknowledgment of the spiritual value of non-Jewish study of certain religious and moral commandments.

A related question appears in Sanhedrin 58b. Resh Lakish states that a non-Jew who observes a day of rest incurs liability for death. Ravina adds that the statement applies even to resting on another day of the week, such as Monday. It is therefore incorrect to claim that the original text speaks exclusively about observing the Jewish Sabbath. [7]

The text uses a severe penal formulation, but it does not in itself report an actual execution for taking such a day of rest. The precise scope of religiously prescribed rest and the issue of later sanctions require separate legal interpretation. We will neither soften it into an innocuous prohibition on “imitation” that erases Ravina's extension, nor present it as proof that people today are executed for taking an ordinary day off.

Fraud and Deception: A Prohibition Explicitly Covering Non-Jews

Chullin 94a sets out an explicit principle attributed to Shmuel:

אָסוּר לִגְנוֹב דַּעַת הַבְרִיּוֹת, וַאֲפִילּוּ דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי

“It is forbidden to deceive people, even a non-Jew.” The discussion uses the concept of geneivat da'at, meaning the creation of a false impression in another person's mind. [8]

The Gemara then points out that Shmuel's position was inferred, in one instance, from an account involving a ferryman and considers other possible reasons for Shmuel's dissatisfaction. This reservation about the evidentiary force of the story does not erase the legal principle cited; it shows, however, how carefully rabbinic texts examine inferences drawn from individual events.

The examples are not limited to the direct taking of property. The passage also discusses a seemingly generous invitation when the host knows the guest will not attend, and a gift presented in a way that causes the recipient to overestimate the giver's effort. It thus shows that dishonesty can lie in how facts are presented, not only in the direct taking of money.

This passage matters precisely because the Talmud is often discussed as though it contained no prohibition on deceiving non-Jews. That claim is false. At the same time, Chullin 94a does not eliminate every distinction elsewhere concerning taking advantage of errors, lost property, or compensation. A prohibition on active deception is one legal question; benefiting from a mistake the other person made independently is another. The boundary between them is itself a subject of later legal debate.

Aid, Saving Lives, and Caring for the Sick

Avodah Zarah 26a–b contains rules that are particularly difficult by modern ethical standards. The Mishnah restricts the childbirth assistance a Jewish woman may provide to a non-Jewish woman, on the grounds that this would help bring a future idolater into the world. The discussion then cites a different baraita: assistance in childbirth is permitted for payment, but not without payment. Rav Yosef explains the permission by the risk of hostility (eivah) if assistance is refused; Abaye objects with regard to the Sabbath, arguing that the refusal can be explained by Sabbath restrictions. [9]

The same discussion introduces the rule lo ma'alin ve-lo moridin: certain people need not be rescued from a pit, but neither may they be deliberately pushed into one. The categories mentioned include non-Jews and Jewish shepherds of small livestock, whom the passage treats as presumptive thieves. Rav Yosef considers rescuing someone for payment out of concern about hostility, while Abaye suggests excuses by which assistance might be refused. This is not a universal modern medical guideline, but it is an actual restriction on assistance in the text.

These passages are not fabricated. We cannot explain them away simply by pointing out that they come from ancient times. Historical circumstances may help us understand the reasoning, but they do not automatically make discriminatory distinctions morally acceptable.

On the other hand, Gittin 61a expressly teaches that the non-Jewish poor should be supported alongside the Jewish poor, that non-Jewish patients should be visited, and that deceased non-Jews should be buried—mipnei darkhei shalom, “for the sake of peaceful relations.” These are positive obligations toward non-Jews, not merely the absence of a ban on helping them. [10]

The rule in Gittin 61a is not identical to a fully modern commitment to equal emergency healthcare regardless of religion. Visiting the sick and saving a life in immediate danger are not quite the same legal question. Yet it would be equally wrong to claim that Talmudic literature contains no positive obligation toward non-Jewish patients and people in need.

A genuine tension thus emerges: one text restricts certain forms of assistance, while another prescribes aid for the sake of social peace. Responsible research must show both. How later rabbis interpreted, limited, or revised such rules, and what guidance applies in modern medicine, will be addressed in GOY-04.

Humanity in God's Image: Universality and Particular Election

Kaufmann manuscript of the Mishnah: Sefaria identifies manuscript page ms50-171r for Pirkei Avot 3:14. The link provides access to the manuscript witness.

So far we have encountered several legal distinctions between communities. Yet in Pirkei Avot 3:14, part of the Mishnah, we find an important moral and theological statement:

חָבִיב אָדָם שֶׁנִּבְרָא בְצֶלֶם

“Beloved is the human being, for the human being was created in [God's] image.” The statement is attributed to Rabbi Akiva. The same passage then emphasizes separately that the Israelites are beloved as God's children and that the Torah was given to them. [11]

This sequence matters. The value of the human being in general is stated first; a particular religious understanding of Israel’s status follows. A statement of universal human worth therefore does not require us to ignore group identity. Equally, Israel's particular identity does not in itself mean that other people lack dignity.

Nor should we treat this passage as an all-purpose answer that erases every severe legal provision. Avot 3:14 does not annul the compensation rule in Bava Kamma 37b or the restrictions in Avodah Zarah 26a. It does show, however, that a universal conception of human worth is also part of the early rabbinic tradition. Any conclusion about “what the Talmud says about all non-Jews” that omits these words is therefore incomplete.

What Do These Passages Prove—and What Do They Not Prove?

A review of the texts does not yield one simple answer. It yields a considerably more precise picture.

First, classical rabbinic literature contains authentic legal distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. One clear example is the unequal compensation rule in the Mishnah at Bava Kamma 37b; other discussions address unequal criminal penalties, restrictions on religious learning, and certain forms of assistance. It would be dishonest to conceal such passages or claim that all of them are forgeries.

Second, texts that prohibit dishonesty and prescribe aid to non-Jews are equally authentic. Chullin 94a explicitly prohibits deceiving them, Gittin 61a requires aid to non-Jewish poor people, the sick, and the deceased, and Pirkei Avot 3:14 speaks of the human being as created in God's image. These passages must not be omitted either.

Third, the texts are internally diverse. Sanhedrin 57a and Bava Kamma 113b cannot easily be reduced to one statement about robbery. Likewise, the severe and inclusive statements about Torah study in Sanhedrin 59a require more than a single sentence pulled out of context. The Talmud preserves arguments, objections, and differing legal traditions, not merely a uniform code.

Fourth, a historical text does not automatically tell us how people act today. The presence of a severe rule proves neither that all contemporary Jews accept or apply it, nor does the presence of an inclusive rule prove that discrimination never occurred in history. Claims about contemporary practice require contemporary evidence.

Fifth, ethical judgment remains legitimate. We can understand a historical text in its own setting and still consider it unjust. Rules that protect human life or property differently on the basis of group membership deserve serious critical examination. That criticism, however, must not turn into assigning collective blame to people living today.

Talmudic passages must therefore be examined according to their actual wording, the legal question at issue, and the strength of the evidence. In the next article, GOY-03, we will investigate why genuine, mistranslated, and entirely fabricated quotations are so often mixed together in public polemics. In GOY-04, we will then ask how later legal authorities codified particular provisions and how their present-day applicability can be assessed.

Sources and further reading

  1. Sefaria, Library: source (a guide to the texts, not evidence for any individual rule). Source
  2. Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 61a: source Source
  3. Mishnah and Gemara, Bava Kamma 37b–38a: source ; source Source 1 Source 2
  4. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 57a, especially the discussion of robbery, withholding wages, and the distinction between “exempt” and “permitted”: source Source
  5. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 113a–b: source ; source Source 1 Source 2
  6. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 59a: source Source
  7. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 58b, Resh Lakish and Ravina: source Source
  8. Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 94a: source Source
  9. Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 26a–b, the Mishnah, childbirth assistance, and the discussion of rescue from a pit: source ; source Source 1 Source 2
  10. Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 61a: source Source
  11. Mishnah, Pirkei Avot 3:14: source Source