Can a Historical Claim Override the Rights of Another People?
Can a historical connection to a land override the rights of others living there? We examine self-determination, security, international law and dignity.
Editorial illustration, not a documentary photograph.
Who Owns the Past—and Who May Live in the Present?
Imagine a family that preserves memories of its ancestors living in a particular place many centuries ago. Now imagine another family that has lived in the same place for generations, cultivating the land and knowing its houses, graves and trees. The first family's history is real. The second family's life is just as real. Who has the right to speak of belonging? And can a right to belong ever be understood to mean that someone else must lose their home?
In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, memory and the present are closely intertwined. The Jewish historical and religious connection to the land runs deep. Palestinians have their own long history of places, families, displacement and national claims. Israeli civilians have a legitimate right to live free from attacks, gunfire and abduction. Palestinian civilians have a legitimate right to freedom, homes, security and political self-determination. These acknowledgements do not, by themselves, offer an easy solution to the conflict. They do, however, mean that we cannot accept a logic in which one people's dignity depends on denying another's. [18]
This article does not seek to drown out history with comforting words. It asks a harder question: which historical claims are justified, which methods of pursuing them are permissible, and where is the line that neither a state nor a resistance movement may cross?
Five Different Meanings of the Word “Right”
In discussions about Palestine, we often hear that one side has a “historical right.” Yet the phrase can refer to at least five different things. A historical connection means that people have a past associated with a particular place. A religious promise forms part of a belief that some understand as an enduring covenant. A private property right requires a specific legal and evidentiary basis for a particular piece of land. National self-determination means that a people has the right freely to determine its political status. State sovereignty, meanwhile, is a question of applicable international law, borders and jurisdiction.
It is wrong to infer the third, fourth and fifth automatically from the first or second. A biblical narrative is not a modern land-register extract. Evidence that a people lived in a region two thousand years ago does not, by itself, establish which person today owns a particular house. Equally, a modern political identity does not erase another community's genuine earlier history.
That is precisely why two standards are needed side by side: serious research into the past and careful respect for the rights of people living today. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes equal dignity, protection against discrimination, personal security, protection of the home and the right to property. It is a foundational normative framework, but not every provision of the Declaration is, by itself, a ruling on a specific disputed parcel of land. [18]
An Ancient Connection and a Modern National Tragedy
Jewish memory of Israel, Judea and Jerusalem was not invented by modern politics. It has been preserved through religious texts, rituals, historical communities and the heritage of the diaspora. The long history of persecution of Jews, whose most devastating modern turning point was the Holocaust, gives the question of Jewish security profound human and political weight. To belittle or mock that historical experience would be unacceptable.
Nor does Palestinian family and local history cease to exist because the terms used for national identities have changed over the centuries. It encompasses the lives of different religious communities, the Ottoman and British periods, displacement and continued residence in the region. The research in PL-11 showed why a modern nationality cannot be treated as a genetically pure, timeless category. Jewish and Palestinian historical connections are not a contest over percentages of ancient DNA.
The historical articles PL-01 and PL-02 have reached editorial completion. When published, their approved findings will be linked to precise historical data, property regimes and displacement. Because this C2 package does not include their locked final archives for the purpose of citing particular figures or land parcels, we do not introduce new figures on 1948 or landownership here. Yet the underlying argument does not depend on such a tally: the genuine tragedy of one people is not permission to inflict a new injustice on another. Equally, violence inflicted on Palestinians does not make attacks on Israeli civilians legitimate.
Occupation Does Not Create Title to Territory
Assessing a modern occupation requires a distinction between actual control and legal title. A state may exercise authority over territory during or after a war, but occupation does not, in itself, transfer sovereignty. The law of occupation governs how an occupying power must treat people and property under its control; it does not grant an unlimited power gradually to turn that territory into its permanent possession.
In its advisory opinion of July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful. The Court based its assessment in particular on the prohibition of acquiring territory by force, Israeli practices of annexation and permanent control, and obstruction of Palestinian self-determination. At the same time, it explained that the mere length of an occupation does not automatically make that occupation unlawful: the character and legal justification of the occupying power's conduct matter. The opinion covers Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem; its legal conclusions should not be confused with the status of every particular private parcel or the substance of a different court case. [1]
In its operative conclusions, the Court found by 11 votes to four that Israel's continued presence is unlawful and must be brought to an end as rapidly as possible. By 14 votes to one, it found that Israel is obliged immediately to cease all new settlement activities and evacuate settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory; by the same vote it affirmed an obligation to make reparation for damage caused. By 12 votes to three, it also addressed the obligation of states not to recognize the unlawful situation as legal or help maintain it. This is an advisory opinion, not a criminal judgment against an individual. The fact that an advisory opinion is not a binding judgment in a dispute between two states does not mean that the obligations under international law discussed in it cease to exist independently of that opinion. [1]
A Home, a Plot of Land and a Civilian Are Not Abstract Political Instruments
When a home is demolished, a farm becomes inaccessible or a family is forced to leave, debates about sovereignty become inseparable from people's lives. Yet legal assessment here, too, must not be superficial. For a particular demolition, we need to know who carried it out, under what authority, whether the requisite military necessity existed and what happened to the residents. PL-05 and PL-06 have reached editorial completion at C10 and are the proper places for evidence-based treatment of particular evictions, demolitions, attacks and state responsibility. We do not reproduce the final account of an individual case here without its locked source; every act still requires its own factual and legal assessment.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits forcible transfers and deportations of protected persons from occupied territory, while allowing temporary evacuation under narrowly defined conditions for people's safety or imperative military reasons. The sixth paragraph of that article prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Article 53 generally prohibits the destruction of private and other protected property unless such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. [4]; [6]
The ICRC's 2025 commentary on Article 49 (paragraphs 3233 and 3236) explains that the prohibition in the sixth paragraph does not depend on the direct displacement of the local population. Nor is it decisive for the scope of the prohibition whether the occupying power's civilians moved voluntarily, if the occupying authorities took part in, supported or encouraged their transfer. This explains the prohibition on population transfer; assigning responsibility for a particular project still requires evidence of the conduct of the actors involved. [5]
Article 33 prohibits collective penalties against people for acts they have not personally committed. This matters also because responsibility for individual attackers must not be transferred to an entire population. The same holds for blaming all Israelis for government decisions or all Palestinians for Hamas's actions. [3]
Who Benefits Economically, and What Responsibility Do Others Bear?
Tanks, soldiers and political statements are not the only things that matter to an occupation. Construction, infrastructure, land regimes, trade, financial links and international agreements can help sustain particular structures of control. Yet exceptional care is needed here: a company's revenue is not its profit, participation in a project is not proof of a crime without further facts, and political support is not the same as responsibility for a specific act of violence.
The ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion identifies obligations of other states: they must not recognize the unlawful situation as legal or render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's continued unlawful presence. This is a specific obligation under international law between states, expressed in the operative conclusions (paragraph 285(7)); it is not an automatic ruling on the criminal liability of every company, investor or citizen. State obligations and the responsibility of a particular private actor require separate legal analysis and a factual evidentiary basis. [1]
PL-07 is editorially complete at C10 and distinguishes among business activities, economic incentives, infrastructure connections and different forms of legal responsibility. Modeled economic estimates are not directly measured net profits of individual companies. PL-08, whose Slovenian C3/v1 has been approved by the user, examines in greater detail how third-state obligations are translated into diplomacy, trade, military export licensing and sanctions. Its starting point is simple but demanding: non-recognition of an unlawful situation, non-assistance in maintaining it, and differentiation between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory are not the same as a blanket ban on all relations with Israel. In each case, the act, its legal basis, objective and actual effect must be assessed. [1]
The distinction is visible in specific European measures. The Court of Justice of the European Union's judgment in Psagot (C-363/18, 2019) requires appropriate indication of the origin of foodstuffs from Israeli settlements in occupied territory, but does not itself create a general import embargo. By contrast, Spain enacted a special law in September 2025 prohibiting imports of settlement products, while Ireland began enforcing a statutory import ban in September 2026 on goods from designated settlement postal areas. These are differently defined legal instruments; their implementation and results need to be checked separately. PL-08, V12; PL-08, V15; PL-08, V17
On June 11, 2026, Slovenia repealed the special decision adopted in July 2025 to prohibit the import, export and transit of military weapons, as well as unimplemented policy frameworks for additional measures concerning Israel. The government emphasized diplomatic dialogue and the application of general rules on military trade controls. Repeal of the special decision is therefore not evidence that every export is now permitted without restriction, just as the earlier decision is not proof that every envisaged restriction was actually enforced. The material consequences of these decisions would need to be established from licensing and shipment data. PL-08, V23–V25
PL-08 also documents the United States' multi-year framework for security assistance to Israel and its use of the veto in the UN Security Council. These can shape the political environment, but do not in themselves prove that every US dollar financed settlements or that every diplomatic action is legally equivalent to participation in a particular violation. Equally, the absence of proof of a particular form of indirect responsibility does not negate states' duty to avoid assisting in the maintenance of an unlawful situation. PL-08, V26–V27
The central conclusion of this comparison is not that every state is necessarily complicit. It is that international obligations are verifiable duties of conduct, not merely broad political declarations. If a state declares such obligations important, it is fair to ask what concrete measures it took, how they were implemented and whether they affected the lives of people in occupied territory.
Can a Religious Promise Become Permission to Exclude?
PL-09 examines Jewish interpretations of the Promised Land, PL-10 Christian Zionism, and PL-11 the history and ancestry of the people of the Levant. Their combined message matters: religious and political interpretations differ; Judaism is not one single modern state policy, Christian Zionism does not represent all Christianity, and population genetics is not a land registry.
Some Jewish and Christian religious thinkers see the promise of the land as a powerful religious obligation. Others draw on their own faith to defend the rights of Palestinian residents today and oppose particular state policies. A believer need not deny their faith to recognize that it cannot be used to force everyone else to surrender their basic rights. A religious interpretation may ground personal conviction or communal tradition, but it cannot on its own replace public legal proof in a dispute among people holding different beliefs.
Likewise, no genetic study can establish a hierarchy of civic dignity. If two communities have comparable links to ancient inhabitants of a place, it does not follow that their present-day rights are measured in percentages of ancestry. Science can help us understand migration and continuity; whether a forced eviction is lawful must be decided through law, and whether exclusion is acceptable must also be examined through ethics.
Israelis' Legitimate Security Concerns Are Not Permission to Annex Territory
The security of Israeli civilians is neither a peripheral issue nor a rhetorical pretext that we may dismiss without examination. Attacks on towns, abductions and fear of renewed mass violence create real demands on the state and the international community. Israel has the right and duty to protect its population through means consistent with international law.
Security was precisely what some ICJ judges raised in separate or dissenting opinions. Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu argued, among other things, that the assessment of the illegality of Israel's presence and the call for withdrawal did not sufficiently account for the security guarantees required for lasting peace. Their arguments deserve fair presentation. But they remain a separate judicial position, not the Court's majority operative conclusion. [2]
The Court's majority held that security concerns cannot justify the acquisition of territory by force or permanent interference with the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. In other words, security needs must be addressed; they cannot be invoked as a general license for permanent annexation, exclusion of residents or indefinite maintenance of an unlawful situation. [1]
Hamas, October 7, 2023, and the Limits of Military Response
The October 7, 2023 attack must be described without euphemism. The UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry found reasonable grounds to conclude that members of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups deliberately attacked and killed civilians, took hostages and committed other violations amounting to war crimes. These findings are not equivalent to a final conviction of every individually named person. [19]
Crimes against Israeli civilians do not become justified because an occupation exists. Nor may those crimes be used to justify collective punishment or attacks on Palestinian civilians. In a separate report, the Commission also investigated Israeli military operations and their consequences for civilians in Gaza. [20]
In its October 2025 case concerning humanitarian obligations, the ICJ specifically explained that an occupying power cannot disregard the population's need for basic necessities; where a population is inadequately supplied, it must allow and facilitate impartial humanitarian relief operations. According to the Court, this was particularly relevant to Gaza. The legal duty of provision and protection applies regardless of which side is responsible for a particular military violation. [7]
International humanitarian law distinguishes between civilians and military objectives and prohibits attacks on civilians. It also prohibits attacks in which the expected incidental harm to civilians would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This is not a simple equation that can be solved merely by counting those killed after an operation: a legal assessment must consider the information and options reasonably available before the attack. [15]; [16]
Here it is important to name different kinds of evidence accurately. In September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israeli authorities and security forces were responsible for genocide in Gaza; its report A/81/430 of October 14, 2026 continued the investigation and set out further findings concerning Gaza and the West Bank. These are the Commission's evidentiary and legal assessments under its investigative standard. They are findings of a UN investigative body, not a final ICJ judgment. The Israeli government publicly rejected the genocide finding. [8]; [9]; [21]
The separate case of South Africa v. Israel under the Genocide Convention was still pending before the ICJ: on May 21, 2026, the Court fixed further written deadlines (for South Africa's reply by November 22, 2027, and Israel's further written submission by May 22, 2029). By the editorial reference date, it had not issued a final judgment on the merits. Provisional measures should therefore not be presented as a final finding of responsibility for genocide. [17]
More detailed findings, timelines and casualty figures concerning Gaza belong in PL-04, whose Slovenian C3 text has already been approved by the user, although its full bilingual and visual editorial process is not yet complete. PL-12 does not introduce new casualty figures without a direct link to the original report, its date and its source.
Self-Determination Is Not Meaningless Because the More Powerful Disagree
The UN reaffirmed the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in General Assembly resolution 80/195, adopted on December 15, 2025. The General Assembly is politically and normatively important, but its resolutions must not automatically be equated with enforceable judicial decisions. [22]
The Palestinians' right to self-determination is not a call to deprive Israelis of security and rights. Conversely, legitimate Jewish and Israeli needs for national security do not justify permanently denying Palestinian self-determination. Political solutions may require difficult negotiations; different participants advocate different state-based, confederal or equal-rights models. Yet these models are not equivalent regardless of their substance: they must be judged by whether they secure genuine freedom, civilian protection, non-discrimination, security and enforceable rights.
This does not deny the particularity of different national experiences. It means that caring for one's own community must not become the permanent subjugation of another. If a proposed solution rests on lasting inequality before the law or forcible displacement, it is difficult to call it just and stable, whatever religious or historical rhetoric its proponents employ.
What Is a Judicial Finding—and What Remains a Moral Judgment?
Intellectual honesty requires a clear boundary. We identify a legal finding where specific legal instruments support it, especially the ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion or treaty law. An empirical finding is presented together with its source, method, date and limitations. An author's moral judgment, meanwhile, argues what people ought to do, even though it is not, by itself, a court's ruling.
On July 19, 2024, the ICJ's advisory opinion found Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful and described the obligations of Israel and third states. The Court reached this particular finding by 11 votes to four. In a joint opinion, Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu acknowledged several violations of international law but disagreed with the conclusion that continued presence itself was unlawful and emphasized the question of security guarantees. Their concerns matter to legal debate, but they are not the majority's operative conclusion. [1]; [2]
On October 22, 2025, in a separate advisory proceeding, the ICJ specifically addressed Israel's humanitarian obligations as an occupying power: providing civilians with food, water, medicine and other essential supplies, and enabling relief by the UN and impartial humanitarian organizations. This was a different advisory opinion on a different subject, not a judgment on genocide or individual criminal guilt. [7]
By comparison, the UN Commission's 2025 and 2026 reports are investigative findings; South Africa v. Israel is an inter-state ICJ proceeding with no final judgment on the merits as of the reference date; and proceedings before the International Criminal Court concern individual criminal responsibility. These distinctions are not verbal niceties but prerequisites for a fair conclusion. [8]; [17]
My moral judgment is this: a historical connection to a land, however profound, does not create a right to treat other people as inferior, take away their homes without a proper legal basis or make them live indefinitely without political dignity. Equally, no experience of displacement, humiliation or occupation justifies a terrorist attack on civilians or hostage-taking. This is an ethical conclusion grounded in equal dignity, not an attempt to pass off a moral sentence as the literal text of a legal provision. [18]
What Test of Justice Can We Apply?
Instead of asking who is “more ancient,” it is more useful to apply a simpler but stricter test.
First: who bears the consequences? If a plan displaces people who did not participate in a conflict in the name of one history, it demands particularly serious legal and moral scrutiny. No community is collectively responsible for the actions of another.
Second: do the same rules apply? Would we condemn an attack on civilians in the same way if the nationalities of the victims and perpetrators were reversed? Would we regard losing our own home as unjust if it resulted from a measure another group could impose almost without limit? Consistency is not blind symmetry: authorities and armed groups have different responsibilities and powers. It is, however, a rejection of double moral standards.
Third: is there a path to mutual security and political freedom? A solution that promises one side peace only by denying the other equal dignity forever is unlikely to last. History may be a reason for remembrance, culture and a sense of belonging. It must not become a blueprint for future lawlessness.
Conclusion: Two Histories Do Not Mean One Must Disappear
We can answer the question in the title clearly while remaining attentive to the facts: a historical right or connection does not, in itself, extinguish the rights of another people. Applying that principle in a particular case requires legal evidence, documented facts and respect for the limits of warfare. It does not require denying the ancient Jewish connection to the land, dismissing Palestinian history or minimizing the suffering of Israeli and Palestinian victims.
If we want to speak of justice, we cannot demand that one people forget its past. But we can demand that no people turn their past into a right to take away another people's future.
Sources and further reading
- ICJ — 2024 advisory opinion on Israeli policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory Source
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) — summary of the 19 July 2024 advisory opinion Source
- International Committee of the Red Cross — Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 33: collective penalties Source
- International Committee of the Red Cross — Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49: transfers and deportations Source
- International Committee of the Red Cross — 2025 commentary on Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Source
- International Committee of the Red Cross — Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 53: destruction of property Source
- International Court of Justice — advisory opinion on Israel’s humanitarian obligations (22 October 2025) Source
- UN Commission of Inquiry — report on Gaza (A/HRC/60/CRP.3, 2025) Source
- UN Commission of Inquiry — report published 14 October 2026 Source
- Court of Justice of the European Union — judgment C-363/18 on origin labelling for settlement products Source
- Spanish Official Gazette (BOE) — Royal Decree-Law 10/2025 of 23 September 2025 Source
- Irish Revenue — restrictions concerning trade with the occupied Palestinian territories Source
- Government of Slovenia — decisions of the 2nd regular session, 11 June 2026 Source
- US Department of State — ten-year memorandum of understanding on assistance to Israel (2016) Source
- ICRC — customary international humanitarian law, Rule 1: distinction between civilians and combatants Source
- ICRC — customary international humanitarian law, Rule 14: proportionality Source
- International Court of Justice — South Africa v. Israel proceedings (case 192) Source
- United Nations — Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Source
- UN Commission of Inquiry — report A/HRC/56/26 on events in the occupied Palestinian territory Source
- UN Commission of Inquiry — detailed findings on military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory (June 2024) Source
- UN / UNISPAL — published Israeli response rejecting a Commission of Inquiry report Source
- UN General Assembly — Resolution 80/195 on the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination Source