SeriesWestern Hypocrisy Part 12 / 12

Is Western Hypocrisy Really Western? — Great Powers and Selective Universalism

Are double standards uniquely Western or common among great powers? We compare China, Russia, and the US while distinguishing legal and political contexts.

AI-generated symbolic editorial illustration, not a documentary image.

International law has a peculiar quality: in official speeches it is often universal, while in political practice it comes with a surprising number of special circumstances. Sovereignty is a foundation of the international order—until it obstructs a strategic interest. Judgments and decisions of international institutions deserve respect—until they constrain the very state that demands such respect from others. The prohibition on acquiring territory by force is a matter of principle—until someone declares a security exception for an ally.

In such cases, asking which country has violated a rule is not enough. We must also ask who has the power to determine the political consequences of a violation, which decision makes headlines, and which inconvenient judgment is relegated to a historical footnote.

When a Principle Applies to an Adversary, but an Explanation Suffices for an Ally

The final article in this series also tests its starting premise: is selective universalism really a Western peculiarity? The examples of China and Russia show that power and self-interest are not a Western monopoly. But it does not follow that all countries have acted alike, that every legal dispute is comparable, or that mentioning other powers in any way diminishes Western double standards.

Quite the opposite. If the West invokes universal rules when judging its rivals, what it does when those same rules constrain its own decisions and those of its allies becomes all the more important. This is not a call to judge other powers more leniently. It is a demand for equally rigorous scrutiny of everyone—especially those who place universality at the heart of their own foreign-policy legitimacy.

The Same Rule Does Not Make Every Case Identical

Testing double standards requires more than a list of countries and historical disputes. We first need to establish exactly which rule we are comparing.

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter establishes the sovereign equality of member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the prohibition of the threat or use of force against states' territorial integrity or political independence. These are common starting points, not rights that a stronger state may grant or withdraw at will. [1]

But different legal instruments must not be treated as interchangeable. A judgment of the International Court of Justice in a dispute between states is not the same as one of its advisory opinions; an arbitral award under a convention is not the same as a government's political statement; and a General Assembly resolution does not automatically have the same legal effect as a binding Security Council decision. The position of a state party to a particular convention may also differ from that of a non-party.

A rigorous test must therefore ask five questions. Which rule applied? Who was legally bound by it? What did the competent body actually find? How did the state respond? And, above all, does the state allow others the same legal and political discretion that it claims for itself?

That last question cannot always be resolved by a judgment. Yet the gap between a proclaimed principle and a publicly chosen exception can be documented.

China: The Arbitration Award Beijing Refused to Recognize

In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration concerning certain disputed rights and conduct in the South China Sea. A tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued its award on 12 July 2016. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) acted as registry in the proceedings; it would be inaccurate to say that “the PCA court decided who owns the islands.” [2] [3]

The tribunal did not decide sovereignty over land territory or islands, nor did it delimit a maritime boundary between the states. It examined which maritime entitlements could arise from particular geographical features, how UNCLOS affected asserted historic rights, and whether certain Chinese actions were compatible with the Convention. Among other findings, it concluded that there was no legal basis for claiming historic rights to resources beyond the entitlements provided for by UNCLOS in the manner associated by China with the area inside the dashed line. [2]

China did not participate in the proceedings and rejected both the tribunal's jurisdiction and its result. On 12 July 2016, the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared the award null and void and without binding effect. Beijing invokes, among other things, its 2006 declaration under Article 298 of UNCLOS, which permits exceptions from compulsory procedures for certain categories of disputes, and argues that the dispute in fact concerns territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitation. The tribunal examined its own jurisdiction and considered claims it believed could be resolved without deciding sovereignty over islands or fixing a maritime boundary. China's objection is the documented position of the Chinese government, not a finding made by the tribunal. [2] [4]

A decade later, this was not a forgotten historical episode. In a statement on 12 July 2026, the Chinese ministry again rejected the award as legally invalid while criticizing states that relied upon it. [5]

This is the heart of the problem. When a state accepts the framework of a treaty regime but rejects an unfavorable award issued through a competent procedure, its own professions of respect for international law cannot substitute for legal assessment. Under Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS, a party's failure to appear does not, by itself, prevent arbitration from continuing; the tribunal must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction and that the claim is well founded in fact and law. Under Article 296, a decision of a competent tribunal is final and binding between the parties to the particular dispute. Legal questions of jurisdiction therefore cannot be settled solely by a unilateral declaration from the party rejecting the award. [20] [21]

Here we see the selectivity of a great power. But that finding offers no excuse whatsoever for Western conduct. It simply provides a comparative yardstick against which Western responses to inconvenient international law must also be judged.

The United States: Invoking UNCLOS Without Being a Party

The United States publicly calls on China to respect maritime rules and the arbitral award. In 2020, the US State Department described Chinese claims in the South China Sea as legally unfounded and expressly relied on the 2016 award. [6]

At the same time, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) explicitly acknowledges this: the United States has not acceded to the Convention, although it regards some of its provisions—notably those relating to navigation and overflight—as reflecting customary international law. [7]

This distinction matters legally. China is a party to UNCLOS; the United States is not. We therefore cannot fairly say that both countries are breaching the same treaty obligation, or that failure to join a treaty in itself constitutes unlawful US conduct. Nevertheless, the political contradiction deserves scrutiny: Washington demands compliance with a decision issued under a treaty mechanism it has not itself joined as a party.

The question is not whether the Philippines should be denied its rights because the United States has not ratified the Convention. That would be the wrong conclusion. The question is why Washington so forcefully demands that a rival comply with an award rendered under UNCLOS—a convention to which the United States has not acceded—even though US non-membership does not diminish China's obligations as a party. This is an argument about political consistency, not a judicial finding that the US and Chinese legal positions are identical.

Russia: Territorial Integrity and the Limits of Selective Self-Determination

With Russia, too, political explanations must be distinguished from international documents. On 27 March 2014, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 68/262, reaffirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. It stressed that the referendum held in Crimea on 16 March 2014 could not serve as a basis for changing the peninsula's status and called on states not to recognize such changes. [8]

Following Russian attempts to annex four Ukrainian regions, the General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11/4 on 12 October 2022. It condemned the referendums organized in parts of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the attempts at their unlawful annexation. It called for non-recognition of changes to their status. The vote was 143 in favor, five against and 35 abstentions. [9] [10]

Russia's leadership invoked the will of local inhabitants, historical ties and self-determination in defending changes to borders; Russia's representative advanced this position at the United Nations. [19] That political argument is not equivalent to an international legal determination that a state may change the internationally recognized borders of another state through force or under conditions of military control. Nor is a General Assembly resolution a criminal judgment conclusively establishing the individual guilt of particular persons.

Criticizing this conduct does not require adopting the Western foreign-policy interpretation in its entirety. It is enough to apply the principle of territorial integrity and the prohibition on acquiring territory by force equally to all states. If that principle applies when a rival violates it, it must also apply when a violation involves an ally.

Chechnya: The Limits of the “Internal Matter” Excuse

Chechnya presents a different question from interstate territorial annexation. It concerns a situation within the internationally recognized Russian Federation in which specific actions of state authorities and the rights of civilians were examined. We must not distort the legal comparison by treating an internal armed conflict as legally identical to the annexation of a neighboring state's territory.

On 24 February 2005, the European Court of Human Rights considered the bombing of a convoy of civilians in Chechnya in Isayeva and Others v. Russia. It found a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In a separate judgment delivered the same day, Isayeva v. Russia, the Court examined an attack on the village of Katyr-Yurt; that case must not be confused with the civilian-convoy case. [11] [12]

These were not judgments on Chechnya's sovereignty. They were judicial findings that the state violated specific human rights in its use of force. The label “internal matter” cannot erase the international human-rights obligations a state has accepted.

Here, too, the test for the West is clear: when it demands transparency and accountability from a rival for its conduct toward civilians, it must be prepared to scrutinize its own military and security operations—and those of its allies—by the same standard. Chechnya is no excuse for Western violations; it is another test of the universality of the rules.

Kosovo: What the Court Actually Said

In political debate, Kosovo often appears as a universal answer to almost every question about self-determination. But in its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice answered a narrowly framed question: whether Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence violated the applicable rules of international law. The Court found that the declaration itself did not violate them. It did not thereby establish a general right of every territory to secede, nor did it recognize a right for another state to annex such a territory by force. [13]

The opinion cannot be used as an automatic legal justification for later annexations or as proof that all claims to self-determination are the same. Nor can it be presented as a judgment binding all states as to Kosovo's final status. It is an advisory opinion with a precisely defined scope.

That does not exempt all Western political decisions concerning Kosovo from criticism. It means that criticism must rest on comparable questions—political criteria for recognition, the use of force, the role of international institutions, and the treatment of other claims to self-determination—rather than on a misquotation of the Court.

Nicaragua: When an International Judgment Concerned the United States

The South China Sea Arbitration — Award (12 July 2016)

UN Security Council Resolution 497 (17 December 1981)

US Proclamation 9852 concerning the Golan Heights (25 March 2019)

If this article stopped at China and Russia, it would do precisely what it criticizes: examine rivals in detail while settling for statements of principle in Western cases. Nicaragua is therefore not a footnote to the story, but its decisive Western test.

On 27 June 1986, in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice found that, through its support for armed groups, the mining of Nicaraguan waters and other actions, the United States had breached certain obligations under customary international law, including the prohibition on the use of force, non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. On the facts before it, the Court rejected the US argument based on collective self-defence. It also held that the United States must cease the violations and make reparation for the injury; the judgment did not fix an exact amount. [14] [15]

On 18 January 1985, the United States announced that it would no longer participate in further proceedings in the case. The International Court of Justice nevertheless continued to hear it. In September 1991, Nicaragua informed the Court that it did not wish to pursue the reparation proceedings, and on 26 September 1991 the Court removed the case from its list. This does not mean that the 1986 judgment was set aside or that the Court subsequently issued a final ruling fixing the sum the United States would pay. [16]

The legal comparison with the Chinese arbitration is not exact: the proceedings differed, and their legal bases and jurisdictions do not coincide. Yet the political question is strikingly similar. What does a great power do when an international body finds that it has overstepped the limits of permissible conduct? Does it allow an inconvenient decision to constrain its policy, or does it seek to neutralize its effect through rejection, non-participation or political power?

Here, the Western double standard is grounded in documented conduct and a judicial finding. A Western state that today urges others to respect international decisions also bears historical responsibility for an instance in which it refused to continue participating in proceedings and the Court found it in breach of its obligations. This is not a ruling that Washington and Beijing are exactly alike. It is a demand that Washington not remove its own history from the test of universal rules.

Four International Court of Justice judges sit at a court bench with documents and microphones.
Judges of the International Court of Justice in The Hague during the Nicaragua v. United States proceedings, 26 November 1984. The photograph does not show the delivery of the 1986 judgment. Image: Rob Bogaerts / Anefo / Nationaal Archief (NL) / Wikimedia Commons CC0 1.0

The Golan Heights: When an Ally's Security Becomes a Territorial Exception

The Golan Heights provide an even more direct example concerning the prohibition on acquiring territory by force. On 17 December 1981, in Resolution 497, the UN Security Council declared Israel's decision to extend its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the occupied Syrian Golan Heights null and void and without international legal effect. It expressly demanded that the decision be rescinded. [17]

Nevertheless, on 25 March 2019 US President Donald Trump signed a proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The rationale rested primarily on particular security circumstances and threats to Israel. This is an unequivocally documented official act of the United States. [18]

Here the double-standard question cannot hide behind differences between abstract political systems. In one case the West rightly emphasizes that territory cannot be acquired by force. In another, an influential Western state expressly recognizes an ally's sovereignty over territory which the Security Council, in Resolution 497, described as occupied and whose incorporation into Israel's domestic legal system it declared null and void.

The US security argument must be mentioned because it formed part of the official decision. But it did not overturn Resolution 497 as a matter of international law. If an ally's security reasons are elevated into an exception to a principle proclaimed inviolable when applied to a rival, the result is not a universal order. It is a form of political discretion shaped by the relationship with the state concerned.

The empty UN Security Council chamber with a curved arrangement of blue seats and red seats in the foreground.
The UN Security Council chamber in New York, photographed in 2024. The image shows the institution that adopted Resolution 497 in 1981; it does not depict that meeting. Image: James D. Forrester (Jdforrester) / Wikimedia Commons CC BY 4.0

Legal Precision Does Not Soften the Criticism

One common response to such comparisons is that the cases have different circumstances. They do. The China arbitration is grounded in UNCLOS, the Nicaragua case in rules applied by the International Court of Justice, the Golan resolution is a Security Council act, the Ukraine resolutions are General Assembly acts, Kosovo was addressed in an advisory opinion, and the Chechnya cases are human-rights judgments.

These are not cosmetic distinctions. Omitting them may produce sharper rhetoric but weaker evidence. The differences in legal basis do not erase the question of selectivity; they determine what can actually be compared.

Where a comparison is legally sound, there is no reason to retreat into vague qualifications. In 1986 the ICJ found US violations in Nicaragua. In 1981 the Security Council declared Israel's extension of its laws to the Golan Heights null and void. In 2019 the United States recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. These are not rumors, alleged hidden agendas or subjective impressions about who enjoys favorable media coverage. They are judgments and official documents that can be placed side by side. [14] [17] [18]

The criticism therefore needs no claim that “everyone lies” or that all great powers share the same motives. It has to demonstrate something narrower but more important: where a rule was clear, where an exception was actually applied, and why one state was allowed an exception denied to another.

The Cost of Double Standards Is Not Evenly Distributed

When a state shields its conduct from international scrutiny, diplomats are rarely the only ones who bear the consequences. So do the inhabitants of territories over which authority is exercised; civilians whose protection becomes secondary; smaller states that have a legal right but little influence over its enforcement; and societies whose security is turned into a bargaining chip for stronger powers.

Nicaragua illustrates the gap between a judicially established right and the ability to obtain effective redress. The South China Sea illustrates the limits of legal proceedings when a great power rejects the award. The Golan Heights show how a policy of recognition can create a gap between the Security Council's legal position and the conduct of one of its permanent members. Ukraine illustrates that the international response to attempted border changes also involves resolutions, political recognition or non-recognition, and questions about their practical effect.

These different examples share an institutional tension: rules matter most precisely when enforcing them is unwelcome to the stronger actor. When military, diplomatic and economic power decisively shape the actual consequences of violations, the promise of universality begins to lose credibility.

It is in this sense that the concentration of authority and political influence within the international system also deserves critical scrutiny. Formally equal rules do not guarantee an equal ability to enforce them when procedures, sanctions, recognition and enforcement levers depend on unequally distributed powers and interests. This is an institutional question that can be examined through documents and decisions; it requires no unproven story about a hidden, unified global agenda.

“Others Do It Too” Does Not Answer for Western Responsibility

The last excuse for Western inconsistency is often almost mathematical: if other powers also violate rules, Western violations are supposedly reduced to one ordinary transgression among many. But law and accountability are not a contest to count other people's mistakes.

China's rejection of the arbitral award does not erase the United States' judicial history in Nicaragua. Russia's invocation of self-determination does not change the international legal status of the Golan Heights. Judgments concerning civilians in Chechnya do not alter the legal assessment of US conduct in Central America. No violation elsewhere entitles a Western state to claim a broader exception for itself.

More importantly, if it is the West that so often invokes rules as a measure of others' legitimacy, it bears a particular political burden to demonstrate consistency. This does not mean separate legal norms applying only to the West. It means that the gap between its own universalist language and its own political practice is especially visible and open to public scrutiny.

Across the preceding eleven articles, these discrepancies appeared in sovereignty, international criminal justice, human rights, media judgments about whose lives matter, surveillance, freedom of expression, trade, the cross-border transfer of environmental risks, climate obligations and historical responsibility. The final article does not attempt to replace those findings with a slogan about the corruption of every great power. It tests whether our standard still holds when rivals are included—and whether that gives the West an excuse. It does not.

Conclusion: Universality Even When the Result Is Inconvenient

Selective universalism is not an exclusively Western invention. Great powers can support international institutions when they serve their interests and limit their authority when those institutions draw a line. This can be documented in different countries and across different legal regimes.

But the answer to the title's question is not “everyone is the same.” That conclusion would ignore distinct legal obligations, judicial findings and actual conduct. Worse, it would dilute documented Western double standards into a general suggestion that nothing can change.

The real test of a universal rule is different. It must apply even when a competent body finds a violation by a state that champions the rule; when a decision runs counter to the interests of a powerful ally; and when a smaller state, lacking major military or diplomatic leverage, invokes the same principle.

At the end of this series, then, one clear question remains—one that the West's self-image cannot dismiss simply by pointing to other powers:

If international law is truly universal, why should an ally be granted broader exceptions than an adversary?

So long as the answer is political power rather than the same rule, talk of universal values will sound chiefly like a promise whose terms are set by the most powerful.

Methodological note

Methodological note: Official Chinese and Russian positions are presented as those governments' positions, not as independently established legal findings. ICJ and ECtHR judgments, the Kosovo advisory opinion, the UNCLOS arbitral award, Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and political statements are not legally interchangeable documents. Critical comparisons about political consistency do not themselves establish identical treaty breaches or equal responsibility among states.

Sources and further reading

  1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, especially Article 2 Source
  2. UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal, The South China Sea Arbitration, award of 12 July 2016, official PCA file Source
  3. PCA, official case record of The South China Sea Arbitration Source
  4. Chinese Foreign Ministry, statement on the award of 12 July 2016 Source
  5. Chinese Foreign Ministry, tenth-anniversary statement, 12 July 2026 Source
  6. US State Department, position on maritime claims in the South China Sea, 13 July 2020 Source
  7. Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas, R42784, version of 26 August 2024 (public mirror of a CRS report) Source
  8. UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/262, 27 March 2014 Source
  9. UN General Assembly, A/RES/ES-11/4, 12 October 2022 Source
  10. United Nations, official report on the vote, 12 October 2022 Source
  11. European Court of Human Rights, Isayeva and Others v. Russia, applications 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005 (official case-law summary) Source
  12. European Court of Human Rights, Isayeva v. Russia, application 57950/00, 24 February 2005 Source
  13. International Court of Justice, Kosovo, advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 Source
  14. International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States, judgment of 27 June 1986 Source
  15. International Court of Justice, summary of the judgment of 27 June 1986 Source
  16. International Court of Justice, proceedings in Nicaragua v. United States, including discontinuance of further proceedings Source
  17. UN Security Council, S/RES/497 (1981), 17 December 1981, official UN document catalogue Source
  18. White House, Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State of Israel, 25 March 2019 Source
  19. United Nations, official report on the debate and the Russian Federation representative's position concerning the referendums, 12 October 2022 Source
  20. United Nations, UNCLOS, Article 296 (finality and binding effect) Source
  21. United Nations, UNCLOS, Annex VII, Article 9 (non-appearance of a party) Source